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Introduction: The Belt and Road 
Initiative and the Sustainable 
Development Goals: Opportunities 
and Challenges*
Jing Gu,1 Hannah Corbett2 and Melissa Leach3
Abstract This introductory article explains the rationale behind this issue 
of the IDS Bulletin and identifies the key issues and research questions 
addressed by the contributors. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is the 
source of significant academic and policy debate, in terms of how it is 
defined and how far it can contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030. This article seeks to explore these 
debates in more depth, looking at the opportunities and challenges that are 
associated with aligning the BRI and the SDGs frameworks at local, national, 
and international levels to achieve sustainable development. It highlights 
new evidence, analyses, and insights from across a range of experts from 
China and BRI countries, and points both to the potential for the BRI 
to help achieve sustainable development outcomes and the challenges, 
implications, and impacts for the countries and communities involved.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, sustainable development, SDGs, 
China, developing country, infrastructure, trade and investment, 
international standards, risk and opportunity.
1 Introduction
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), proposed in 2013 by China’s 
president, Xi Jinping, has significant potential to contribute to the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda). Re-enacting and 
extending key aspects of  the ancient Silk Road’s ethos and geography 
for the twenty-first century, the BRI is an enormously ambitious agenda 
which could reach up to 70 per cent of  the world’s population or more 
(Xi 2019; Frankopan 2019). It involves diplomacy; trade and investment 
and financial cooperation; infrastructure and connectivity; regional 
governance; and people-to-people bonds. It draws on both China’s 
domestic development experience and China’s international experience 
in South–South cooperation. It is the prime means through which the 
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country is taking forward its economic and foreign policy aspirations on 
the global stage, and represents an outward-facing stance and agenda, 
at a time when older industrial powers in the US and Europe show at 
least temporary retreat into nationalism. Nevertheless, the BRI is broad, 
open, and evolving, without a single or shared understanding; indeed, 
it has become a label under which initiatives and aims of  many kinds 
are being pursued. This ambiguity is itself  a source of  both opportunity 
and challenge.
Recent high-level statements, including at the latest Belt and Road 
Forum held in Beijing in April 2019, emphasise the incorporation of  
international perspectives and mainstream global agendas such as the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The BRI could, in this view, 
offer opportunities to address global economic social and environmental 
goals through its projects, and contribute to resolving such issues as the 
chronic shortage of  funds, inadequate institutional development, and 
weak partnerships. However, questions remain around how far the BRI, 
and the actors involved in it, from national governments to private sector 
investors, align with achieving sustainable development outcomes – 
especially as this was not the original intention of  the initiative. Moreover, 
despite a growing body of  evidence, more work needs to be done to 
understand the political, economic, financial, environmental, and social 
risks, implications, and impacts for involved countries and communities.
In this context, this issue of  the IDS Bulletin focuses in on the relevance 
of  the BRI for the SDGs and how the two agendas might be better 
aligned locally, nationally, and globally. Amidst often polarised debate, 
it provides vitally needed case study evidence to support a realistic 
analysis of  opportunities and challenges, and to inform the design and 
implementation of  the BRI in ways that support the SDGs in practice.
Despite high-level claims about the BRI’s value to the SDGs, there is 
remarkably little work examining this interrelationship in significant 
depth. This IDS Bulletin explicitly addresses this gap from a range of  
aspects. Case studies from the perspective of  both China and the BRI 
countries, at both country and project level, are used to contribute 
more nuanced assessments to current discussion and debate on China’s 
international development policies and practices. The IDS Bulletin 
combines evidence and analysis from development communities 
(researchers, donors, practitioners) as well as representatives from 
business, investment, and financial communities who are rarely brought 
together for a study such as this. It also draws on the rich discussions 
that took place at ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Supporting 
Sustainable Development through High Quality Infrastructure’,  
11–13 March 2019, Wilton Park, UK supported by the UK 
Department for International Development and IDS, that brought these 
different groups together to discuss the potential and limitations of  the 
BRI to contribute to a more sustainable world. The event highlighted 
four key areas for future action:
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 l A strengthened evidence base on what works in terms of  aligning 
financial and sustainable development outcomes and managing risks;
 l Improved knowledge exchange and mutual learning across sectors, 
actors, and countries on what works;
 l Investment in consultation and capacity building amongst BRI 
countries so they can more effectively manage and prioritise 
investments to align with their own national sustainable development 
goals; and
 l Global cooperation and leadership around creating international 
standards and regulation for infrastructure investment, including 
social and environmental standards.
The diversity of  this experienced and knowledgeable epistemic 
community of  scholars, policymakers, practitioners, and financial 
and private sector representatives reflects the multidimensional and 
interdependent character of  the components of  the BRI itself, and of  
the debate over its aims and objectives, implementation, operational 
practices, and impact. Such diversity also provides for a range of  
viewpoints to be considered in relation to the evidence brought 
forward in the case studies and critical reviews at the core of  this 
IDS Bulletin, and also in regard to the wider international debate over 
the BRI. This is important given the varying understandings, myths, 
and misconceptions across different groups around the BRI’s role and 
effects. The IDS Bulletin brings together country case studies of  the 
BRI and sustainable development in Myanmar, Kenya, Pakistan, and 
Greece. It also explores a range of  cross-cutting topics including: the 
BRI as a Digital Silk Road; environmental and social standards; and the 
BRI as a critical link to delivering the 2030 Agenda.
1.1 The BRI and the SDGs
1.1.1 The BRI, connectivity, and sustainable development
The main intention of  the BRI, as stated in official Chinese discourse, is 
to act as the major catalyst for promoting and facilitating infrastructure 
investment in order to build closer connectivity between the Chinese 
economy and economies across the world. As China’s former Foreign 
Affairs Vice-Minister, He Yafei has explained:
The core idea of  the Belt and Road Initiative is to achieve greater 
connectivity, closer ties, infrastructure links, people-to-people 
links and policy consultation. Through developing new economic 
corridors and cooperation, whether that be through physical 
infrastructure or digital, China is adding new ideas to regional 
governance (Belt and Road Advisory 2018).
The stated reasons for pursuing the BRI focus on realising a number of  
economic opportunities, both for China and partner countries, with the 
logic based on China’s ‘own experience that investment in infrastructure 
promotes economic growth and reduces poverty’ (Miller 2017: 43). 
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This positive relationship between infrastructure and economic 
development is far from unique to China, being echoed in experience 
in Europe, the US, Latin America, and beyond. Nevertheless, China’s 
new infrastructure vision goes far beyond earlier efforts in its scope 
and ambition (Renwick, Gu and Gong 2018). The official conception 
of  the BRI is for a route ‘connecting the vibrant East Asia economic 
circle at one end and the developed European economic circle at the 
other, and encompassing countries with huge potential for economic 
development’ (National Development and Reform Commission 2015: 
III). The Chinese government has explicitly stated that the initiative has 
four principal aims: (1) bringing prosperity to underdeveloped parts of  
China, particularly in the west of  the country; (2) increased connectivity 
and economic development along both routes through the movement of  
goods, services, information, and people and the exchange of  culture; 
(3) greater integration between China and its neighbours; and (4) energy 
security through diversification of  import sources.
To meet these aims, reported estimates suggest that the BRI will 
require funding in the order of  US$4–8tn (Ho 2017). Drawing partly 
on statistics from the People’s Bank of  China, China’s Central Bank, 
China Daily reports that financial institutions in China have already 
committed over US$440bn for BRI infrastructure projects (Jia 2019). 
It notes that Renminbi-denominated overseas investment funds 
amounted to over 320bn yuan (US$47.49bn) and the report argues that 
the Chinese capital market has helped companies raise 500bn yuan 
through equity funding. As an example, it states that BRI countries and 
companies have issued more than 65bn yuan in Panda bonds in the 
Chinese onshore market, according to the central bank (ibid.).
Natalie Blythe, head of  global trade and receivables finance at HSBC, 
reports that 90 per cent of  the funding for the BRI infrastructure 
projects comes from the public sector (HSBC 2018). The key funding 
sources are the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New 
Development Bank; the US$40bn Silk Road Fund; China’s two big 
policy banks – the China Development Bank and the Export–Import 
Bank of  China; and China’s big four non-commercial banks have 
put up tens of  billions of  dollars. However, as Yi Gang, Governor 
of  the People’s Bank of  China has recognised, there is a need, and 
Chinese willingness, to leverage more private funds for infrastructure 
construction under the BRI (ibid.). There are obvious challenges in 
facilitating such private sector investment, notably sector reservations 
over investment in projects in high debt economies and the need to 
enhance debt and risk management.
Responding to this concern, China and its BRI partners have 
elaborated a debt-sustainability analysis framework at the 2019 Belt 
and Road Forum. China’s financial institutions and the other BRI 
economies are encouraged to use this non-mandatory policy tool for 
rating debt risk before making lending decisions. The framework is 
also designed to meet the further private sector concern over financial 
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‘safeguarding’, with the analysis method set by China’s Ministry of  
Finance based on international standards provided by the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In addition to this stated 
intention to engage with the private sector for investment, the Chinese 
government has established a multilateral development financing 
cooperation centre in collaboration with eight multilateral development 
institutions, including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, 
and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, intended to prepare for 
‘high-quality’ projects and promote international standards for BRI 
financing (ibid.).
Within the stated aims, there are a number of  more specific economic 
drivers for the BRI. There is a general consensus that a significant 
potential win for China in the BRI lies in the opportunities it offers 
the country to address its increasingly important issue of  industrial 
overcapacity; that is, a condition experienced whereby certain sectors 
including iron and steel, glass, cement, aluminium, solar panels, and 
power generation equipment, generate more products than the market 
can absorb (Yu 2017; Casarini 2016). This industrial overcapacity may 
prove to be a relatively short-term problem, as the Chinese economy 
transitions from export-oriented growth to a new model grounded in 
domestic consumption and outward investment (Yu 2017; Casarini 
2016). The BRI has the potential to address this by generating 
infrastructure demand to catch up with the supply. In addition, by 
building infrastructure in China and beyond, the BRI can form a key 
component and foundation for the long-term transition (Gu and Carey 
2019). As Yu acknowledges, the BRI will help China ‘to deal with the 
domestic problem of  industrial overcapacity and speed up industrial 
restructuring and technological upgrading at home’ (Yu 2017: 367).
Another economic driver of  the BRI for China is that international 
infrastructure investment presents opportunities for China to utilise 
its large foreign exchange reserves more effectively and gain benefits 
from diversification, rather than focusing on investing in US Treasury 
Bonds. This shifts at least the potential to realise infrastructure gains 
through the BRI. There is a strategic benefit too in this strategy. In 
channelling China’s investment away from the US, it can help lower 
China’s political and economic risk exposure against the background 
of  a ‘trade war’ with the US. According to the Chinese government, by 
the end of  March 2019, it had signed 173 cooperation agreements with 
125 countries and 29 international organisations (Xinhua News 2019). 
The focus is on transport, energy, and communications infrastructure 
but the BRI’s activities are now much broader and embrace aspects 
of  collaboration ranging from agriculture, the environment, taxation, 
security, global health, and humanitarian response to cultural exchanges.
The BRI comprises two main routes: one continental land-based 
and one maritime route named as the Silk Road Economic Belt and 
the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. In addition, there is a newly 
promulgated Arctic Silk Road as part of  China’s new Arctic Policy 
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(Government of  China 2018), whilst projects in Latin America, the 
Caribbean, and across Africa are, at times, packaged within the BRI. 
In practice, however, operational project development is focused 
along corridors. In the continental Belt, there are six major corridors for 
international economic cooperation – the New Eurasian Land Bridge, 
and the China–Mongolia–Russia, China–Central Asia–West Asia, 
China–Indochina Peninsula, China–Pakistan, and Bangladesh–China–
India–Myanmar economic corridors. The officially stated objective is 
that, by 2050, the Belt and Road region comprising these corridors will 
contribute 80 per cent of  global gross domestic product growth, and 
contribute to the movement of  three billion people into middle-class 
status (Hillman 2018).
The capacity for the BRI to act as an important partner in the 
implementation of  the SDGs and the 2030 Agenda has been considered 
widely (Renwick et al. 2018; Shah 2016; UNDP 2017). The potential 
symbiosis of  the BRI and the SDGs was recognised by United 
Nations Secretary-General António Guterres in his address to the 
May 2017 Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing, drawing comparisons 
between China’s (then termed) ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative and the 
SDGs. The Secretary-General argued that both major initiatives are 
rooted in a shared vision for global development: ‘Both strive to create 
opportunities, global public goods and win-win cooperation. And both 
aim to deepen “connectivity” across countries and regions: connectivity 
in infrastructure, trade, finance, policies and, perhaps most important of  
all, among peoples’ (Guterres 2017). This viewpoint has been reiterated 
by other senior figures. UN Under-Secretary-General, Tegegnework 
Gettu, at the 2018 High-Level Policy Forum on Global Governance: The 
‘Belt and Road’ Finance and Investment Forum, held in Guangzhou, 
said: ‘The Belt and Road Initiative, given its massive investments and 
financing flows, can potentially unlock the resources needed to achieve 
the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ (Gettu 2018).
While the successful implementation of  the 2030 Agenda and the 
achievement of  the SDGs is primarily a matter for local and national 
commitments and actions, strengthened international cooperation 
and understanding are important in providing funds and investment; 
supportive regulatory and governance frameworks; and sharing 
knowledge, lessons, and examples of  good practice (Gu and Kitano 
2018). It is also important that actions and investments undertaken 
under the banner of  BRI support do not contradict national and local 
action towards the SDGs. SDG 17 talks of  ‘partnerships for the goals’ 
and it is now clear this must include the mass of  actors involved with 
the BRI. These include international development banks, multilateral 
agencies, national governments, Chinese state-owned enterprises, 
private sector organisations, and professional services.
Almost all of  the major global and regional intergovernmental 
organisations, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) for example, have 
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signed up to work with China on the BRI. UNDP is working with the 
Chinese government, to cooperate with China and BRI partners to 
meet their development aims, promote greater consensus, and identify 
practical projects allied with investment to promote shared economic 
growth with inclusive social and environmental benefits (CCIEE and 
UNDP 2017). The Global Governance Forum brings together Belt 
and Road countries, UN officials, development practitioners, civil 
society organisations, and the private sector to explore a collective 
plan for concrete actions. In addition, the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) and China’s National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC) signed a Memorandum of  
Understanding in January 2016 to facilitate the efficient use of  public–
private partnerships (PPPs) in support of  the initiative (UNECE 2016).
One of  the facets of  the evolution of  some emerging economies 
from primarily ‘recipients’ of  international development assistance to 
becoming simultaneously ‘recipients’ and ‘providers’ has been increased 
attention to how these new providers understand and approach 
development as a basis for their evolving policies and practices. In the 
case of  China, the dominant discourse is that sustainable development 
should be understood as holistic or comprehensive. Such development 
needs to be founded on overall economic growth, and the principal 
engine and facilitator for this growth is infrastructure and technical 
capacity building. Primarily, as President Xi’s own statements underline, 
this approach comes from the preeminent official Chinese reading of  
China’s own historical development and reform experience (Xi 2017), 
its models for poverty reduction and human development based on 
urbanisation and Special Economic Zones, as well as its experience of  
solidarity with (aspects of) the independence movements of  the 1960s 
and 1970s in Africa and Asia. Notably, these overwhelmingly positive 
accounts of  China’s development experience are contested, whether 
in drawing attention to the (rural) poor, the elderly, and children 
left behind by dominant poverty reduction strategies, or to the more 
complex geopolitics underlying China’s socialist governments in the 
independence period.
In dominant Chinese perspectives, sustainable development emphasises 
the need for a holistic, integrated approach to policy and practice 
(Gu 2015; Gu et al. 2016). Broadly, it embraces the idea of  ecological 
civilisation as the final goal of  change within a given society, involving 
a synthesis of  economic, educational, political, agricultural, and other 
societal reforms toward sustainability (Zhu 2016). The term ecological 
civilisation was first coined in the 1980s, but came into widespread 
use in 2007 when it became an explicit goal of  the Communist Party 
following Hu Jintao’s report to the Party Congress. It has gained 
additional weight since Xi Jinping’s report to the 2017 Party Congress 
and inclusion of  Xi Jinping’s thought into the Party Constitution 
(Xi 2017). It has figured prominently in Xi Jinping’s recent speeches, 
with reference both to domestic policies and international cooperation 
(CGTN 2019). The easy compatibility between economic reform 
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and ecological principles implied by the high-level rhetoric around 
ecological modernisation nevertheless overlies intellectual and political 
debate about the concept and its application, with some strands 
associated strongly with organic Marxism (Wang, He and Fan 2014).
Attempts to integrate environmental concerns and ecological principles 
are evident in China’s own domestic processes of  economic reform 
and restructuring, the rebalancing of  its energy sourcing, and climate 
change mitigation. In 2008, an important analysis by the China Council 
for International Cooperation on Environment and Development 
(CCICED) stated that ‘China faces a grave overall environmental 
situation’ in its overall sustainable development (CCICED 2008: 43), the 
Council publishing its final report in 2015 (CCIDEC 2015).
Indeed, the environmental fallout of  China’s rapid growth is all too 
evident in high levels of  air and water pollution, waste, and land 
degradation (Albert and Xu 2016). To overcome this situation, the 
CCICED argued that four major fundamental transformations were 
needed to sustain China’s economic development and establish itself  as 
an environmentally friendly society: (1) growth should be transformed 
from mostly investment and export-driven to more consumption and 
domestic demands-driven; (2) manufacturing should have a reduced 
share of  the industrial structure with greater weight given to services and 
agriculture; (3) the basis for development should be shifted from capital 
and natural resources to human resources and technical progress; and 
(4) the unidirectional linear process of  resources–products–waste should 
be replaced by the feedback cyclic process of  resources–products–waste–
resource recycling. The response to this should centre upon creating a 
national innovation system (CCICED 2008: 12).
1.1.2 China’s approach to sustainable development
A key component of  the proposed system is highly relevant to China’s 
current involvement with global sustainable development and the 
globalised approach to achieving substantial change. This was to establish 
an open innovation system whereby both China and other developed 
nations could collaborate together in joint efforts to promote innovation. 
In this cooperation process, the CCICED envisaged that technological 
innovation forms the source, whilst institutional innovation provides the 
guarantee, social innovation serves as the basis, and the promotion of  
development and application of  energy-saving and environment-friendly 
technologies would then constitute the core (ibid.: 5). Indeed, in recent 
years, China domestically has become a world leader in the innovation 
and application of  low-carbon energy systems involving solar and 
wind power, for instance, through a unique combination of  state and 
private sector action. The extent to which this domestic experience of  
environmental and green innovation is replicated in China’s international 
investment along the BRI is more debatable, as we explore below.
China’s approach to sustainable development has also been shaped by 
two important policy frameworks on development, the first formulated 
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through the Chinese state, the second through the Communist Party 
of  China (CPC). Firstly, the 13th Five-Year Plan, adopted by the 
Fourth Session of  the 12th National People’s Congress in March 2016, 
defined a concept of  innovative, coordinated, green, open, and shared 
development. These central principles underpinning China’s approach 
to implementation coalesce with those of  the 2030 Agenda:
Peaceful Development, Win–Win Cooperation, Integration 
and Coordination, Inclusiveness and Openness, Sovereignty 
and Voluntary Action, as well as ‘Common but Differentiated 
Responsibilities’, should be followed in building a new type of  
international relations featuring win–win cooperation, establishing 
all-round partnership, and achieving economic, social and 
environmental development in a balanced manner (UN 2016: 2).
In 2016, the Chinese government published China’s Position Paper on 
the Implementation of  the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  the People’s Republic of  China 2016). 
This sets out the principles, priorities, and policies and sought to explain 
the progress made in the implementation of  the 2030 Agenda. The paper 
set out a number of  specific elements to be pursued as priority aims:
 l Eradicating poverty and hunger through targeted measures 
to alleviate and eliminate poverty, and enhancing agricultural 
production capacities and food security;
 l Implementing innovation-driven development strategies and 
generating momentum for sustainable, healthy, and stable economic 
growth;
 l Advancing industrialisation to inject impetus to coordinated 
development between urban and rural areas and among the three 
dimensions of  sustainable development;
 l Improving social security and social services to ensure equal access to 
basic public services;
 l Safeguarding equity and social justice to improve people’s wellbeing 
and promoting all-round human development;
 l Protecting the environment and building protective barriers for 
eco-security;
 l Addressing climate change actively and integrating climate change 
response into national development strategies;
 l Promoting efficient utilisation of  resources and sustainable energy; 
and
 l Improving national governance and ensuring economic and social 
development in line with the rule of  law.
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China further emphasises the need for global partnership and collective 
action in implementing the 2030 Agenda, stating that the global 
community needs to provide sound support in five principal ways 
(UN 2016). These include:
 l Strengthening capacity building of  countries so as to improve 
institution building, increase public resources, and generate internal 
growth momentum;
 l Creating an enabling international environment for development, 
building a balanced, win–win, and inclusive multilateral trading 
system and improving global economic governance;
 l Engaging with all stakeholders and working towards a more 
equitable and balanced global partnership for development;
 l Promoting coordination mechanisms and incorporating development 
policy into global macroeconomic policy coordination; and
 l Improving follow-up and review by conducting regular reviews 
of  global implementation progress while a review of  national 
implementation would be done according to respective national 
conditions and the principle of  voluntary action.
The second key policy framework is China’s ‘new development 
philosophy’ initiated and explained by Xi Jinping in his Secretary-
General’s Report to the CPC Congress in October 2017. China’s 
development of  ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new 
era’ under President Xi Jinping has at its core a ‘people-centered 
philosophy of  development’ (Xi 2017: 1, 16); a philosophy reflecting 
and reinforcing the SDGs and 2030 Agenda commitment to leave no 
one behind in the journey to 2030.
1.2 Challenges and risks
These high-level international and Chinese policy statements around 
the BRI, ecological civilisation, sustainable development, and 
development in general all emphasise alignment between the BRI and 
the SDGs. At the same time, the BRI has also generated a wide range 
of  concerns and reservations, which raise questions about the extent of  
such alignment in real politics and practice. Internationally, there has 
been geopolitical backlash as some countries have pushed back against 
Beijing’s growing influence and power, hard and soft (Balding 2018). 
Governments such as India, the US, France, the UK, and Japan have 
held back from joining the BRI. Beyond these macro- and geopolitical 
dynamics, the BRI project has generated a wider range of  concerns 
and reservations related more to challenges over its functionality, 
implementation, and risks. The agenda of  concerns is extensive and 
includes question marks about the financial strength and durability 
of  the BRI, given its now global reach and the need to diversify and 
broaden the sources of  reliable large-scale funding. Issues of  opaque 
tendering and contracting have also been raised, alongside issues of  
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corruption and asymmetrical development gains; for example, in terms 
of  knowledge-sharing, employment opportunities, technical know-how, 
and capacity building. 
Moreover, a range of  specific risks – financial, social, political, and 
environmental – has been highlighted in relation to the impact of  BRI 
projects on recipient countries. In terms of  financial risk, there have 
been documented cases of  pushback by some governments (such as Sri 
Lanka, Malaysia, and also Pakistan), faced by what was presented to be 
BRI-project-related debt. This issue was highlighted at the Wilton Park 
event. For example, Kyrgyzstan currently has 12 loan agreements with 
China, which has committed around US$2.2bn to road and energy 
projects (Santander 2019). The dramatic improvements in infrastructure 
have been coupled with a significant increase in national debt (Hurley, 
Morris and Portelance 2018; Kong et al. 2019; Dollar 2019). Examples 
such as these have fuelled accusations that China is engaging in 
so-called ‘debt trap diplomacy’ through the BRI, lending excessively to 
developing countries, knowing full well that these countries will not have 
the means to repay the loans, and will then be forced to default on the 
loans and hand over key strategic assets to China, or otherwise submit 
their sovereignty to Beijing, as a political strategy (Hurley et al. 2018).
The term ‘debt trap diplomacy’ was first coined around the example 
of  Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, when in 2017 the country turned 
over its operational control to a Chinese-dominated joint venture in 
return for US$1.1bn in investment from China Merchant Port Holdings 
(CMPort). Yet, others have, in turn, critiqued this narrative. Brautigam 
(2019), for instance, discusses the more complex interests around 
Hambantota Port, showing that this was a long-standing national 
project, yet a rather inefficiently managed, loss-making one, in which 
debts were owed to many international investors, not just China. 
Brautigam argues that proceeds from the sale of  a stake to CMPort 
went to the Sri Lankan treasury, which used them to make payments 
on the Chinese loans and other debt service obligations, and to look 
forward to turning the port around into a profit-making operation. 
Brautigam (2019) also suggests that more generally, the political aims 
and risks of  China’s infrastructure investments have been overblown; 
the BRI strategy, at heart, remains economic. It should also be noted 
that the Malaysian government and that of  Pakistan have both 
drawn back from their initial positions on the BRI following intensive 
negotiations with the Chinese government and the loan provider 
agencies (CNA 2019; Dunya News 2019).
Environmental risks, and evidence of  environmental damage and 
negative ecological impacts from BRI projects, are also emerging 
(Teo et al. 2019). These were also underscored at the Wilton Park event. 
There is evidence of  contradictions between China’s environmental 
policies at home and in BRI countries, where, for instance, investment 
in coal-fired power plants continues across Central Asia (Tan 2018; 
Shearer et al. 2018), albeit in a region where renewable energy was 
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described by the 2015 UNECE Renewable Energy Status Report as 
‘still facing challenges’ (UNECE 2015).
There is a growing body of  evidence emerging from African countries, 
such as Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of  Congo (DRC), and 
Uganda, that highlights the environmental and social risks experienced 
by local communities as a result of  investment projects. For instance, 
projects such as the Kribi Port Project in Cameroon have resulted in 
loss of  habitats and forests, and the social risks to communities include 
loss of  livelihoods and homes through land acquisition which has not 
been properly compensated (Schenkel 2018). Although tenure data 
are improving, the problem of  land acquisition and compensation 
continues to pose a challenge, compounded by the issue of  poor 
legal documentation. Direct Chinese investments in natural resource 
extraction and management, such as in forests, might therefore bring 
damage to community rights and livelihoods (Zhen 2016).
However, there is also some evidence of  positive environmental and 
livelihood benefits from Chinese projects. The International Institute 
for Environment and Development (IIED) Forest Governance project 
(Mayers 2018) has shown that experiences are highly varied, and much 
depends on the local context and specifics of  the scheme, and the extent 
to which good community consultation and transparent approaches 
to project governance and benefit-sharing are built in. Similarly, the 
assumption that Chinese projects involving agriculture, land, and water 
invariably lead to grabs and dispossession has been carefully critiqued 
(Brautigam 2015). In this latest episode of  China in Africa, there has been 
great variation on the ground, with both positive and negative experiences 
shaped by embedded social, economic, political, and historical factors.
In the context of  all these forms of  risk, at an international level, 
for some European governments such as France, Germany, and the 
UK, there is an issue of  safeguarding, that is, the degree to which BRI 
processes are aligned with established international standards and 
norms. In her address to the Second Belt and Road Forum held in 
Beijing in April 2019, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde 
argued that, what she termed ‘BRI 2.0’ could,
benefit from increased transparency, open procurement with 
competitive bidding, and better risk assessment in project selection. 
The launch of  the green investment principle at this conference 
is a further important step forward for the BRI – and a step 
forward for green, low-carbon and climate-resilient investment. 
Debt sustainability and green sustainability will strengthen BRI 
sustainability (Lagarde 2019).
1.3 Case studies
The contributions to this IDS Bulletin provide a rich diversity of  further 
contributions to this important and ongoing debate. They supply 
much-needed detail of  what is happening in practice on the ground, 
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adding to existing evidence and further illuminating the issues being 
debated internationally about the relationship of  the BRI to the SDGs. 
Though wide-ranging in their coverage, these studies are aligned 
around the central theme of  this IDS Bulletin, namely, the opportunities 
and challenges involved in drawing these two global development 
initiatives together in a constructive, effective, practical relationship that 
can help to deliver, substantively, the SDGs by 2030. Taking this central 
theme, the respective studies focus on the question of  how far the BRI 
is actually realising the potential to strengthen SDG delivery in practice. 
Specifically, the studies address the question as to what opportunities 
the BRI is offering to achieving the SDGs, and in what ways are 
opportunities counter-balanced by challenges and risks that limit the 
fulfilment of  such opportunities.
As we have indicated above, at the core of  the BRI is connectivity, 
building strong transport, communications, and energy connections 
between countries through policy cooperation, infrastructural 
investment, project implementation, and operational management to 
promote inclusive, equitable, and mutual economic growth through 
collaborative sustainable development. The contributing studies in this 
issue focus, thematically, on just what this overarching ambition means 
in practice. In the first of  the studies, Gong Sen and Li Bingqin (this 
IDS Bulletin) move beyond the attention and investment concentration 
on energy and transport infrastructure to explain the opportunities 
presented by promoting greater information and communications 
technology (ICT) infrastructure investment and the BRI as a Digital Silk 
Road. Whilst evidence indicates that some of  China’s own cities have 
had some economic gains by grasping digital connectivity and engaging 
robustly with the emerging digital economy, the transferability of  the 
Chinese experience to other BRI economies to promote sustainable 
development has been unclear.
Utilising a wide range of  sources for the first time, the authors show 
that a multiplicity of  digital investments is underway. Yet, potential 
benefits to SDG agendas are limited by their predominantly business, 
rather than poverty or environment focus; the lack of  coherence 
between Chinese investments and national plans, and the fact that 
most are imposed top-down, missing (digital) opportunities for local 
consultation, and the enhancement of  voice; and raising concerns about 
the imposition of  surveillance. Thus, they conclude that the benefits of  
ICT investment in the BRI should not be overestimated, and themselves 
carry risks. The authors argue that, crucially, enhancing activities in the 
virtual world need to be matched with those in the real world to deliver 
sustainable outcomes.
In the second study, by Jiang Xiheng (this IDS Bulletin), analysis 
centres on the growing debate over BRI infrastructure investments 
and their relationship to international standards. In this study, the 
author looks at the critical question of  whether the BRI will contribute 
to environmental aspects of  the SDGs, asking whether Chinese 
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infrastructure investors will follow high environmental and social 
standards for greening BRI. They argue that it is critical to understand 
whether ‘greening the BRI’ will be translated into action, especially 
by Chinese investors. Analysing the environmental, social, and fiscal 
impacts and risks brought by large-scale infrastructure projects, the 
authors detail the pressures and incentives Chinese investors face, as 
well as their capacity to green BRI projects. Their analysis illustrates 
the way these pressures play out in practice and the impact and 
implications for standards. They argue that, while the frameworks are 
in place, significant gaps remain in operationalising these. Regarding 
management and communication capacities (more than technical 
capacities), the challenge is to implement standards in the fragile social 
and ecological settings of  many BRI countries. Thus, risks to local 
environments and communities still prevail, despite good intentions.
Against the background and context provided by the present 
introduction and the two initial chapters, the following four articles 
provide country-focused studies. Zhou Taidong (this IDS Bulletin) 
examines the extent to which the BRI and Myanmar’s national 
sustainable development plan and the SDGs are aligned. Zhou argues 
that, in principle at least, these are in alignment and the BRI presents 
an important opportunity to help Myanmar realise its development 
ambitions and achieve the SDGs. But in order to fully realise this 
opportunity, both countries still face huge challenges in security, social, 
environmental, and financial dimensions. Infrastructure and economic 
investments struggle amidst, and are sometimes fuelling, political 
conflict, community distrust, dispossession of  land and resources, and 
ecological problems, in Myanmar’s fragile setting. It is concomitant 
upon both governments to make strong efforts, including in consultation 
and community engagement, to ensure that the challenges are overcome 
and opportunities realised in practice.
In their article, Jing Gu and Shen Qiu (this IDS Bulletin) examine the BRI 
and Africa’s sustainable development through a study of  Kenya. They 
argue that many African countries are already realising the opportunities 
of  the BRI and gaining practical results, particularly through 
infrastructural investment. However, their study also highlights continuing 
reservations in African countries about the challenges associated with 
the BRI. The authors illustrate the balance between opportunities and 
challenges in Kenya, illustrating Kenya’s developmental needs, the BRI, 
and China’s ability to meet these needs, the challenges of  continued 
financing, debt management, project implementation and completion 
and, from China’s own perspective, considerations of  risk exposure, 
project monitoring, and outcomes assessment. 
The study of  Sino-Greek economic cooperation through the case of  
COSCO’s investment in the Port of  Piraeus by Liu Qianqian and 
Polyxeni Davarinou (this IDS Bulletin) argues that the port investment 
is mutually beneficial, grounded in opportunities for stimulating 
infrastructure investment, enhances the competitiveness of  the port, 
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and boosts the local economy and job creation. However, the authors’ 
assessment of  this high-profile major project also identifies difficulties; 
in this particular case, concerns of  some European countries to 
hold onto a common EU position on the BRI, and inflexibility in 
corporate overseas companies. The Port of  Piraeus has a broader role 
in enhancing Sino-Greek economic cooperation (and by extension, 
Sino-European cooperation), but for this to unfold effectively, it will be 
necessary for Chinese and European actors to reconcile interests and 
goals with internal and international politics.
The next article, by Mustafa Hyder Sayed (this IDS Bulletin), takes us 
to South Asia as it explores the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC). The study explains the background and development of  the 
CPEC, identifying the factors that offer opportunities to Pakistan, 
China, and other regional BRI partner economies. The study notes 
key projects such as non-renewable and renewable power generation 
projects, strategic motorway construction, as well as the high-profile 
Gwadar Port, Gwadar Free Trade Zone, and Gwadar International 
Airport projects. However, Sayed argues that there are substantial 
challenges, including an important lack of  a communication strategy 
and a need to engage non-governmental stakeholders.
The final article by Namsuk Kim (this IDS Bulletin) broadens the 
perspective once again to consider the relationship between the BRI 
and the SDGs as the crucial bridge to leave no least developed country 
behind. The article critically reviews the financing and cooperation needs 
for least developed countries as they work towards the SDGs, identifying 
a serious financing gap. It suggests that the BRI could contribute to 
this, but only if  some critical enabling conditions are met – including 
aligning the BRI and the SDGs.
2 Conclusion
Collectively, these studies contribute a more diversified analysis and 
understanding of  China’s international development policies and 
practices, especially concerning the BRI and the SDGs. The evidence 
assembled through these reviews and detailed case studies offers insights 
into interlinkages between the BRI and the SDGs. A number of  cross-
cutting lessons emerge, including the diversity of  these interlinkages. 
Both BRI and SDG investments and practices are immensely varied, 
and whether or not alignments or contradictions emerge depends very 
much on the set of  issues in question. Context also matters; the social, 
economic, and political settings of  the countries and places where BRI 
investments are taking place shape their impacts and outcomes, and 
their effects in relation to the SDGs. How BRI investment benefits are 
distributed between different social groups also has a profound impact on 
whether they contribute to the SDGs around poverty, inequality, gender 
equality, and the cross-cutting principle of  leave no one behind. China has 
a long historical presence in most of  the countries now part of  the BRI, 
and the implications of  this latest, largest episode in China’s presence 
cannot be understood outside these embedded historical experiences.
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The examples in this IDS Bulletin expand the context-specific evidence 
base but they are only a few. Another lesson concerns the gap between 
rhetoric and practice around the BRI and the SDGs. Much is claimed, 
and at the level of  official discourse – whether of  national governments, 
Chinese companies, or supportive international agencies – the right 
vision, commitments, frameworks, standards, and technical expertise 
are now in place to ensure that BRI investments align with national 
sustainable development priorities, and avoid risks. Yet evidence on the 
ground, whatever the country or issue, reveals a more complex and 
mixed picture, in which implementation, practice, and capacity struggle 
to meet these claims. Meanwhile, the image of  the BRI providing neat 
technical and financial solutions to countries’ development problems 
is often contradicted by more complex entanglements with social and 
political issues and interests.
Looking ahead, more evidence of  the synergies and tensions between 
the BRI and the SDGs is clearly needed. A bank of  case studies which 
captures these relationships, and that highlight best practice and 
examples of  maximising the synergies and reducing the tensions in 
different contexts, needs to be developed and made globally available 
and accessible.
We also need a strengthened evidence base around what works in 
terms of  aligning financial and sustainable development outcomes, 
understanding and managing risk, implementing and applying 
standards, and building the capacity of  national governments, local 
communities, and private contractors to work together successfully to 
manage projects.
There also needs to be investment in consultation and capacity 
building. Donors, including development and multilateral agencies and 
development banks, should consider how they could invest in building 
the necessary capacities within BRI countries to more effectively 
manage and prioritise investment, in alignment with their own national 
sustainable development goals. They should also identify ways in which 
they can facilitate and support consultation and engagement between 
BRI national governments, civil society, local communities, and project 
investors, so that those directly affected have a greater say.
Thus, the potential exists to align the ambitions of  the BRI around 
policy coordination, connectivity, trade, financial integration, and 
cultural exchange with the SDG framework and its focus on people, 
the planet, and power. Given the scope and scale of  the BRI, it has 
the potential to contribute to global public goods. However, partners 
across national governments in developed and developing countries, 
investors and private sector organisations, multilateral agencies, and 
regional banks need to work together to conceptualise how this might 
be achieved, as in essence this was not the original intention or ambition 
of  the BRI. There is sometimes a mismatch between the BRI recipient 
countries and Chinese companies around how far investments and 
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their outcomes can or should be aligned with the SDGs. National 
governments in countries have a role to play in articulating their own 
development strategies in relation to BRI investments.
Finally, to discuss these issues properly requires also that we embrace the 
reality of  the power relations at stake in BRI investments, and discussion 
about them – both material power and resources, and the power to 
narrate what is going on through political statements and the media. We 
need to attend more closely to whose voices are being heard and whose 
are excluded – and to how this might need to change. Analysing power 
and politics, and supporting developmental alternatives to be surfaced 
and articulated, is a key task ahead in this dynamic context.
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The Digital Silk Road and the 
Sustainable Development Goals*
Gong Sen1 and Li Bingqin2
Abstract The information and communications technology (ICT) sector has 
attracted growing interest among stakeholders in countries involved in the 
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Chinese investors. A Digital Silk Road 
initiative within the BRI is growing, as countries are encouraged to work 
together on production and trade enabled by digital technologies. Digital 
connectivity and the emerging digital economy can have positive impacts on 
development, as has been demonstrated in some Chinese cities. However, 
it is difficult to tell whether the Chinese experience will be transferable. 
This article reviews what China has done in relation to the Digital Silk Road 
and the possible contributions made towards delivering the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) in investee countries. We conclude that while 
ICT investment has the transformative power to benefit the world’s 
poorest, its benefits should not be overestimated. Enhancing activities 
in the virtual world need to be matched with those in the real world to 
deliver sustainable outcomes.
Keywords: Digital Silk Road, Sustainable Development Goals, ICT 
infrastructure, digital, technology, Belt and Road Initiative, barriers to 
development, China, multilateral relations, digital information.
1 Introduction
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was proposed to develop economic 
cooperation between countries along the Silk Road. As the countries 
involved are often poor countries which are not very active in industrial 
production and international trade, building economic infrastructure, 
such as Special Economic Zones and transportation infrastructure, has 
become essential for enhancing economic connectivity and facilitating 
trade. Between 2013 and 2018, the largest proportion of  investment 
was in physical infrastructure such as ports and railway lines. The total 
investment by China in BRI countries has reached US$90bn, with an 
average growth of  5.2 per cent annually, while BRI countries in kind 
have invested over US$40bn in China (Renwick forthcoming, 2019).
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The content of  the BRI is evolving. As information and 
communications technology (ICT) allows the digital economy to 
thrive in the digital age, China has started to harvest the benefits of  
the fast-growing and innovative digital economy domestically. The 
ground-breaking force lies in the ability of  the digital economy to 
empower disadvantaged regions and the population, in a way which 
would have been impossible in the past. Digital trading platforms or 
social networks such as Taobao, JD.com, and WeChat have transformed 
the way enterprises operate and have brought new opportunities and 
innovations. This has had a notable positive impact on some of  the 
most impoverished communities, which had previously been trapped in 
poverty through geographic isolation (Li et al. 2018), and the disabled 
(Goggin et al. 2019; Zhong 2018).
The digital economy and the businesses that operate within it have 
become a powerful driving force behind China’s rural poverty reduction 
(He 2019). At the 2015 Hangzhou G20 Summit, following a speech 
by China’s president, Xi Jinping, the G20 members agreed that the 
digital economy could have great potential in delivering development 
outcomes. The aspiration was that there could be synergies among 
the BRI countries, particularly between the digitalisation of  the Silk 
Road and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Cyberspace 
Administration of  China 2016). During the 2016 World Internet Summit, 
nine countries put in motion an initiative to develop cooperation in the 
field of  the digital economy amongst countries along the Digital Silk 
Road. In May 2017, Xi Jinping spoke at the opening ceremony of  the 
Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum:
We will continue to drive innovation, strengthen cooperation in 
cutting-edge areas such as the digital economy, artificial intelligence, 
nanotechnology, and quantum computing, and promote the 
construction of  big data, cloud computing, and smart cities to 
connect to the 21st century Digital Silk Road (Xinhua News 2017).
To this day, ICT-enabled economic cooperation and the application of  
other new technologies in the BRI countries has been called the Digital 
Silk Road.
The BRI has now been integrated into the United Nations (UN) 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda) to achieve 
the SDGs (Renwick, Gu and Gong 2018). Further to this, UN agencies 
have urged China to bring the BRI in line with the 2030 Agenda. As the 
Secretary-General António Guterres stated at the opening of  the Belt and 
Road Forum for International Cooperation:
While the Belt and Road Initiative and the 2030 Agenda are different 
in their nature and scope, both have sustainable development 
as the overarching objective. Both strive to create opportunities, 
global public goods and win-win cooperation. Both aim to 
deepen ‘connectivity’ across countries and regions: connectivity in 
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infrastructure, trade, finance, policies and, perhaps most important 
of  all, among peoples (Guterres 2017).
The World Bank also engages actively with the BRI through 
(1) convening, (2) analytical and advisory services, (3) project origination 
and preparation, (4) project financing, and (5) implementation 
support (World Bank 2018). As argued by some Chinese authors 
(see, for example, Cao 2016; Jin 2018), alignment between these two 
development agendas could serve as an external push, for Chinese 
enterprises that wish to operate internationally, to adopt better social 
standards and at the same time to contribute to the SDGs. Xue and 
Weng (2018) also showed how incorporating individual BRI projects 
into a host country’s framework for SDG implementation could benefit 
the implementation of  BRI projects within host countries.
In principle, as a new component of  the BRI, the Digital Silk Road 
should also work in line with the 2030 Agenda. However, little research 
has been done to examine whether the Digital Silk Road is able to 
contribute to the 2030 Agenda and what the advantages and limitations 
of  e-commerce are as an instrument for delivering the SDGs. This 
article is an attempt to fill in this identified gap in the literature. There 
are multiple types of  technologies included in the Digital Silk Road 
initiatives. This article focuses on digital technology.
2 Barriers to sustainable development and digital solutions
2.1 Barriers to sustainable development
An important strand of  the development studies literature focuses 
upon the barriers to development. As this is the era of  sustainable 
development, it is also important to identify the barriers towards 
achieving the SDGs. As countries are in the middle of  implementing 
the SDGs, barriers to their achievement may yet be exposed. The focus 
of  recent literature on the barriers to realising the SDGs tends to be on 
various environmental factors. However, from the perspective of  policy 
and implementation, the accumulated research outputs on the barriers 
to economic and human development and the most recent findings on 
environmental sustainability should all be taken into account to develop 
a balanced and comprehensive picture.
Earlier researchers identified multiple interlinked development traps: 
conflict; reliance on natural resources; being landlocked with bad 
neighbours; and bad governance (Collier 2007). Over time, the concept 
of  human development replaced the focus on overall economic growth, 
with the former arguing for focusing on how people fare as the economy 
grows. For a human being to thrive and be part of  society, they need 
multiple capitals (physical, financial, social, political, human) and 
infrastructure to support them to develop the capability to achieve 
what they want to achieve (Sen 2004). The most significant barriers 
to universal human development, as pointed out by Bonini (2017) 
are income, and social and political inequalities. He argues that the 
solutions are not limited to technology and funding.
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The SDGs are a combination of  goals for human development and 
environmental sustainability. Under this newer framework, development 
is expected to be people-centred and planet-sensitive. The barriers to 
implementing the SDGs include multiple sources: (1) economic and 
financial barriers (Adhikari 2018); (2) barriers to innovations (Filho et al. 
2017); (3) social barriers (population growth, paired with unsustainable 
consumption and production patterns among the wealthy); (4) political 
barriers (including political will and governing capacities) (Urmee and 
Md 2016); (5) poor monitoring and evaluation systems (Olsen et al. 
2014); (6) institutional barriers (Shiel, Smith and Cantarello 2018); and 
(7) trade barriers (de Melo and Solleder 2018).
The authors agree that technology cannot be the only solution to 
achieving sustainable development. However, as the world economy has 
entered the digital age and digital technology has been transforming 
people’s lives as well as redefining market boundaries and changing 
the ways businesses and people work so profoundly, it is important to 
examine what digital technology can achieve and what barriers exist 
that may prevent it from reaching its potential.
2.2 Digital solutions and the barriers to development
There is a growing body of  literature on the potential of  digital 
technologies (ICTs). ICT investment may have the potential to 
contribute to all perspectives of  development and help to remove any 
barriers, one way or another.
1 ICT as a form of  information infrastructure has offered connectivity 
like other physical infrastructure insomuch as it can link landlocked 
countries or poverty-ridden regions to the outside world (Ng and Tan 
2018; Alexopoulos 2018).
2 Economic and political activity based on the ICT infrastructures 
have boosted trade and financial resources across borders (Mbise 
et al. 2018 on financial aid for trade) and have the potential to 
channel agency for the population whose voices may be less heard or 
whose needs are considered to be less of  a priority than those of  the 
established institutions (Maurer, Nelms and Rea 2018). Not having 
access to digital technology thus has the potential to directly affect 
the opportunities of  some of  the most impoverished populations in 
the world (Yu et al. 2018).
3 Digital platforms and business transactions may also generate social 
network effects (Murendo et al. 2018) and facilitate risk-sharing (Riley 
2018), and thus generate unexpected social capital (Ahmed 2018).
4 Access to digital technology may help to improve access to social 
services such as education and health care (Hong et al. 2017; Thapa 
and Sein 2018).
5 Enhancing ICT may also serve to improve environmental 
sustainability by monitoring environmental threats and through 
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the assessment of  environmental protection programmes (Asongu, 
Le Roux and Biekpe 2018; Mcdonald et al. 2002).
In this sense, digital infrastructure and the economic and social ecology 
based on this infrastructure would have the potential to overcome 
some of  the barriers that had turned out to be challenging to get 
around or even considered to be developmental traps. However, like all 
technologies, digital technology can be a double-edged sword. There 
is a growing concern over how digital technology has been used to 
misinform rather than to inform (Mills 2016; Ciampaglia 2017), and to 
isolate rather than bridge understanding between people with differing 
opinions (Agarwal, Animesh and Prasad 2009). Despite the capability 
of  digital technology to empower the less powerful, it can also empower 
those in power disproportionately, and enlarge rather than narrow 
the gaps between the developed and less developed world (Ahlfeldt, 
Koutroumpis and Valletti 2014; Fang et al. 2018).
3 What may the Digital Silk Road offer to the delivery of the SDGs?
It is well established that access to physical infrastructure may help to 
initiate trade and open doors for people from the most impoverished 
regions to the outside world, even if  it cannot solve all the problems 
associated with poverty. As part of  the BRI, the Digital Silk Road is an 
add-on to the conventional physical infrastructure. By linking countries 
with fibre-optic cables, mobile structures, and e-commerce links, and 
introducing common technical standards in participating nations, the 
Digital Silk Road can function to complement or supplement physical 
infrastructure. As discussed earlier, digital networks may help businesses 
in poor countries to be better prepared; for example, gathering 
information about global events, especially in relation to target markets 
and creating efficient business links, and also through calls for charity 
donations. However, some countries involved in the BRI do not even have 
the basic ICT infrastructure to allow them to tap into the world market 
(James 2009) and ICT access can be disproportionate, with cities and the 
more affluent population having better access (Onitsuka et al. 2018).
Despite theoretical claims, there is little practical evidence that can give 
Chinese policymakers the needed support for the Digital Silk Road. 
This is due to the newness and rapid evolution of  the Digital Silk Road 
initiative, along with the Chinese government’s different approach to 
governance, i.e. domestic policy inspiration is often drawn from the 
international experiences of  the elites (Houlihan, Tan and Green 2010) 
and introduced top down; sometimes it is first experimented with using 
pilots at the local level (Ngar-Yin Mah and Hills 2014).
Yet, what has given the Chinese government the confidence to go 
about promoting digital infrastructure abroad is its own domestic 
experience with recent inland regional development; for example, in the 
Chongqing–Sichuan–Guizhou and Ningxia–Qinghai–Gansu regions, 
which were some of  the poorest provinces in China. These provinces 
found it hard to compete with coastal cities such as Shanghai and 
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Guangzhou. They were geographically isolated, and investors found it 
hard to move their businesses to these regions. Despite these barriers, 
they represented abundant labour resources and much cheaper labour 
costs than the coastal regions. Still, it was not economical for exporters 
to operate in these cities because of  the difficulties and cost to export the 
goods produced. As the coastal regions thrived with sustained growth, 
for years these southwest regions remained suppliers of  cheap migrant 
labourers to the more prosperous regions.
Overall, it took them several steps to move out of  the poverty trap:
1 At the turn of  the century, with the help of  the Developing the 
Western Regions initiative, these regions invested heavily in 
improving infrastructure. Thanks to a more convenient connection 
to the main railway network, road and aviation networks, and new 
economic development zones, as well as the early adoption of  some 
of  the best internet networks in China, these regions managed to 
attract investors from coastal regions and became the fastest growing 
regions in terms of  gross domestic product (GDP) growth in China in 
the early 2010s (Katz and Jones 2015). The gap in GDP per capita at 
provincial level during 2009 and 2016 between the western provinces 
and the richest provinces had been narrowed, reversing a 30-year 
widening trend (Li 2017).
2 Since 2007, with the support of  some of  the most advanced digital 
infrastructure in China, these inland cities have been able to compete 
with the richest regions in China on high-tech and high-end financial 
services in a way that they would not have dreamt of  in the past 
(Liu and Hu 2010; McNally 2004). Guizhou, which hosts some of  
the poorest counties in China, started to sell premium farm produce 
or horticultural products through e-commerce to the wealthiest cities 
in the country. The much cheaper and accessible internet financial 
services allowed smaller businesses to gain competitiveness in the 
market (Turvey and Xiong 2017). More recently, connectivity within 
these provinces has also given them the power to take advantage 
of  their own large markets and let their customers enjoy the 
benefits of  more accessible services and products (Tan et al. 2011; 
Leong et al. 2016). These new opportunities resulted in a surge of  
returning migrants and talents who became entrepreneurs or who 
were employed by the large companies that had settled in these 
regions, despite the benefits of  large-city living (Mohabir, Jiang and 
Ma 2017; Bai, Wang and Zhang 2018).
Aside from the business sector, increasingly, digital infrastructure has 
also changed the way Chinese governance works. Community-based 
digital governance platforms and government digital complaint systems 
were set up to generate and channel people’s voices upwards to help 
local governments to improve their performance (Chu, Yeh and Chuang 
2008). The ability to respond to public complaints promptly has been 
built into the key performance indicators of  the local officials concerned 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 50 No. 4 December 2019 ‘The Belt and Road Initiative and the SDGs: Towards Equitable, Sustainable Development’ 23–46 | 29
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
(Gao 2015; Almén 2018). It has been used widely in monitoring 
service and infrastructure accessibility and quality, and public and 
environmental health, as well as environmental governance (Zhang, Mol 
and He 2016; Li 2018).
Despite international criticism of  a surveillance state potentially 
emerging, the broader use of  digital networks has benefited the 
impoverished regions to deliver results in all perspectives of  human 
development as well as sustainable development (Giroux 2014; 
Trojanow et al. 2015). Using online teaching or teacher training and 
remote health-care provision or remote health-care professional 
support, some of  the most isolated regions are able to receive some 
basic services that were not available to people in the past. Despite these 
results, livelihoods are still far from ideal (Yang, Zhu and MacLeod 
2018; Hwang et al. 2018) and emerging solutions to overcome some of  
the most challenging barriers to development come predominantly from 
continual innovation (Tu, Wang and Wu 2018).
The Chinese government’s aspiration to use digital connectivity to 
support development internationally via the BRI is, to a great extent, a 
result of  having seen what it has and can achieve in China. As Xiang 
(2017) suggests, ICT is meant to help open the possibilities for economic 
development, narrow the digital divides in terms of  accessibility 
and unequal quality among BRI countries, and at the same time 
provide good-value-for-money products and services for people. The 
data collection, transmission, and sharing among the BRI countries, 
or spatial information passageways, may provide supplementary 
information to monitor and evaluate the progress of  participating 
countries along the Belt and Road (B&R) on sustainable development 
(Gong, Gu and Teng 2019). The ability to do so, with the aid of  
China’s experience, will be crucial for overcoming some of  the barriers 
mentioned in Section 2.2; that is, to generate reliable monitoring, 
evaluation, and targets for delivering outcomes for the SDGs.
This is itself  empowering or a form of  capacity building for developing 
countries that do not necessarily have the same capacities as developed 
countries. The Chinese Academy of  Sciences (2017) published the 
Report on Remote Sensing Monitoring of  China Sustainable Development 2016, 
which argued that Chinese assistance in the development of  a Digital 
Silk Road would lead to more open and just public administration. 
Li (2017) finds that enhanced internet coverage could make positive 
contributions to per capita GDP. The effect would be that ten more 
percentage points of  coverage would increase GDP by 0.9 percentage 
points. Such findings are quite similar to those of  Choi and Yi (2009) 
and Czernich et al. (2009) in different contexts.
4 The Digital Silk Road: policy framework and associated cross-
country collaboration
In this section, we first outline the policy framework for the Digital Silk 
Road and the cross-country collaboration it has generated so far.
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4.1 Intergovernmental collaboration
By April 2019, China had signed collaborative agreements with 16 BRI 
partner countries to build up the Digital Silk Road together and has 
jointly signed a collaborative initiative for a B&R Digital Economy with 
seven BRI countries. Some examples of  these agreements signed by the 
Chinese Ministry of  Industry and Information Technology within the 
BRI framework include:
 l A letter of  intent with the International Telecommunication Union 
to strengthen cooperation within the ICT sector;
 l Bilateral Memoranda of  Understanding (MoUs) with the 
government departments of  Cambodia, Iran, Bangladesh, and 
Afghanistan;
 l Agreements with the five member states of  the East African 
Community, Ethiopia, and the International Telecommunication 
Union to jointly build information highways in East Africa;
 l An action plan to strengthen a partnership for the joint development 
of  ICTs between China and the Association of  Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN); and there has been significant progress in the 
construction of  China–Myanmar, China–Pakistan, China–Kyrgyzstan, 
and China–Russia cross-border fibre-optic cables for information 
transmission (Office of  the Leading Group for the BRI 2019).
4.2 Multilateral relations
By the end of  2017, China had 17 international terrestrial cable border 
stations with 12 neighbouring countries, and ten submarine optical 
cables had been laid to connect 12 countries (CAICT 2018). The 
Chinese government has been assisting three telecom enterprises to 
participate in the construction of  a China–ASEAN Information Harbor 
(CAEXPO Secretariat 2018). Chinese industries have also been actively 
promoting the development of  BeiDou-2, a Chinese global satellite 
navigation system, aiming to have 35 satellites by 2020. Several Asian 
countries, including Pakistan, Laos, Brunei, and Thailand, have adopted 
the system (Hao 2019).
4.3 Chinese businesses and foreign governments
Within the BRI framework, many private enterprises reached out 
to the national or local governments of  the BRI countries to sign up 
collaboration agreements or to contract public infrastructure building. 
These activities have taken multiple forms:
 l Alibaba signed MoUs with the Pakistan Trade Development Bureau 
in May 2017 to promote the development of  small- and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in Pakistan, and with the Thai government 
in April 2018. The latter would help to set up an intelligent data 
centre in the Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC) to help SMEs in 
the EEC to build a digital platform for tourism in Thailand and to 
enhance the capacity of  local e-commerce workers.
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 l Chinese companies have also been involved in the construction 
of  smart cities in other countries. Both Huawei and Alibaba, for 
example, have engaged in the construction of  Smart Dubai (Stewart 
2019). Besides this, Alibaba Cloud Computing has been involved in 
the data analysis of  the EZ-Link Card in Singapore (Asian Scientist 
Newsroom 2017) and the digital transformation plan of  Saudi Arabia 
(Viney, Pan and Fang 2017).
 l The Thai government has tried to attract Alibaba and Huawei to 
invest in the EEC. According to Rookie Network Technology Co. Ltd 
(Fu 2018), the critical Chinese network for smart logistics controlled 
by Alibaba has established a fast track for fresh agricultural products 
including Durio zibethinus murr. from Thailand to many major cities 
in China. Huawei established an open lab in Bangkok in June 2017, 
a collaborative and innovative platform for local customers and 
entrepreneurs. The total investment of  the lab was US$15m (Xinhua 
News 2017).
 l Some countries, such as Argentina, have embraced Alibaba’s 
initiative of  the Electronic World Trade Platform (eWTP) (Chu 
and Li 2018). In May 2017, the President of  Argentina stated that 
the government had reached a strategic agreement with Alibaba 
regarding the eWTP.
4.4 Direct investments and sales by Chinese businesses to BRI markets
Chinese companies also increasingly invest or operate in foreign 
markets. For example, in 2016, the China Mobile Communications 
Corporation, China Unicom, and China Telecom invested about 
US$800m in overseas markets and started business operations in 
many countries and regions including Pakistan, Thailand, and 
Singapore. These days, more app companies are becoming interested 
in international markets. As early as 2013, Huawei started to invest in 
Myanmar and donated equipment equivalent to US$5m for various 
purposes, including to the Southeast Asian Games Organisation and for 
mobile technology systems (China News Agency 2017). Since 2018, the 
country’s Ministry of  Transport and Communications has been working 
with Huawei to develop 5G broadband services across Myanmar within 
the next five years. A further push was given to its 5G plans in February 
2019 when Huawei pledged to increase digital literacy and the usage of  
the Internet of  Things in Myanmar.
Chinese companies increasingly operate internationally in e-commerce, 
online to offline (O2O), social networking, utilities, content, and games. 
Apart from developed countries, Chinese apps are gaining users in 
BRI countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, Latin 
America, and Africa. By the end of  2017, more than 700 companies 
had international businesses (iResearch 2018).
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4.5 Chinese and foreign business partnerships
Increasingly, international companies have started to join Chinese 
companies to work on BRI-related projects. For example, the Inspur 
Group initiated a B&R Digital Economy Strategic Alliance in 
November 2017 together with Cisco, IBM, Diebold, and Ericsson 
(Inspur Group 2017). These companies developed a partnership with 
the Export–Import Bank of  China, the China Development Bank, 
the China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation, and the China–
Africa Development Fund. The partnership was the first cooperative 
mechanism introduced by enterprises which would provide world-class 
data centres, as well as deliver cloud services and solutions to enable 
smart cities and smart enterprises.
The activities within the Digital Silk Road have shown that it is 
a gradually evolving field. The Chinese government has played a 
pivotal role in forming these initiatives; reaching agreements or 
mutual understandings with other countries’ governments. It has also 
been actively encouraging Chinese enterprises that were not initially 
interested in developing business relationships abroad, particularly with 
developing countries. After the initial set-up and the availability of  basic 
infrastructure, businesses from around the world started to engage, and 
an ecosystem started to develop around the initiatives.
5 The Digital Silk Road and the Sustainable Development Goals
Geopolitical debates and even confrontations have been taking place 
as the system continues to evolve. It is gaining importance in the BRI 
framework, and a lively ecosystem has emerged regardless. From the 
perspective of  development, can this system deliver some of  the desired 
outcomes relating to the SDGs?
5.1 Leveraging digital connectivity to stimulate growth and reduce poverty 
and inequality
As discussed in Section 2, for countries that have been trapped in 
poverty, digital connectivity provides new opportunities to accumulate 
human capital, tap into the international market, and improve social 
participation. However, access to digital infrastructure is only the 
starting point. The outcomes of  digital enablement depend on the 
quality of  connectivity, the supporting environment, and user capability. 
Therefore, it is not always realistic to expect digital connectivity to 
deliver development outcomes single-handedly. However, what can be 
expected is that improved digital connectivity (including improvement 
in accessibility and quality) can at least open up new opportunities. With 
growing investment and collaboration, the Digital Silk Road projects are 
developing fast in different directions in multiple developing countries 
(Gu and Carey 2019).
This article uses examples or cases published by Chinese official 
websites, academic research in Chinese and in English, as well as in 
media coverage of  the BRI countries to put together the pieces of  the 
jigsaw.
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5.2 Enhancing connectivity
Connectivity relating to the Digital Silk Road can be viewed from 
multiple perspectives. It can be through access to digital networks 
with devices. Oreglia (2019) reports that until 2014 or 2015, many 
small-town and rural business people did not have a phone and had 
to rely on travel agents, or go to wholesale markets, typically by bus 
on dangerous roads or by train on slow railway lines. Even in 2010, 
there were only 594,000 mobile phone subscribers in the country 
– 1.14 subscriptions per 100 inhabitants – and 493,314 landline 
subscribers – 0.98 per 100 inhabitants. The cost of  a SIM card was 
around US$2,000 in the late 2000s, and still in the hundreds of  dollars 
in the early 2010s. Private landlines were rare, especially outside 
major cities, so people used public phones, which were expensive and 
unreliable. Norwegian company Telenor and Qatari company Ooredoo 
helped to lower the price of  SIM cards in cities instantly to US$1.50, 
and mobile phone services became accessible to 89.8 per cent of  the 
population in 2017, with 75.1 mobile broadband subscriptions per 
100 inhabitants in 2017. In rural areas, Chinese budget models of  
Huawei, Honor and Oppo, for example, were more popular than the 
more expensive versions. Other ‘local’ brands also use phones made in 
China, and Chinese entrepreneurs manage the commercial distribution, 
marketing, and sales of  the products. Other Chinese brands such 
as Coolpad, Gionee, Vivo, Meizu, and Zopo, typically unknown in 
the West, have been gaining significant market shares in emerging 
economies.
Connectivity can also mean the link between the Chinese market 
and BRI countries. Alibaba has been thriving by bringing companies 
into the digital world and trade. It has also helped foreign companies, 
particularly small and medium enterprises to tap into the vast Chinese 
domestic market (AliResearch 2019). On 31 October 2018, the first 
eWTP in Africa was launched in Kigali (Mugisha 2018), which has 
increased the sales of  Rwandan coffee on Tmall (Gahigi 2019). The 
Taobao Village model was also introduced to Thailand to help tackle 
poverty and raise community income via e-commerce and digital 
technology (Arunmas 2018). In February 2019, the Eastern Economic 
Corridor Office of  Thailand (EECO) established agreements with 
Alibaba to use e-commerce and digital technology to promote Thai 
products to Chinese customers (Eastern Economic Corridor 2019).
Connectivity may also mean access to business services. After successful 
innovation in China, Alipay has taken some share of  financial 
technology (fintech) markets through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) 
in India, Singapore, Korea, Russia, and Thailand. Such a cross-border 
exchange and accounting system were crucial for Alibaba’s cross-border 
e-commerce cooperation. Paytm was the largest mobile payment and 
commerce platform in India but one year after being taken over by Ant 
Financial, it became the fourth biggest electronic wallet globally. By the 
end of  2017, Paytm had 215 million users, of  which nearly 200 million 
were new users following the takeover (Sriram 2019).
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Additionally, e-commerce benefited poor people and small- and 
medium-sized businesses. Cloud Computing for EZ-Link provided 
timely information to more than 50,000 SMEs in Singapore. Lazada, 
Southeast Asia’s number one online shopping destination created in 
2012, now with Alibaba (its largest shareholder since 2016), provides 
services for more than 400,000 SMEs in Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Its business more than 
doubled in 2018 (Cadell and Aravindan 2018).
5.3 Narrowing the digital gap and inequalities in countries in Africa and 
elsewhere
Han (2018) estimates that levels of  digitalisation of  participating 
countries along the Belt and Road route increased by 2.78 per cent in 
2016 compared to the previous year, while the average global growth 
rate was 2.1 per cent. Arguably, the better performance of  the Belt 
and Road countries was attributed to the rapid construction of  ICT 
network infrastructure and technical cooperation between China and 
the participating countries. As well as the previously mentioned case of  
Rwandan coffee farmers, Tanzania represents another example. China 
Telecom helped the country to install a fibre-optic transmission network. 
Huawei also signed a US$182m deal for constructing landline and mobile 
ICT networks. Tanzania was upgraded from ‘no internet application’ to 
‘world-class’ access, which has also resulted in the development of  local 
ICTs and internet industries (TanzaniaInvest 2015).
Connectivity between business stakeholders and members of  society by 
BRI member state users has also become more active. WeChat, including 
the payment system, was being adopted and adapted in other countries 
even before Tencent reached some of  them. They are widespread for 
both business and personal use. They are used by small businesses and 
larger traders to settle transactions, including internationally. Their 
use has helped to establish relationships with suppliers and buyers and 
turned out to be particularly popular with people who trade agricultural 
products and natural resources (Oreglia 2019).
5.4 Local capacity building
As well as providing digital infrastructure, Chinese companies offered 
talent training to empower entrepreneurs and other users of  digital 
technology. Alibaba offers training courses to future entrepreneurs from 
Africa and Southeast Asia and helps aspiring young entrepreneurs to 
develop businesses and innovations (Hsu 2018). Huawei established an 
overseas training centre in 2012 for global talents. By the end of  March 
2018, more than 40,000 technicians and experts had participated in 
the future seed programme at the centre. It also sets up research and 
development centres in Africa (Fu 2018).
5.5 Protecting the environment
The development of  physical as well as digital infrastructure through 
the BRI has started to proceed economically in developing countries. 
However, China’s own experience shows that economic prosperity can 
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have negative environmental impact if  there is little consideration for 
the environment. It is well known that many regions in China have 
suffered from serious environmental degradation, pollution, and urban 
heat island effects (Li 2013).
The BRI aspires to balance environmental and economic goals. The 
Digital Belt and Road (DBAR) programme was initiated in 2016 by 
Chinese scientists in cooperation with experts from 19 countries and 
seven international organisations. The aim was to improve environmental 
monitoring and data sharing, and to support policymaking. The 
Chinese Academy of  Sciences (CAS) is investing more than 200m yuan 
(US$32m) in the next five years to support the DBAR programme. 
According to the Chair of  the programme:
Environmental and socio-economic information will be shared 
through a platform for big Earth data, scheduled for roll-out between 
2016 and 2026. This open-access gateway will allow researchers, 
policymakers and the public to track changes, development and 
trends. The programme will investigate indices and indicators to feed 
into the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (Guo 2018).
5.6 Institutional development
According to Xu (2017), the Inspur Group has helped the digitalisation 
of  the taxation administration of  Zimbabwe. The engineers from the 
Inspur Group provided hands-on tutorials to the local technicians and 
engineers for four years. It did not charge the customers on a daily or 
even hourly rate. The success of  the Inspur Group’s work in Zimbabwe 
has attracted taxation bureaus from more than ten other African 
countries. In response, the Inspur Group has organised more than 500 
overseas events about cloud computing and big data and has trained over 
10,000 digitalisation professionals for Egypt, South Africa, and Vietnam.
6 Discussion and conclusion
A Chinese idiom may help to capture the role of  the Digital Silk Road 
for the BRI: ‘adding wings to a tiger’ (ru hu tian yi), which means to add 
more capacity to a strong force. As discussed, the Digital Silk Road has 
generated some benefits in the BRI countries, which contributes towards 
some of  the SDGs. Its primary contribution would be to enhance 
connectivity and complement physical infrastructure. It helps to link 
some of  the most disadvantaged or isolated countries or communities 
to the outside world and allow them to benefit directly from one of  the 
world’s markets through trade and entrepreneurship. It also empowers 
people and small businesses with information that they would not 
otherwise have had access to.
A growing number of  developing countries in Africa, Southeast Asia, 
and the Middle East have become engaged with the Chinese government 
and Chinese companies on digital initiatives. The acceptance of  this 
approach illustrates its potential value to these BRI countries. There 
are several advantages of  the Digital Silk Road initiative, other than 
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building large-scale physical infrastructure. For the companies and 
hosting governments, the costs of  constructing digital infrastructure is 
much lower than for physical infrastructure projects. Although Chinese 
digital solutions and technologies may not be the most advanced, they 
meet the needs of  developing countries and lower-income groups (Zhang 
2017). Therefore, they have been particularly welcomed by lower-income 
countries and beneficial to the more impoverished populations, allowing 
them to benefit from international development.
Our review shows that the Digital Silk Road has not been able to offer 
direct solutions to environmental problems, despite efforts to collect 
the data. Data monitoring would help to generate future policies on 
evaluation and targeted environmental protection. However, data 
collection is not the same as delivering actual solutions. It will take a 
lot more commitment and supportive efforts to really deliver the goal 
to protect the environment. What digital data collection can achieve is 
that the increased availability of  the digital network, information, and 
skills, the need for better environmental protection, and lower energy 
consumption can be better communicated to people around the world. 
This may play an essential role in pressing enterprises and consumers to 
change their behaviour in the future.
Another frequently raised issue is the need for bottom-up decision-
making, voice channelling, and co-production. Despite the increased 
availability of  these activities in the Chinese context, i.e. digital 
platforms, social media, and apps being more and more used for 
public consultation at the policy formation stage, these goals are 
not built into the BRI system (Seele, Jia and Helbing 2019). A more 
co-productive approach that involves not only the governments of  the 
hosting countries of  Chinese technologies, but also other stakeholders 
such as businesses, non-governmental organisations, and communities 
in these countries, may help to prevent some of  the negative opinions 
or even resistance in the future, and thus enlist greater support for the 
sustainability of  the BRI itself.
Digital technologies can be used for bad causes as well as good. 
Internationally, China has been portrayed negatively for trying to 
empower a surveillance state using technology. However, even if  China 
refrains from using digital technologies to impose state control on its 
people, it cannot guarantee that other countries would do the same 
once they gain that same technological access. Therefore, as ICT 
networks increasingly operate across national boundaries and into some 
uncharted territories, there needs to be international cooperation to 
develop a legal framework to prevent ICT networks from being misused 
to cause problems at a more rapid pace.
A threat and possibly more of  a reality than ever for the Digital 
Silk Road to contribute to the delivery of  the SDGs, is the heated 
geopolitical contest between China and the US. Through punitive tariffs 
or business constraints, the new trading system built for poorer countries 
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to boost international trade may be adversely affected. To what extent 
the improvement of  development outcomes can be eroded as a result 
of  this is still too early to tell, and more research should be done to 
develop a better understanding of  the possible consequences. After 
all, delivering the SDGs and benefiting the poorest global populations 
would require world leaders to learn to take advantage of, rather than 
block, the new opportunities of  digitally enabled development for the 
vast number of  poor people.
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Green Belt and Road Initiative 
Environmental and Social 
Standards: Will Chinese Companies 
Conform?*
Jiang Xiheng1
Abstract The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) proposed by China in 2013 has 
been seen as one of the most ambitious initiatives to enhance infrastructure 
connectivity within and across countries. However, the initiative has 
attracted some controversy over the last five years. On the one hand, it 
is commended for responding to the urgent needs of many developing 
countries in building up basic energy and transportation infrastructures; 
on the other hand, it is questioned for the environmental, social, and 
fiscal impacts brought by large-scale infrastructure projects. The Chinese 
government proposed a green BRI in 2016. It is critical to understand 
whether greening the BRI will be translated into action, especially by the 
Chinese companies who fund and construct BRI projects. This article 
examines the pressures and incentives Chinese companies face alongside 
their capacity to green BRI projects. Gaps are identified in these three 
aspects and policy recommendations proposed to the key stakeholders.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, greening, environmental and social 
standards, Chinese companies.
1 Introduction
China’s initiative to build the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 
twenty‑first century Maritime Silk Road, in abbreviation the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI), aims at common development through enhanced 
connectivity in policies, facilities, trade, investment, and people-to-
people bonds (Xinhua News 2015). China believes that infrastructure 
is the foundation of  economic growth and enjoys competitive funding, 
capacity, and technology advantages in the building of  infrastructure. 
According to some recent estimates, the global infrastructure investment 
needed to support the currently expected rates of  economic growth 
is above US$3.3tn annually (McKinsey Global Institute 2016), while 
Asia alone needs US$1.7tn (ADB 2017: vii). While the infrastructure 
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need is increasing, there are fewer infrastructure projects with private 
participation in emerging markets and developing countries. The 242 
projects recorded in 2016 is 27 per cent less than the 334 projects 
registered in 2015, and a little more than half  the average number of  
projects during the years 2011–15 (World Bank 2017).
Many countries face significant infrastructure investment gaps and are 
therefore keen to participate in the BRI (WWF 2018). According to the 
World Bank report published in April 2019, countries that lie along the 
Belt and Road corridors are ill-served by existing infrastructure and by 
a variety of  policy gaps, and as such they under-trade by 30 per cent 
and fall short of  their potential foreign direct investment (FDI) by 70 per 
cent (World Bank Group 2019). Since its launch, BRI investments have 
largely focused on infrastructure. While different estimates for BRI 
projects can be found, the Chinese Ministry of  Commerce records that 
from 2014 to 2017, the number of  BRI projects and the size of  the 
investments are growing at a rate of  18 per cent and BRI investments 
reached US$143bn in 2017, which is around one third of  the total 
global infrastructure investments (ibid.). Among the newly contracted 
projects in 2017, three quarters of  them are in the power and transport 
sectors, but the BRI portfolio is expected to shift towards manufacturing 
and urban infrastructure development in the near future (ibid.).
Given such scale and structure, BRI investment inevitably faces high 
environmental and social risks. Many BRI countries in Central Asia 
and Southeast Asia have vulnerable ecological and social systems, 
which further magnify risks. In addition, meeting global climate change 
targets requires rapid progress toward decarbonisation, creating a risk 
of  stranded assets to fossil-fuel infrastructure. Negative environmental 
and social impacts have the potential to delay or stall projects, which 
can lead to major financial losses. As Chinese companies have 
increased their footprints abroad, they are being held accountable for 
environmental and social outcomes, just like multinational companies 
from other countries.
Over the past decades, China has paid increasing attention to 
ecological preservation and environmental protection, both in domestic 
development and overseas investment. China’s president, Xi Jinping, 
has repeatedly stressed the importance of  building an ecological civilisation 
both in China and globally. In 2016, he called for a Green Silk Road 
(State Council Information Office of  the People’s Republic of  China 
2016), and in 2017 he proposed an international coalition for a green 
BRI and a big data service platform on ecological and environmental 
protection (Xinhua News 2017). Both the coalition and the big data 
platform were launched in April 2019. The coalition convened Chinese 
and international stakeholders for dialogue, knowledge-sharing, and 
technology transfer, structured under ten thematic partnership groups 
(International Cooperation and Exchange Center of  the Ministry of  
Ecology and Environment 2019). The data platform provided data on 
the ecological conditions; environmental laws and regulations; business 
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opportunities in BRI countries with the help of  the internet; big data; 
and satellite remote sensing (ibid.).
Will Chinese companies follow the higher environmental and social 
standards in the context of  a greening BRI, as advocated by the 
Chinese government? How can all stakeholders including the Chinese 
government, host countries, and international institutions make green 
investment happen at a faster speed? Finding answers to these questions 
is needed in order to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, as well 
as for the success of  the BRI as a contribution to global development. 
This study situates these questions in an analytical framework in order to 
examine the key determinants, the status quo, and the gaps, and to give 
policy recommendations for the key stakeholders.
2 Analytical framework
The analytical framework in Figure 1 focuses on companies that are 
the key actors in direct infrastructure investment and construction 
activities, towards higher or lower environmental and social standards. 
These include large Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private 
companies that invest in or construct infrastructure projects abroad. 
To encourage companies to adopt and build up capacity for higher 
environmental and social standards, the right pressure and incentives 
must be put in place, as shown in the framework.
There are various sources of  pressure on Chinese companies to green 
investments and construction activities. These include the evolving 
green BRI policy and regulatory framework articulated by the Chinese 
government, more stringent regulations, and higher environmental and 
social safeguard standards in host countries, as well as increasing scrutiny 
from non‑governmental organisations (NGOs) and local communities.
Pressure
• Chinese policies and regulations
• Host-country regulations
• NGOs, media, and scrutiny of 
local communities
Capacity of companies
Incentives
• Financing from Chinese banks 
and international ones 
• Reputation gains
• Host-country incentives
Projects with high 
environmental and social 
standards
Figure 1 Analytical framework of companies engaged in BRI investment and 
construction
Source Author’s own.
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The overriding incentive for investors is to find projects that provide a 
return on investment. They are thus sensitive to financing opportunities 
around the BRI, as well as more indirect factors such as reputation gains 
and host‑country policy incentives. Among which, the role of  financing 
incentives is the key one and thus is the focus of  analysis.
Chinese companies vary significantly with respect to their capacity for 
higher environmental and social standards. Some major ones are the 
most competitive contractors on the global infrastructure market while 
some minor ones are short of  capacity.
3 Pressure for Chinese companies to follow high environmental and 
social standards
3.1 The evolving green BRI policy and regulatory framework
Since 2015, official BRI documents have increasingly stressed the 
importance of  greening infrastructure investments. This framework 
provides a set of  guiding principles, although it puts the onus of  
operationalising them onto investors and project implementers. However, 
over time, there is a trend towards more precise rules that could provide 
a baseline to more specific and binding regulations in the future.
The first official document illustrating what the BRI is and how it is 
expected to be carried out is the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk 
Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road, published jointly 
in March 2015 by the National Development and Reform Commission 
(NDRC), the Ministry of  Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the Ministry of  
Commerce (MOFCOM) (Xinhua News 2015). This document asserts 
that the BRI will follow the principles of  consultation, joint efforts, 
and shared benefits, as well as market rules and international norms. 
It also states that the BRI will ‘strengthen the green and low-carbon 
construction and operation management of  infrastructure, taking full 
account of  the impact of  climate change during construction’ (ibid.).
In order to mainstream ecological civilisation in the BRI and imbed 
sustainability into the efforts of  policy coordination, infrastructure 
connection, trade, and investment, the Guidance on Promoting Green Belt 
and Road was issued by the Ministry of  Environmental Protection which 
became the Ministry of  Ecology and Environment (MEE) in March 
2018, jointly with the MFA, the NDRC, and the MOFCOM in 2016. 
This policy paper promotes the adoption of  green concepts in all BRI 
activities and notes the importance of  international collaboration and 
government–enterprise coordination to ensure implementation results 
(Belt and Road Portal 2017b).
This framework received further specification in 2017. In order to 
further strengthen cooperation on eco-environmental protection and 
enable eco-environmental protection to serve, support, and guarantee 
the Belt and Road construction towards environment-friendly routes, 
the Belt and Road Ecological and Environmental Cooperation Plan was enacted 
in May 2017 (Belt and Road Portal 2017c). It translates the guidance 
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of  green BRI into more detailed policies. It emphasises commitments 
to enhanced guidance to further green corporate behaviour by 
implementing the Guidance on Promoting Green Belt and Road, and the 
Guidelines for Environmental Protection in Foreign Investment and Cooperation 
jointly released by the MOFCOM and the MEE (ibid.). It also 
stresses the implementation of  the Initiative on Corporate Environmental 
Responsibility Fulfilment for Building the Green ‘Belt and Road’ announced by 
19 key state enterprises (ibid.).
Green concepts and environmental protection requirements have also 
been integrated into other BRI policies. In the Vision and Actions on Energy 
Cooperation in Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime 
Silk Road, commitment is made ‘to attach great importance to the issue 
of  environmental protection in the process of  energy development, and 
strive to encourage the efficient development and utilisation of  clean 
energy and technology transfer as well’ (Belt and Road Portal 2017d).
In December 2017, the Code of  Conduct for Chinese Private Investors 
was jointly published by the NDRC, the MOFCOM, the People’s 
Bank of  China (PBOC), the MOF, and the All‑China Federation of  
Industry and Commerce as a BRI policy (Belt and Road Portal 2017a). 
It includes one chapter on environmental protection and resource 
conservation. In particular, there is one notable excerpt: ‘In countries 
where there is no environmental laws and standards, the environmental 
standards of  international organisations and multi-lateral organisations 
could be adopted’ (ibid.). With increasing specifications to fill the gaps 
of  regulation, this shows evident progress in terms of  policy guidance. 
Past policies requested investors to observe the laws and standards of  
host countries and use Chinese standards in such cases where no local 
laws exist. In addition, in the Action Plan on Standardization Connectivity 
2018–2020 (Belt and Road Portal 2018), one of  the key actions is 
designated to enhance international collaboration on standardisation in 
energy saving and environmental protection to serve the green BRI.
The Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation held 
in April 2019 set clear directions for BRI development after its first 
five years. With high quality as the theme of  the Forum, the event 
emphasised the principle of  ‘extensive consultation, joint contribution 
and shared benefits’, and made clear the approaches of  ‘open, green 
and clean cooperation’ for the goals of  high standards, a people-centred 
approach, and sustainability (Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  the People’s 
Republic of  China 2019a). Consensus was achieved that support for the 
United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 
Agenda) should be made an integral part of  Belt and Road cooperation, 
and that economic growth, social progress, and environmental 
protection should be pursued in a balanced way (Ministry of  Foreign 
Affairs of  the People’s Republic of  China 2019b).
Xi Jinping made commitments on transparency and clean governance 
in pursuing Belt and Road cooperation and zero tolerance for 
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corruption. He said that ‘everything should be done in a transparent 
way’ and that ‘[China] will adopt widely accepted rules and standards 
while the laws and regulations of  participating countries should also 
be respected’ (Ministry of  Foreign Affairs of  the People’s Republic of  
China 2019a). Green finance was repeatedly mentioned, including in 
the context of  enhancing collaboration on the Paris Agreement. In 
the joint communiqué, commitments are made to ‘build high-quality, 
reliable, resilient and sustainable infrastructure’ and it is emphasised 
that ‘high‑quality infrastructure should be viable, affordable, accessible, 
inclusive and broadly beneficial over its entire life‑cycle, contributing 
to sustainable development of  participating countries and the 
industrialisation of  developing countries’ (Belt and Road Portal 2019a). 
To achieve the goal, parties will work together in line with China’s 
national legislation, regulatory frameworks, international obligations, 
applicable international norms and standards (ibid.).
In addition to this framing, a few key concrete measures launched by 
China and participating countries and organisations continued the 
trend towards greater specificity in rules and processes around greening 
the BRI. The BRI International Green Development Coalition 
was launched with ten thematic groups and over 120 participating 
international organisations, government ministries, and NGOs, 
thinktanks and businesses. This group serves as an important forum for 
future discussions on greening the BRI. In addition, major financial 
institutions from China, the UK, France, Singapore, Pakistan, the 
UAE, Hong Kong SAR, and other countries and regions signed up 
to the Green Investment Principles for Belt and Road Development (Green 
Finance 2019). To improve cooperation in project preparation and 
implementation and to promote projects that are investable, bankable, 
economically viable, and environmentally friendly (ibid.), the Ministry 
of  Finance of  China in collaboration with the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the 
World Bank Group, the Inter‑American Development Bank (IDB), and 
a few other financial institutions jointly established the Multilateral 
Cooperation Center for Development Finance (Ministry of  Foreign 
Affairs of  the People’s Republic of  China 2019c).
3.2 The increasingly stringent regulations and growing capacities of host 
countries
Alongside a growing emphasis on sustainability in the framework 
of  the BRI, policies of  host countries can serve as a powerful driver 
for greening infrastructure investments. The Chinese government 
requires overseas investors to abide by the laws and regulations of  the 
host countries, although monitoring and enforcing this requirement 
is a difficult challenge. BRI countries in Central and Eastern Europe 
are generally EU members and apply high environmental and social 
standards to investments. A number of  African countries such as 
Nigeria, Kenya, and others are setting up an environmental safeguard 
reporting system for foreign investors. Many BRI countries are 
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enhancing their legal requirements for labour protection, technology 
transfer, and local share of  benefits. Chinese investors will face 
increasingly complex due diligence and compliance management 
challenges (UNDP 2017).
In addition, policy coordination and capacity building under the BRI 
framework can help some BRI countries with weak legislative and 
executive capacities build up their capacities to manage environmental 
risks. China signed Memoranda of  Understanding (MoUs) with 
the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and over 
30 countries for environmental protection under the green BRI and 
launched the Green BRI Envoy Plan, which provided training courses 
for over 2,000 officials engaged in environmental protection (MEE n.d.). 
The Green Finance Leader Programme was launched in 2018 and 
provided knowledge-sharing seminars for 120 regulators from 35 BRI 
countries (IFC 2018b). With the BRI International Green Development 
Coalition and the ecological big data platform becoming operational, 
regulatory coordination, capacity building, and technology transfer can 
further improve the regulatory environment in BRI countries.
3.3 Growing pressure from NGOs, the media, and local communities
International and local NGOs, the media, as well as local communities 
in host countries can have a strong influence on the operations of  
infrastructure projects. In addition to a fragile ecology and sensitive 
environment, many countries along the Belt and Road are confronted 
with complex geopolitical and social challenges. The majority of  BRI 
projects are large construction projects with significant environmental 
and social impacts. Investors must pay careful attention to local 
concerns and priorities if  those investors should wish to acquire a social 
licence to operate over the lifespan of  a project. For example, a recent poll 
of  public opinion in six BRI countries showed that the public prefer 
renewable power investments to fossil-fuel investments by a ratio of  
two to one, and are much more likely to support foreign investment for 
renewable projects over traditional power infrastructure (Littlecott and 
Hawkins 2019). While it is the host-country government that ultimately 
decides on its preferred power infrastructure, with Chinese companies 
acting as contractors winning bids and implementing projects within 
the contracted budget, there is some scope for greater accountability of  
Chinese companies within this process.
Many international and local media, and environment and human 
rights organisations are also closely watching these projects. Any 
negative environmental impact, land dispute, or labour issue can be 
immediately exposed to reach a large domestic and international 
audience. A number of  projects in Southeast Asian and African 
countries have been stalled or cancelled due to these factors. A 
well‑known case is the Myitsone Dam in Myanmar which was stalled in 
2011 after two years of  construction, impacting the Chinese company 
that won the project through bidding, and with significant losses. 
This case helped Chinese companies understand that environmental 
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regulation, social impact, information disclosure, political uncertainty, 
public opinion, and the capacity of  Chinese investors are all factors for 
risk management in overseas infrastructure investment.
Furthermore, some negative cases have been turned into bloated and 
anecdotal stories in the media and believed by the local people. An 
often-told story is that Chinese companies predominantly employ 
Chinese workers, depriving locals of  potential jobs, and where locals 
are employed, they are paid low salaries and offered little training. In a 
recent study coordinated by the School of  Oriental and African Studies 
and the London School of  Economics, researchers compared Chinese 
and non-Chinese manufacturing and construction companies in Angola 
and Ethiopia, two of  the top African destinations for Chinese direct 
investment. Fieldworkers studied 76 companies over a four‑year period, 
31 of  them Chinese, which included interviewing 1,500 Angolan and 
Ethiopian workers (Pilling 2019). The study found that the negative 
stories about Chinese companies are mostly untrue. It showed that 
Chinese companies generally employ just as many local workers as 
non-Chinese companies, pay them more or less the same, and train 
them to similar standards, though usually less formally (ibid.). In light 
of  the existing bias, and in order to change this grim portrayal of  
Chinese companies, more evidence-based study is needed. At present, 
compared with their US and European peers, Chinese companies have 
to outperform in order to get similar recognition.
4 Financing incentives that promote environmental and social 
safeguards
The financial sector can play a key role in delivering sustainable 
infrastructure by requiring best practices in infrastructure planning, 
design, construction, and operation (WWF 2018). Over the past decade, 
Chinese financial regulators have adopted a variety of  standards 
regarding green finance. This growing regulatory framework refers to 
and borrows from international standards. More research is needed 
to understand how investors are operationalising this framework in 
practice. Going forward, greening the BRI will require this system to 
continue strengthening in financial institutions, both on paper and 
in practice.
4.1 China’s green financing policies
In 2007, the PBOC, the Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), and the Ministry of  Environmental Protection (MEP – now 
the MEE) jointly issued the Green Credit Policy and called on banks to 
take environmental impact and energy efficiency into consideration 
when making lending decisions. In order to play the role of  financial 
institutions in implementing state council policies enacted in 2011 on 
promoting energy efficiency, emission reduction, and environmental 
protection, the CBRC issued the Green Credit Guidelines in 2012 
(Fa 2012). It provided the operational guidance on how to implement 
green banking in three aspects which: support a green, low-carbon, 
and low-waste economy; manage environmental and social (E&S) 
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risks; and improve the environmental and social performance of  
financial institutions themselves. In this document, E&S risks were 
defined as ‘potential impact and risks brought to the environment and 
communities by banks’ clients and their primary supply chains through 
construction, production and operational activities’ (IFC 2018b: 7). The 
development of  E&S risk ratings and the identification of  high E&S risk 
clients was also explicitly required (ibid.). Three years later, the policy 
guidance was developed into detailed indicators. The CBRC began 
to impose Green Credit Key Performance Indicators and E&S risk 
reporting obligations on banks in 2015.
With regard to its convergence with international good practices, the 
Green Credit Guidelines encourage banks to adopt good practices and 
international standards or act up to the standards in essence. This 
document has greatly enhanced the awareness of  Chinese financial 
institutions regarding green finance and the corresponding internal 
management systems have been building up in all financial institutions, 
though they might vary in progress. To date, three banks are signatories 
to the Equator Principles (Equator Principles Association 2019), three 
banks are signatories to the UN Global Compact (UNGC), and five 
investment managers have signed the UN Principles for Responsible 
Investment (UNPRI) (IFC 2018b).
This green finance regulatory framework also covers overseas 
investment. It requests that banks should strengthen E&S risk 
management for proposed overseas projects, and ensure that project 
sponsors are compliant with local environmental, land, and health and 
safety laws and regulations in the project country or region. Banks are 
also required to publicly commit to adopting relevant international best 
practices or standards for the proposed overseas project or ensure that 
the proposed project is consistent with international best practices in 
essence (China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission 2019).
4.2 International green financing policies compared to Chinese ones
The Performance Standards on Environmental and Social 
Sustainability of  the International Financial Corporation, World 
Bank Group (IFCPS) is a widely recognised international standard 
for advanced economies. It has been adopted by, or has influenced 
the development of, all multilateral development banks (MDBs) and 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries. Comparing China’s Green Credit Guidance (GCG) and the 
IFCPS shows convergence in many areas but also variation in emphasis 
on information disclosure and compliance (Table 1).2 The GCG policies 
are, more or less, guidelines that are soft in enforcement provisions and 
information disclosure to the public, although IFCPS standards are 
encouraged by the policies.
To improve regulatory mechanisms for enhanced implementation, 
in August 2016, the PBOC and six other ministries jointly issued the 
Guidelines on Building a Green Finance System (Xueqing 2016) to enhance 
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institutional innovation in the administration of  environmental and 
social factors in outbound Chinese investment. It also calls for enhanced 
environmental information disclosure; for instance, to incorporate the 
environmental information of  enterprises, including environmental 
violations, into the financial credit information database. It seeks to:
 l establish a mechanism to share enterprise environmental 
information, which should provide a basis for loan and investment 
decisions of  the financial institutions;
 l to clarify the requirements of  information disclosure and other 
regulatory arrangements for green bond issuance;
 l to encourage rating agencies to evaluate the green performance of  
the issuers and the greenness of  the projects, as well as the impact 
of  environmental costs on creditworthiness, and to disclose such 
information separately in credit rating reports;
 l to gradually establish and improve the mandatory environmental 
information disclosure system for listed enterprises and bond issuers;
 l to encourage third-party professional organisations to participate 
in the collection, research and release of  corporate environmental 
information and analytical reports (PBOC 2016).
The guidelines also explore more stringent regulatory and market 
instruments such as environment pollution liability insurance to manage 
environmental risks, in implementing the BRI and other overseas 
investment projects (ibid.).
Table 1 Comparison between IFCPS and China’s GCG policies
IFCPS standards GCG policies
1 Assessment and management of environmental and social 
risks and impacts
• More stringent standards of accountability of 
financial institutions in reporting to regulators but 
less requirements for information disclosure.
2 Labour and working conditions • Energy consumption, pollution prevention, health, 
safety, land acquisition and resettlement, ecological 
protection, and climate change are covered.
• Implementation requirements are not made in 
detail.
• Self-reporting is requested.
• Compliance to both local laws and regulations as 
well as Chinese laws and regulations are requested.
• IFCPS standards are encouraged. 
3 Resource efficiency and pollution prevention
4 Community health, safety, and security 
5 Land acquisition and involuntary resettlement
6 Biodiversity conservation and sustainable management of 
living natural resources
7 Indigenous peoples
8 Cultural heritage
Source Author’s own.
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4.3 The implementation of the Green Credit Policy by major Chinese 
banks
According to the IFC, the 21 largest Chinese banks have adopted E&S 
risk management practices, and green financing projects now make up 
approximately 10 per cent of  the portfolios of  these banks (IFC 2018b). 
There are no data on the portfolio of  BRI green financing, but it is 
useful to examine the performance of  the key funders of  BRI projects, 
that is, the China Development Bank (CBD) and the Export–Import 
Bank of  China (China Exim Bank), in order to understand how these 
policies are implemented in BRI countries.
The CDB is the largest development bank in the world in terms of  
capital. At the end of  2017, the CDB continued to maintain the leading 
position in supporting China’s overseas financing and investment efforts, 
with a balance of  foreign currency loans equivalent to US$261.7bn 
and a balance of  cross‑border RMB loans of  RMB83.4bn (CDB 
2018). With US$17.6bn BRI loans in 2017, the CDB provided 
funding to support infrastructure connectivity, production capacity, 
and equipment manufacturing cooperation, financial cooperation, 
and overseas industrial parks (ibid.). It has developed collaboration 
with over 100 overseas central banks, development banks, and 
commercial banks. The CDB has adopted the GCG and joined some 
related international initiatives, such as the UNEP Finance Initiative. 
The CDB’s environmental and social policy requests that borrowers 
abide by the laws and regulations of  the host country, and that loan 
applications must be accompanied by an environmental impact 
assessment by an independent third party. Environmental standards and 
costs must be included in the loan agreement and the environmental 
impact assessment should be conducted when the project is completed 
(Greenovation Hub 2016).
The China Exim Bank is a policy bank with the mandate to promote 
steady growth, structural adjustment, and international economic 
cooperation. As early as 2007, it issued the Guidance on Environmental 
and Social Assessment of  Lending Projects and in 2012, the bank set the 
strategic goal to become a pioneer in green finance in its 12th Five-Year 
Plan (Development Research Center of  the State Council and the 
Export–Import Bank of  China 2019). In 2015, the bank issued 
Guidance on Green Credit in accordance with the Key Performance 
Indicators of  Green Credit Implementation requested by the CBRC. 
In 2017, the bank released the Rules on Advisory Business for Carbon 
Assets, Operational Procedures on Due Diligence, and Operational 
Rules on Loan Risk Monitoring and Management, aiming at enhanced 
environmental and social risk management (ibid.). In 2018, the 
bank adopted new lending policies for coal, chemicals, non-ferrous 
metals, and thermal power to restrict lending to industries with major 
environment and social risks. To date, the BRI loans of  the China 
Exim Bank reached RMB 1tn with around RMB 250bn rated as green 
credit (ibid.).
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5 Capacities for Chinese companies to follow high environmental and 
social standards
5.1 The general picture
According to a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
study based on 543 responses from Chinese enterprises invested in BRI 
countries, and the feedback from 38 stakeholders from host countries, 
sustainable development concepts are acknowledged and practised by 
most Chinese enterprises, but the capacity, implementation, and results 
can still be improved (UNDP 2017).
Table 2 Policies of development banks
China 
Development 
Bank
China Exim Bank World Bank
Asian 
Development 
Bank
African 
Development Bank
Environmental and 
social assessment 
(ESA)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Social and 
environmental 
standards by 
industry
Effective restraints 
in some industries
Effective restraints 
in some industries
Yes
Standards for 
such industries as 
agriculture and 
energy
Requirements 
for agriculture, 
education, energy 
infrastructure, etc.
Consistent with 
the environment, 
society, and laws 
of the host country
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Consistent with 
international 
environmental and 
social standards
Encourage, 
require to deliver 
the results 
that reach the 
standards in 
essence 
Encourage, 
require to deliver 
the results 
that reach the 
standards in 
essence
Yes Yes Yes
Information 
disclosure
Annual reports 
and sustainable 
development 
reports
Annual reports 
and sustainable 
development 
reports
Information access 
policy
Public 
commutation 
policy
Information 
disclosure and open 
policy
Appeals system Not available Not available Yes Yes Yes
Third-party audit Not available Not available Yes Yes Yes
Audit, supervision, 
and management 
in project 
construction and 
operation
Requirement for 
self-reporting
Requirement for 
self-reporting
Planning
Included in the 
ESA
Included in the ESA
Negative/exclusion 
list 
Planning
New policy 
enacted in 2018
Yes Yes Yes
Source Adapted and partially translated from Greenovation Hub (2016).
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With regard to social performance, over half  of  the surveyed companies 
had conducted social impact assessments before implementing 
their projects. Companies have also tended to attach importance to 
philanthropic activities. Complying with local laws and regulations 
on employment is the standard for establishing labour relations and 
some opt for more proactive communication-based solutions to deal 
with labour disputes. However, some enterprises have not conducted 
independent social impact assessments. Some enterprises also have 
problems with the limited effectiveness of  their charitable giving. 
Cultural differences and unfamiliarity with local customs have been 
major barriers for establishing good labour relations (ibid.). Chinese 
companies’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities in Myanmar, 
for instance, show that companies are extremely short of  people who 
understand local communities.
According to the UNDP study, in regard to environmental issues, the 
majority of  Chinese enterprises have conducted environmental impact 
assessments according to the requirements of  the host countries, 
and generally by third-party organisations. The stringency of  these 
assessments and their impacts on project design varies across firms 
and countries. Most companies have adopted measures to reduce 
emissions, pollutants, and intentionally control the environmental 
impact throughout the whole product life cycle. Nevertheless, Chinese 
enterprises must control their environmental impact more systematically 
and scientifically, and track and document relevant data and 
information within their business operations (ibid.).
5.2 Capacity-building efforts
The awareness and will of  Chinese companies to build up the capacity 
to respond to government policy guidance and better manage overseas 
risks has been increasing rapidly. Contractors are a group of  important 
players in BRI infrastructure projects. From 2013 to 2018, the turnover 
of  contracted projects conducted by Chinese firms reached US$400bn 
(Belt and Road Portal 2019b). The China International Contractors 
Association (CHINCA) is the national organisation formed in 1988 
by Chinese international project investors, contractors, labour service 
companies, and related service providers, with over 1,500 members 
operating in 190 countries (CHINCA n.d.). Over the last few years, 
CHINCA has been actively strengthening industry self-discipline and 
capacity building, issuing industry reports and compliance guidance, 
and holding training courses. For instance, in order to enhance the 
awareness and capacity of  companies to engage and communicate 
with local communities, CHINCA released the Handbook on Community 
Engagement for Chinese Contractors in May 2018 and it has been holding 
training programmes on this topic (CHINCA 2019a). CHINCA has 
also been actively collaborating with MDBs to host seminars since 
early 2018 and has been promoting joint funding between its members 
and the MDBs.
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It is also important to observe the transition of  Chinese contractors 
in their business models for BRI projects. CHINCA has also been 
promoting the transition of  contractors to investors and developers, 
changing from the EPC (Engineering Procurement Construction) 
model to BOT (Build–Operate–Transfer) models (CHINCA 2019b). In 
general, for the BOT model, the host-country government will specify 
the quality and quantity of  utility services such as electricity and ensure 
the return of  the company with an agreed pricing mechanism. For the 
EPC model, the contractor will deliver the design, procurement, and 
construction of  the project within a fixed budget on the standards agreed 
with the owner. The key difference between the two is that with the 
BOT model, companies could pursue higher standards and internalise 
the increased costs, but with the EPC model, standards are limited 
within the fixed budget. This difference plays a key role in the capacity‑
building efforts of  Chinese companies to pursue higher standards.3
Some Chinese companies have taken the lead in aligning themselves 
with high international standards in order to attract international 
funding and promote the image of  international business operations. 
China Three Gorges South Asia Investment Ltd (CSAIL) is a company 
incorporated by a major Chinese state-owned enterprise, the Three 
Gorges Corporation, the International Finance Corporation of  the 
World Bank Group (IFC), and the Silk Road Fund. With leading 
technical and engineering capacity in hydro- and wind power projects, 
the company is also committed to high international environmental and 
social standards for power projects under the China–Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (CPEC) umbrella. In 2017, CSAIL issued its Health Safety 
Social and Environmental Management System (internal document) 
which combined the E&S systems of  the IFC, China, and the host 
country, Pakistan. With 20 frameworks and eight standard operating 
procedures, the system covers a wide range of  safeguards on safety, 
environment, society, and health. To date, all CSAIL power projects, 
with the BOT model, have adopted these standards. With the continued 
efforts of  CSAIL in securing compliance by all contractors, the projects 
received high consideration from the IFC and local communities.4
Smaller Chinese companies could also be encouraged to adopt 
higher standards with funding incentives from international financial 
institutions. In 2017, the EBRD gave a loan to a Chinese private 
company for the first time, sending positive signals to Chinese 
companies willing to pursue higher standards. The EBRD gave 
a US$52m loan to Angel Yeast Egypt, which is fully owned by 
the Chinese firm Angel Yeast, to finance the construction of  new 
production facilities and a modern wastewater treatment plant in an 
area of  Istanbul that has a high level of  poverty and unemployment. 
Over 200 jobs will be created, while 300 new and current workers will 
receive in-depth technical training (Zgherib 2018). For the EBRD, 
Angel Yeast met its E&S policy and performance requirements and it 
is willing to give loans to other Chinese investors that can meet these 
high standards.5
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6 Main findings
As China is shifting to green development, it is paying increasing 
attention to a green BRI. Chinese companies are the key players 
to deliver infrastructure projects for the BRI. Their awareness and 
capacity are building up with increasing domestic and overseas pressure 
and incentives. The progress is evident but there are still gaps to cover.
6.1 Continuous progress in Chinese policy guidance and regulatory 
pressure is expected in the face of complex environmental and social risks
Chinese ministries have been actively making policies and regulations 
to guide companies to improve environmental and social safeguard 
measures. The real challenge now is to ensure that high-level guidelines 
from regulators can be translated into substantive investor and contractor 
operational improvements. Current policies request investors to abide by 
local laws and regulations and encourage the adoption of  international 
standards. In the case where host-country regulations and standards 
are very low or unestablished, Chinese companies could use Chinese 
standards which may be higher, but not as high as international ones. 
However, international NGOs and local communities would judge the 
projects according to the high standards practised by other international 
investors, and would not compromise their requirements just because the 
total budget of  the project might be too low for the contractor to practise 
the higher standards. In many cases, opposition from international 
NGOs and local communities pose major risks to the projects.
6.2 Strategic planning and regulation capacity in the host country is also 
critical
Host-country development strategies and regulations play a key role in 
determining not only project standards but also the employed business 
model of  the project, thus fundamentally influencing the environmental 
and social impacts throughout its life cycle. For instance, it is the host 
country that makes decisions on building coal‑fired plants or clean 
energy plants in its energy strategy, and therefore their awareness and 
capacity to make an energy development strategy that aligns with their 
CO2 emission commitment under the Paris Agreement is of  significance.
6.3 Continued efforts are expected from the banks to play a more 
engaging role in the monitoring of E&S policy implementation
China’s major banks are leading in green finance in emerging economies, 
and are converging with MDBs in E&S safeguards. The enhanced 
regulatory details in the E&S safeguards and information disclosure 
represent an important opportunity to improve on these standards across 
BRI projects. However, the normal practice of  Chinese banks, which 
rely more on self-reporting, in contrast to the on-site monitoring and 
inspection practised by MDBs, might not be a measure strong enough to 
help companies manage social and environmental risks successfully.
6.4 Chinese companies face more challenges in management and 
communication capacity than in technical capacity
Chinese companies have been used to relying on local governments to 
deal with local communities, and many have not realised the need to 
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acquire a social contract from local people. Therefore, companies have 
tended to overemphasise building a relationship with local governments 
but neglected consulting with local communities, NGOs, and the 
media, who have ever-increasing demands for environmental protection 
and labour benefits. IFC officials have pointed out that a lot of  the 
conflicts between companies and the local people have been caused 
by small things in the eyes of  Chinese managers. The companies have 
been realising these concerns but they face a shortage of  qualified staff 
trained in the local language and cross-cultural communication. This 
demands greater effort to build up this capacity.
6.5 The right business climate is a key factor to ensure that pressures and 
incentives are aligned
Joint financing with international financial institutions and private 
investors will help prevent environmental and social hazards. However, 
the key challenge for investing in the infrastructure in developing 
countries is that very limited projects are considered bankable for MDBs 
and private investors, as the low private participation rate shows. In 
many countries, connecting capital available for green investment with 
investment opportunities is hampered by investment barriers, market 
failures, and policy misalignments. To overcome them, governments 
have a key role to play to strengthen domestic frameworks for economic, 
investment, and climate policies, to ensure that they are mutually 
supportive, and ultimately to improve the risk–return profile of  green 
investment projects (OECD 2017). It is important for Chinese and 
international investors to work out the right business models with the 
host country for BRI projects.
7 Recommendations
Now a clearer picture has been established of  the three key aspects 
centred around the decision-making of  Chinese companies in adopting 
higher standards and good international practices: progress and gaps 
in pressure, incentives, and capacity. The key stakeholders including 
the Chinese government, Chinese companies, host countries, and 
international institutions could work in a more coordinated way to 
achieve the goal of  a greening BRI.
7.1 Making the pressure more effective
Based on the momentum of  policy guidance, Chinese ministries need 
to make continued efforts to promulgate more detailed regulations and 
performance indicators to give companies clearer signals. For instance, 
to require information disclosure and open consultations with local 
communities at an early stage of  the project.
International organisations should give more technical assistance on 
economic analysis and strategic planning to the developing countries 
along the Belt and Road. Objective economic analysis will help 
participating countries choose the kinds of  investments and reforms that 
will best meet their development needs.
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The newly launched BRI International Green Development Coalition 
and the big data platform could play constructive roles in promoting 
cooperation among governments and key stakeholders. These 
frameworks could provide a way for investors (public and private), 
recipients (both governments and domestic stakeholders), and other 
partners to share information on what standards they use and how they 
operationalise them. This could create a process to promote upward 
convergence of  standards across the BRI over time. These will need 
to be multilateral and transnational in nature and co-owned by different 
countries and stakeholder groups, although there would obviously be 
a critical convening role for China. Such an outcome would be in line 
with the interests of  all stakeholders and China now has the technical 
capacity to provide this public good.
7.2 Enhance joint financial and reputational incentives
To enhance financial incentives to companies, clear and transparent 
BRI financing rules will be a key solution to both insufficient financing 
incentives for investors and the low rate of  financing participation from 
MDBs. Some conditions are already there for the joint development of  
a set of  rules and standards. In May 2017, China’s Ministry of  Finance, 
the World Bank, and five other MDBs jointly signed an MoU on 
strengthening cooperation on the BRI to support the 2030 Agenda and 
the Paris Agreement. At the April 2019 Belt and Road Forum, a number 
of  MDBs, alongside the Chinese Ministry of  Finance, announced the 
creation of  the Multilateral Cooperation Center for Development 
Finance, with the AIIB serving as secretariat. These and other platforms 
provide an important opportunity for fomenting further collaboration.
Governments and international institutions could also harmonise 
efforts to promote the investment climate of  developing countries and 
to reduce the risks for potential investors, particularly private investors. 
Reforms include improving the legal protection of  investment and the 
consistency of  the regulations. Developing countries participating in the 
BRI need the ambition to substantially improve their environment for 
sustained investment.
International organisations could provide more public goods to help 
the regulators of  participating countries and incentivise investors. The 
IFC’s member-led Sustainable Banking Network, with 34 members 
including China, provides strategic and technical how-to guidance to 
help institutions to systematically integrate sustainability considerations 
into business strategy and operations (IFC 2018a). The World Wildlife 
Fund for Nature (WWF) suggested the development of  a Sustainable 
Infrastructure Opportunity Index, to provide a guiding framework 
to prioritise BRI countries with sustainable infrastructure investment 
opportunities based on both infrastructure drivers and the environmental 
governance performance of  various BRI countries (WWF 2018).
Both the Chinese government and international organisations could 
jointly enhance demonstrations of  high standards and good practices. 
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For investors, it is hard to understand the abstract concepts but easy 
to follow practices that could bring them higher benefits. They need 
confidence in business cases that could satisfy high standards, business 
sustainability, and public interests. While the Chinese government is 
trying to highlight the good practices of  the BRI over the past six years, 
international organisations could help this process with their knowledge, 
experience, and comparative perspectives. For example, experience 
of  cases such as that of  CSAIL, the largest clean energy investor in 
Pakistan, and the IFC, the largest private investment institution in the 
world, joining hands to conduct an investment that could provide huge 
support to economic growth and the improvement of  livelihoods in 
Pakistan. Similarly, the EBRD could demonstrate how an MDB could 
support medium and small investors to reach high E&S standards.
7.3 Multiple measures need to be taken for the capacity building of 
companies
Awareness of  environmental and social hazards and the willingness 
to make efforts to meet standards is crucial. In addition, measures 
need to be taken to target the key challenges. Companies need to 
optimise internal management including decision-making, monitoring, 
performance evaluation, and the employment of  more professionals 
on compliance and E&S management. In response to the shortage 
of  talent for effective communication with local communities, more 
effective measures should be adopted to promote domestic education 
that equips a greater number of  graduates with language skills and 
cross-cultural understanding. Hiring more local employees would also 
aid better local engagement. For SOEs, a more flexible employment 
mechanism could be explored in overseas corporations. The market for 
consulting services on international rules should be further developed. 
Chinese business associations and environmental NGOs should be 
promoted and encouraged to operate overseas and play supporting and 
monitoring roles.
In conclusion, the BRI is a great development opportunity for those 
countries short of  infrastructure and funding. However, BRI investment 
could bring about mixed environmental and social impacts. Investor 
guidance, regulation, and support will be critical in meeting the high 
environmental and social standards necessary to achieve the sustainable 
development of  BRI countries and the world. The Chinese government, 
host-country governments, as well as international organisations and 
financial institutions all have important roles to play.
Notes
*  This IDS Bulletin is supported by the Center for International 
Knowledge on Development’s (CIKD) China–UK Partnership 
Programme on Knowledge for Development.
  I would like to express my gratitude to Thomas Hale of  the 
University of  Oxford for his contributions and input in the writing 
of  this article. I would also like to show appreciation to the two peer 
reviewers, each of  whom provided valued critique.
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Aligning the Belt and Road 
Initiative with Myanmar’s 
Sustainable Development Plan: 
Opportunities and Challenges*
Zhou Taidong1
Abstract The ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by the Chinese 
government provides an important opportunity to promote the global 
implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. This 
article, using Myanmar as a country case study as it is strongly committed to 
both the BRI and the 2030 Agenda, aims to paint a nuanced picture of how 
the BRI could benefit Myanmar’s sustainable development. After providing 
an overview of Myanmar’s recent development context, the Myanmar 
Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP), and the progress of China–Myanmar 
cooperation under the BRI, it argues that there are both big opportunities 
and huge challenges in tapping the potential of the BRI’s development 
dividends for Myanmar. The article proposes that China and Myanmar should 
make joint efforts in terms of mainstreaming conflict-sensitive approaches, 
increasing the confidence of Myanmar’s public in Chinese investment, 
encouraging responsible investment, and diversifying financing options.
Keywords: 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; Belt and Road 
Initiative; Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan; China–Myanmar 
Economic Corridor; Myanmar.
1 Introduction
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), formerly known as One Belt, One 
Road (OBOR) proposed by China’s president, Xi Jinping, and then 
arduously advocated and pushed forward by the Chinese government, 
offers an important opportunity to accelerate efforts to achieve the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) globally. Though different in 
scope, the BRI and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(2030 Agenda) share overlapping goals and objectives with big potential 
to drive mutual synergy (BRF Advisory Council 2019). The five 
pillars of  the BRI – policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, 
unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-to-people bond 
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– are intrinsically linked to the 17 SDGs (Guterres 2019). By closing 
financing gaps and providing new sources of  economic growth through 
improved connectivity, the BRI could help reduce poverty and improve 
a range of  social needs including employment, education, and health.
Myanmar, the largest country in mainland Southeast Asia with a 
population of  53 million and located strategically at the junction of  
Southeast Asia and South Asia, has witnessed rapid growth in recent 
years and become one of  the world’s fastest growing economies 
(IMF 2016). In August 2018, the Myanmar government formulated 
the Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) to ensure 
coherence among different policies and institutions, reinvigorate 
reform, and promote action to achieve the SDGs. In the meantime, 
the new government, led by the National League for Democracy 
(NLD) and State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, has embraced 
the BRI and economic cooperation with China despite some setbacks 
during Myanmar’s post-2011 reforms. While the BRI presents huge 
opportunities for Myanmar to fulfil its MSDP and development 
ambitions as well as the 2030 Agenda, challenges remain.
This article aims to analyse the opportunities and challenges brought 
by the BRI to the implementation of  the MSDP in the context of  
a globally unanimous 2030 Agenda. It is structured in five parts. 
Following this introduction, Section 2 briefly outlines Myanmar’s recent 
development context and the MSDP. Section 3 provides an overview 
and progress of  China–Myanmar cooperation under the BRI based 
on the five pillars. Section 4 discusses opportunities and challenges in 
synergising the BRI and the MSDP and, more importantly, in tapping 
the potential of  the BRI to contribute to Myanmar’s sustainable 
development. Section 5 concludes and puts forward recommendations 
to align the BRI and the MSDP to optimise its use as an investment tool 
for maximum sustainable development dividends.
2 Myanmar’s development context and the MSDP
Myanmar, isolated for much of  the past six decades, is undergoing 
a critical process of  political, economic, and social transition. Since 
opening up in 2012, the country has experienced rapid growth. Though 
the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowed down from 
6.8 per cent in fiscal year (FY) 2017 (1 April 2017–31 March 2018) to 
6.2 per cent in the transitional FY2018 (see Figure 1) according to the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), the growth is still robust by regional 
and global standards (ADB 2019). To promote economic recovery in 
a turbulent global context, the Myanmar government has undertaken 
a series of  policies in recent years including opening up to foreign 
direct investment (FDI) of  retail and wholesale trade and the insurance 
business; implementation of  the Companies Act; and large investments 
in infrastructure projects including those related to the BRI. As a result, 
growth is forecast at 6.6 per cent in FY2019 and 6.8 per cent in FY2020 
(ADB 2019).
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Nevertheless, the country is still facing tremendous development 
challenges. Subnational conflicts are still widespread, affecting up to one 
quarter of  the population, and impeding the entire country’s political 
trajectory, economic growth, and human development (Burke et al. 
2017). The military still plays a massive role in economic governance 
and senior military officers own shares in some of  the most profitable 
extractive businesses (Stokke, Vakulchuk and Øverland 2018). While 
FDI flows increased in 2017/18 compared to the previous fiscal year, 
FDI commitments declined by 14 per cent in 2017/18 compared to 
2016/17, reflecting uncertainty in the investment climate related to the 
Rakhine crisis and weak reform momentum (World Bank 2018).
Major sources of  investment largely rely on Singapore, China, and 
Thailand, and are limited in diversification. Myanmar’s ranking in the 
2019 World Bank Doing Business report remained unchanged at 171st 
out of  185 countries, despite some key improvements in reducing the 
cost of  registering a company and increasing the reliability of  electricity 
supply, and the transparency of  tariff information (World Bank 2018). 
The country also ranks the lowest in the Southeast Asia region in other 
assessments; 148 out of  the 189 countries and territories in the Human 
Development Index (HDI) (UNDP 2018) and 131 out of  the 140 
economies in competitiveness according to the World Economic Forum 
(Schwab 2015).
Persistent low-quality infrastructure remains a major impediment to the 
country’s economic growth and competitiveness (Verbiest and Naing 
2017). Myanmar is one of  the most underdeveloped countries in Asia 
in terms of  infrastructure. Only 38.9 per cent of  the road network is 
paved and only 37 per cent of  the population has access to electricity. 
The country has the lowest road density and greatest power-sector 
Figure 1 Myanmar annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate (2008–18)
Source Author’s own, based on data from the Myanmar Statistical Information Service 
(2019).
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investment needs in the region (Vakulchuk et al. 2017). According to 
the ADB (2014), investment gaps in Myanmar could total as much as 
US$80bn by 2030 or US$4.7bn per year.
In August 2018, the Myanmar government issued the MSDP as the 
single national strategy (2018–30) to provide an overarching plan for 
longer-term sustainable development and strengthen coordination and 
coherence among the myriad sectoral, ministerial, and subnational 
plans. The 66-page-long document not only builds upon multiple 
existing strategy documents and sectoral plans, but also mediates 
between local developmental needs and the global sustainable 
development agenda. It sets out three pillars, five goals, 28 strategies, 
and 251 action plans (see Box 1). The three pillars include peace and 
stability (pillar 1), prosperity and partnership (pillar 2), and people and 
planet (pillar 3), which are the same as the five Ps that broadly capture 
the scope of  the 2030 Agenda.
For each of  the five goals, the MSDP has developed clear strategies and 
multidimensional action plans, to be supported by multiple programmes 
and projects, and a broad range of  stakeholders. Key strategies consist 
of, among others, fostering union-wide peace, promoting equitable 
and conflict-sensitive socioeconomic development, improving rule of  
law and good governance, strengthening civil engagement and public 
participation, enhancing macroeconomic management, supporting job 
creation, creating a secure and conducive investment, as well as building 
a priority infrastructure base (Myanmar Union MOPF 2018). Priority 
sectors include trade, financial services, infrastructure, education 
Box 1 Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (MSDP) (2018–30)
Pillar 1: Peace and stability
Goal 1: Peace, national reconciliation, security, and good 
governance
Goal 2: Economic stability and strengthened macroeconomic 
management
Pillar 2: Prosperity and partnership
Goal 3: Job creation and private sector-led growth
Pillar 3: People and planet
Goal 4: Human resources and social development for a 
twenty-first century society
Goal 5: National resources and the environment for national 
prosperity
Source Myanmar Union MOPF (2018: 5).
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and health, environment, sustainable energy, natural resources, and 
sustainable cities. Though goals and action plans in the MSDP are 
country-specific, relevant SDG targets were identified to ensure 
consistency and alignment between the MSDP and the SDGs.
The Myanmar Union Ministry of  Planning and Finance (MOPF) is 
the focal entity for the implementation of  the MSDP and houses the 
MSDP Implementation Unit (MSDP-IU). The MSDP-IU, consisting 
of  the National Economic Coordination Committee (NECC), the 
Development Assistance Coordination Unit (DACU), and the Planning 
Department, and Policy Appraisal and Progress Reporting Department 
of  the MOPF, is responsible for providing guidance, approving strategic 
decisions, and resolving strategic issues regarding the implementation 
of  the MSDP. With help from the World Bank and other agencies, the 
MOPF also established a project bank to facilitate implementation 
of  the MSDP in a predictable, coordinated, and transparent manner. 
The project bank is a rolling databank consisting of  major and 
transformative projects that have been screened, appraised, and 
prioritised, and that are ready for implementation with the most 
appropriate source of  financing.
Projects included in the database will not only go through the screening 
process which is based on their relevance with strategic planning and 
prioritisation, but also the categorisation process in terms of  source 
of  financing, such as public–private partnership (PPP) projects, 
development assistance projects, and government budget projects. 
Projects will then be dealt with in different ways. For example, budgets 
will be transferred to projects that should be funded by the government; 
development assistance projects are transferred to the DACU and some 
of  the PPP projects will be transferred to the PPP Centre (Aung 2019). 
As of  the end of  June 2019, the project bank has yet to be formerly 
launched and no detailed information at project level has been revealed.
It is worth noting that the MSDP greatly emphasises environmental 
sustainability, including tackling deforestation, mangrove loss, the 
illegal wildlife trade, unregulated mineral extraction, air and water 
pollution, increases in waste, and climate change. It makes clear that 
environmental and social impact studies for all the proposed projects 
must comply with regulations made by the Myanmar Ministry 
of  Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation, and the 
government will be responsible for compensating and resettling those 
who are impacted. The MSDP reflects that the Myanmar government is 
trying to ensure balance between development in economic, social, and 
environmental dimensions. This will have important implications for 
BRI cooperation, to be illustrated in Section 4.
3 China–Myanmar cooperation under the BRI: current status
Despite government change and some setbacks during Myanmar’s 
post-2011 reform, China’s economic engagement with Myanmar 
has deepened. Myanmar is also involved in two of  the six economic 
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corridors identified under the BRI.2 This section outlines the progress 
of  China–Myanmar BRI cooperation in terms of  the five pillars – 
policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, 
financial integration, and people-to-people bond.
3.1 Policy coordination
Improving policy coordination is an important guarantee for 
implementing the BRI. The major indicators include: the building 
of  an intergovernmental macro policy exchange and communication 
mechanism, the number of  visits by leaders from both sides, and mutual 
political trust and alignment in development strategies and policies 
(China National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry 
of  Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of  Commerce 2015). Since 2013, 
when the BRI was proposed, China and Myanmar have made great 
achievements in terms of  policy coordination, reflected by the frequency 
of  visits by Myanmar leaders to China, their positive comments on the 
BRI, as well as progress in BRI cooperation. For example, in November 
2014, Myanmar President U Thein Sein pointed out at the Dialogue of  
Strengthening Connectivity Partnership in Beijing that the BRI would 
bring peace, stability, and prosperity to the world. He then further 
remarked that the Myanmar side would deepen cooperation with China 
in infrastructure connectivity in September 2015 (China News 2015).
State Counsellor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi also paid her first international 
visit to China after winning the election, and was present in the first 
and second Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum in 2017 
and 2019 respectively. The Memorandum of  Understanding (MoU) on 
the BRI signed between the two countries in May 2017 represented a 
milestone for policy coordination between the two sides (Ying 2018).
Cooperation between the two countries under the BRI made another 
great stride when Chinese State Counsellor and Foreign Minister Wang 
Yi proposed the establishment of  the China–Myanmar Economic 
Corridor (CMEC) during his meeting with his counterpart Aung 
San Suu Kyi in November 2017. The CMEC, taking the shape of  
a ‘reverse-Y’, will connect China’s southwestern province of  Yunnan to 
Mandalay in Central Myanmar, and then east to Yangon and West to 
Kyaukpyu, Rakhine State. The CMEC is the second bilateral economic 
corridor after the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and 
constitutes an important part of  the BRI. It aims to promote economic 
integration by linking three important economic centres in Myanmar; 
namely, Mandalay, Yangon New City, and the Kyaukpyu Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) (Ying 2018).
In February 2018, the two sides finalised a 15-point MoU at the 
working group level and agreed to collaborate on many sectors 
including basic infrastructure, construction, manufacturing, agriculture, 
transport, finance, human resource development, telecommunications, 
and research and technology in order to develop the CMEC. Following 
that, the two governments formally signed the MoU to build the CMEC 
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in September 2018 (Thiha 2019). During the second BRI Summit at the 
end of  April 2019, China and Myanmar reached further agreements on 
trade, economic development, and technical assistance.
Myanmar’s positive gesture was further reflected in the establishment 
of  the OBOR Implementation Steering Committee in November 
2018, which is chaired by the State Counsellor and includes chief  
ministers from subnational governments as well as representatives 
from various departments. The functions of  the Steering Committee 
include improving coordination among different organisations, giving 
policy-related guidance, formulating management plans, and organising 
experts to conduct research on BRI-related projects. The Myanmar 
government also formed the CMEC Joint Committee chaired by the 
Union Minister for the MOPF and the CMEC Committee chaired 
by the Union Minister for Commerce in late 2018. Such committees 
not only signal the importance Myanmar attaches to the BRI, but also 
demonstrate that the CMEC is an important part of  the comprehensive 
strategic cooperation between China and Myanmar. That said, the 
Myanmar government has emphasised that the chosen projects under 
the CMEC must align with the country’s national priorities as outlined 
in the MSDP. It has been reported that only nine of  the 30 projects 
proposed by China were approved by the Myanmar side (Lwin 2019).
3.2 Infrastructure connectivity
Infrastructure connectivity is a priority area for implementing the 
initiative, covering transport, port infrastructure, oil and gas pipelines, 
the power grid, civil aviation cooperation, as well as cables and 
other communication networks (China National Development and 
Reform Commission, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of  
Commerce 2015). The projects along the CMEC are largely related 
to infrastructure construction, including the China–Myanmar oil and 
gas pipelines, the Kyaukpyu deep-sea port with two berths in its initial 
phase, the Kunming–Kyaukpyu railway line, the Mandalay–Tigyaing–
Muse expressway, and the Kyaukpyu–Nay Pyi Taw highway projects.
Among them, the China–Myanmar oil and gas pipelines, the first oil 
and gas pipelines running through the south to the north of  Myanmar, 
predate the BRI and are in operation. The crude oil pipeline is jointly 
invested in by the Southeast Asia Pipeline Company Ltd (50.9 per cent), 
a subsidiary company of  the China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), and the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) (49.1 per 
cent). The gas pipeline is jointly invested in by the CNPC Southeast 
Asia Pipeline Company Ltd (50.9 per cent), the MOGE (7.37 per cent), 
the POSCO DAEWOO Corporation (25.04 per cent), the ONGC 
CASPIAN E&P B.V. (8.35 per cent), the Gas Authority of  India 
Ltd (4.17 per cent), and the Korea Gas Corporation (4.17 per cent), 
bringing together six parties from four countries (CNPC 2017).
The China–Myanmar oil and gas pipeline project, through supplying 
energy to China, has not only diversified the oil and gas imports and 
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exports of  Myanmar and spurred growth in the oil and gas industry, 
but also played an important role in providing energy to central and 
northern Myanmar through the different offtake points. For example, 
in Kyaukpyu, due to the project, residents now enjoy 24-hour access 
to electricity at a cheaper cost. The project also contributes substantial 
economic benefits to Myanmar including tax revenue, investment 
dividends, right-of-way fees, cross-border fees, training funds, and others.
Progress has also been made in the Kyaukpyu deep-sea port project. 
China and Myanmar signed a framework agreement on 8 November 
2018, three years after the bid was awarded to the China-based CITIC 
Group. The framework now foresees a US$1.3bn joint investment 
for implementation of  the first phase of  the Kyaukpyu deep-sea port. 
The total cost of  the project, which is now planned in four phases, is 
estimated at about US$7bn. The first phase will include two deep-water 
berths. The China-based CITIC Group will hold 70 per cent stake 
while the remaining 30 per cent will be invested by the Myanmar 
government and local public firms.
The two countries also signed an MoU in October 2018 for preparation 
of  a feasibility study for the Muse–Mandalay railway line. In June 2019, 
the China Railway Eryuan Engineering Company (CREEC) submitted 
a technical report as part of  the feasibility study. The report is based on 
a ground survey along the Muse–Mandalay highway road and includes 
soil analysis results as well as suggested routes. Officials of  the CREEC 
and Myanmar Railways conducted inspections on the ground and also 
held public meetings with the authorities, residents, and elders of  the 
townships of  Kyaukme, Lashio, and Muse, where the railway might 
pass through. The railway is expected to span over 430km with five 
train stations. The designed speed for the train is 160km per hour.
Figure 2 Trade value between China and Myanmar (US$ million)
Source Author’s own, based on data from the Myanmar Statistical Information Service 
(2019).
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3.3 Unimpeded trade
Investment and trade cooperation are a major task in building the 
BRI, including investment and trade facilitation, the reduction and 
removal of  investment and trade barriers, and the optimisation of  
trade structure. During the BRI period 2013–17, Myanmar’s trade 
with China (excluding Hong Kong and Macau) steadily increased 
(see Figure 2) and by 2017, the total trade between the two countries 
exceeded US$11.79bn, an average increase of  13.8 per cent over the 
five years (Myanmar Statistical Information Service 2019). China has 
remained Myanmar’s largest trading partner two years in a row. The 
outward direct investment from China (excluding Hong Kong and 
Macau) in Myanmar, once affected by the suspension of  the Mystone 
Dam project, recovered back to US$12.9bn in 2017 (see Figure 3), with 
344 projects in sectors such as oil and gas, electricity, manufacturing, 
transport, and communications far exceeding those from other major 
countries in the region (ibid.). The investment is likely to further 
increase when the projects planned under the CMEC are implemented, 
including the New Yangon City project (US$1.5bn),3 the Kyaukpyu 
SEZ (US$2bn), the Mandalay Yida Economic and Trade Cooperation 
Zone (US$4bn), and the Myanmar–China border economic 
cooperation zones.
3.4 Financial integration
Financial cooperation is an important element of  implementing the BRI. 
Myanmar is one of  the founding members of  the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB). In 2016, the AIIB, together with the World 
Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the ADB approved 
its first loan for a Myanmar project: a US$20m loan to the 225MW 
(megawatt) Myingyan gas-fired power plant (Frontier Myanmar 2016). 
Myanmar is also one of  the 28 countries that had approved the Guiding 
Figure 3 China’s foreign direct investment in Myanmar in comparison (US$ million)
Source Author’s own, based on data from the Myanmar Statistical Information Service (2019).
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Principles on Financing the Development of  the BRI, which includes 
fostering a transparent, friendly, non-discriminatory, and predicator 
financing environment, underscoring the importance of  conducting 
social and environmental impact assessments and risk management, 
as well as sustainable and inclusive development (China Ministry of  
Finance 2017). China and Myanmar cooperated in a bilateral currency 
swap and settlement. The China and Myanmar Currency Exchange 
Center was established in Ruili City, Yunnan Province in 2015, making 
Ruili the first city to trade kyat in China. The centre intended to build an 
effective platform to promote the Sino–Myanmar currency exchange’s 
standardisation and legalisation, increase China–Myanmar trade, and 
facilitate cross-investment (Yurun and Yingqing 2015).
3.5 People-to-people bond
The people-to-people bond provides public support for implementing 
the BRI reflecting in, among others, education, training, tourism, public 
diplomacy, as well as corporate social responsibility. In 2017, the Chinese 
government awarded 103 Myanmar student scholarships and arranged 
more than 168 short-term training projects with 637 trainees (Ying 
2018). China and Myanmar have also agreed to establish cultural centres 
in the two countries, with the launching of  the China Cultural Center 
in Yangon in 2017. Cooperation and exchanges among thinktanks 
have witnessed a huge increase in the two countries since 2013 (ibid.). 
In addition, China has increased and reoriented its aid to people’s 
livelihood projects in Myanmar, including offering humanitarian aid to 
help displaced people in Rakhine State, performing eye operations for 
Myanmar patients, and implementing a series of  agricultural technology 
transfer projects under the Lancang–Mekong Cooperation Mechanism. 
One of  China’s civil society organisations, the China Foundation for 
Poverty Alleviation, also established its first overseas country office in 
Yangon, providing scholarships for Myanmar students.
4 Discussion
The MSDP has more or less internalised the 2030 Agenda based on 
Myanmar’s context. As Myanmar’s largest neighbour, trading partner, 
major investor, and development partner, China could definitely play an 
important role in fostering sustainable development in Myanmar. The 
BRI, more specifically the CMEC, can be an overarching framework for 
the two sides to upgrade cooperation for shared benefits. Nevertheless, 
there are still daunting challenges ahead to translate such ideas and 
policies into actions.
4.1 Opportunities
The CMEC, as part of  the BRI, represents big opportunities for 
Myanmar to implement its MSDP and the 2030 Agenda in different 
ways. First, the CMEC shares synergies with the MSDP in design 
and represents the convergence of  common interests between the two 
countries. For example, the MSDP considered adequately addressing 
the infrastructure gap and upgrading international transport corridors 
as the key to achieving Myanmar’s development ambitions. In fact, one 
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could argue that the idea of  the CMEC comes from Myanmar’s own 
development plan. The Industrial Policy formulated by Myanmar’s 
Ministry of  Industry in 2016, which later constitutes an important part 
of  the MSDP, identified four economic corridors for global integration, 
including the North–South Economic Corridor, the East–West 
Economic Corridor, the Northeast–Southwest Economic Corridor, and 
the economic corridor from Yangon to Myawaddy. The CMEC greatly 
overlaps two of  them; namely, the North–South Economic Corridor 
(Yangon to Mandalay) and the Northeast–Southwest Economic 
Corridor (Kyaukpyu–Mandalay–Muse).
The Industry Policy also made it clear that Myanmar would construct 
international deep-sea ports and place industries close to them, including 
Kyaukpyu deep-sea port where ‘cargo ships from Europe, Africa and 
West-Asia may dock’ (Myanmar Union MOI 2016: 17). The Kyaukpyu 
SEZ was also long planned as a commercial centre of  port cities to 
help address the economic imbalances between developed Yangon and 
underdeveloped Rakhine State. Thus, it could be said that the CMEC 
fully aligns with the MSDP or even originates from Myanmar’s own 
development plans, catering to Myanmar’s development needs.
Second, the CMEC could be a catalyst for infrastructure development 
and economic growth in Myanmar. A modern and well-functioning 
infrastructure is fundamental to Myanmar to develop into a developed 
market economy. There have been many assessments globally regarding 
the positive impacts of  infrastructure on economic growth, including 
enhancing competitiveness and productivity, improving accessibility of  
public services, facilitating trade and mobility, as well as generating jobs 
(McKinsey and Company 2016; Straub and Terada-Hagiwara 2010). 
Evidence from other countries also suggests that BRI road projects and 
associated investments offer considerable opportunities in increased 
productivity, reduction of  trade costs and barriers, agglomeration 
effects, and flow on effects for production, employment, and incomes 
(Berg et al. 2015).
Road and railway construction under the CMEC would connect major 
urban centres and communities across the country and with major cities 
and markets in neighbouring countries, notably Bangladesh, China, and 
India. For example, with Muse being the largest trade portal between the 
two nations and Mandalay being central Myanmar’s commercial centre, 
the Muse–Mandalay railway line has the potential to play an important 
role in enhancing connectivity between Myanmar and China as well as 
with other regions of  Southeast Asia. Port development could also enable 
Myanmar to become a regional hub, thanks to its strategic location. 
As such, the CMEC could offer Myanmar an important opportunity 
to modernise and industrialise, especially the underdeveloped western 
regions. Improved infrastructure connectivity, delivered to a high quality 
with a focus on viability, resilience, and sustainability would catalyse the 
development of  new industrial chains, value chains, and supply chains, 
nurture human capital, and support long-term growth.
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Thirdly, the BRI could also provide an impetus to address the 
significant financing gap in Myanmar. Given the limited public 
budget, the Myanmar government would need to explore different 
funding mechanisms, including the PPP model, loans from multilateral 
development banks, as well as aid from development partners. The 
different funding mechanisms and channels under the BRI, such as the 
Silk Road Fund, the China Development Bank, the Import and Export 
Bank, Chinese commercial banks, and state-owned enterprises, could 
partially satisfy funding needs.
Meanwhile, the CMEC would also have huge implications for 
the Myanmar peace process as its projects extend across many of  
Myanmar’s conflict areas and affect the livelihoods of  local people. The 
CMEC provides impetus for China to contribute to the peace process 
in Myanmar. To secure the success of  the economic corridor, China will 
need to work with the Myanmar government to address subnational 
conflicts in Northern and Western Myanmar. In fact, the Chinese 
authorities have brokered informal talks to end immediate hostilities 
and pressured ethnic armed organisations to participate in formal peace 
dialogues (International Crisis Group 2017). Arguably, the CMEC could 
complement the Myanmar government’s efforts in promoting peace and 
stability through development.
4.2 Challenges
While there is strong political will and passion from the Myanmar 
government for the BRI, few projects have been implemented and there 
are daunting obstacles ahead to put the CMEC on the ground.
Firstly, the CMEC currently lacks concrete and effective tools to address 
the security risks led by the domestic crisis in Myanmar. Subnational 
conflict in Myanmar is not a peripheral issue and the reasons are 
extremely complex, driven by competing demands concerning control 
over resources, authority, and territory (Burke et al. 2017). Conflicts 
between the Myanmar government and ethnic armed groups not only 
jeopardised border security and regional connectivity but also brought 
security risks to Chinese investors in Myanmar. The Rohingya issue in 
Rakhine and ethnic armed rebels in northern Myanmar constitute the 
major hurdles for the CMEC. For example, Kyaukpyu is located in the 
restive Rakhine State, and although the Kyaukpyu deep-sea port and SEZ 
are not in the Rohingya conflict zone, the potential threat that Rohingya 
militants pose to the Kyaukpyu infrastructure cannot be easily dismissed. 
Highways and railways under the CMEC will also pass through other 
conflict zones. In addition, conflicts in northern Myanmar have resulted 
in the occasional closure of  some border posts and the deaths and injuries 
of  Chinese civilians. While there might be strong concerns about debt 
sustainability on the Myanmar side, it is threats to the security of  Chinese 
works and Chinese-built infrastructure projects that worry the Chinese 
side most and could potentially hamper cooperation. The non-intervention 
foreign policy principle further constrains China’s policy options in 
dealing with such complex issues at Myanmar’s subnational level.
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Secondly, while the CMEC receives a widespread positive attitude from 
government officials and business communities, Myanmar’s public seem 
to have little knowledge of  the CMEC and remain suspicious of  China’s 
investment. The CMEC faces challenges in both information and 
trust deficit. China’s growing footprints in Myanmar aroused popular 
resentment and social unrest in the past and such memories have not 
withered away. With the adoption of  opening up policy in Myanmar, its 
civil society groups are becoming more active and vocal as well as more 
cautious towards China’s investment.
However, the author’s field visits revealed that a large proportion of  
civil society and the public rely on social media regarding CMEC 
information. Very few thinktanks are doing research and exchanges 
on the CMEC or even China’s cooperation with Myanmar due to a 
shortage of  funding and expertise. In the meantime, the Myanmar 
public also has territorial concerns regarding further integration with 
China. For example, in early 2019, a piece of  news regarding a Chinese 
company’s establishment of  the Yongbang Digital Economic Zone in 
Mongla, Shan State, which will encourage use of  digital currency, has 
provoked wide complaints on the violation of  the country’s sovereignty 
(Wansai 2019).
Thirdly, as many of  the CMEC projects are large infrastructure 
projects, they will face huge challenges in terms of  land acquisition and 
compensation, environmental protection, and stakeholder engagement 
in Myanmar. The SDGs and the MSDP both recognise that Myanmar’s 
development depends fundamentally on sustainable management of  
the natural environment. Studies have shown that Myanmar’s natural 
environment functions greatly as a capital asset, providing goods and 
services to the country’s citizens (Mandle et al. 2016; Emerton and 
Aung 2013). As such, the Myanmar government has repeatedly made 
it clear that there would be no exception to the rigorous and stringent 
assessment process of  identifying and reviewing projects under the 
CMEC, taken from their strategic alignment with the MSDP.
Though the MSDP sets out that the Myanmar government will be 
responsible for land acquisition and resettlement, history has shown that 
the issue is more complex on the ground. Land disputes often emerge 
for different reasons, including unclear or overlapping ownership, the 
theft of  compensation funds by corrupt local governments, or concerns 
about losing livelihoods resulting from loss of  land. The China–
Myanmar oil and gas pipelines project, completed in 2015, still has 
disputes regarding land compensation.
According to a report from the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) 
in Myanmar (Helsingen et al. 2017), the BRI road infrastructure, 
if  not properly planned or constructed, could have many negative 
impacts including increased risks of  natural disasters such as landslides 
and flooding, water pollution, wildlife mortality, and ecosystem 
degradation. The significance of  these risks is underscored by the fact 
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that the CMEC cuts through areas that are home to about 24 million 
people and they could be impacted by increased sedimentation due to 
upstream infrastructure development, deforestation, and other land use 
change (ibid.).
Underlining all of  the challenges regarding land acquisition, 
environmental protection, and community engagement are a lack 
of  proper systems, institutions, instruments, and capacities on both 
sides to monitor, assess, and make changes accordingly during 
project implementation. For example, despite improving its domestic 
environmental policies, China still does not promulgate regulations 
concerning environmental protection of  its foreign direct investment. 
Guidelines for foreign investment and the promotion of  corporate social 
responsibility largely rely on the initiative of  the investing company. 
Environmental criteria and their impacts in decision-making are still 
unclear for major Chinese funders such as the Import and Export Bank 
and the China Development Bank.
Another important issue lies in how to deal with the relationship among 
different interest groups and how to establish a broader community 
of  common interests. Rapid changes that accompany accelerated 
development generate both winners and losers and can create instability. 
Field studies also revealed that local residents would only support 
development initiatives if  they experience direct benefits. Community 
members often supported improvements to local roads which ease direct 
access to markets, schools, and hospitals. However, some have expressed 
concerns that new and large roads would enable more military 
engagement, attract armed disputes over taxation, land confiscation, 
or forced displacement, as well as flows of  migrants from other regions 
(Burke et al. 2017: 34).
Fourthly, there are also financial sustainability concerns on the 
Myanmar side. The railway and highways across the northern 
mountain ranges could be very expensive. An earlier feasibility study for 
the railway priced the project at US$20bn, and China had offered to 
pay for 90 per cent. However, even then, Myanmar could not afford its 
share. China and Myanmar also face several other financial challenges. 
Myanmar’s financial system fails to meet international standards. 
The country’s stock market is still underdeveloped, and it is hard for 
enterprises to obtain financing in Myanmar. In addition, as a currency 
swap agreement has yet to be signed between China and Myanmar, it is 
inconvenient for Chinese enterprises to invest in Myanmar.
5 Conclusion and recommendations
The Myanmar NLD government has adopted various policies to 
reinvigorate and maintain its economic growth, including issuing 
the MSDP and embracing the BRI. In essence, the MSDP and the 
BRI are fully aligned and the BRI could be an important vehicle for 
Myanmar to realise its development ambitions and achieve the SDGs. 
This is probably why China–Myanmar BRI cooperation has steadily 
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progressed, unanticipated by many observers. Nevertheless, to fully tap 
the potential of  the BRI’s contribution to the MSDP, both countries still 
face huge challenges in security, social, environmental, and financial 
dimensions, and will need to make strong efforts to bring the initiative to 
the ground.
First and foremost, China and Myanmar should mainstream conflict-
sensitive approaches into all aspects of  CMEC implementation. 
A sustained peace is integral to both the CMEC and Myanmar’s 
sustainable development. The MSDP attributes domestic conflicts to 
‘mistrust between groups, the lack of  transparent and accountable public 
institutions, the exclusion and marginalisation of  people from decision-
making processes as well as a persuasive sense of  injustice generated by 
inequitable distribution of  resources, acute macroeconomic instability 
and vulnerability to economic shocks’ (Myanmar Union MOPF 2018: 8).
As such, while continuing to provide necessary assistance to the Union 
Peace Conference – 21st Century Panglong, China should work with 
Myanmar partners to make sure programmes and projects under the 
CMEC are designed, implemented, and managed with the participation 
of  all stakeholders. Great efforts should be made in terms of  disclosing 
information and decentralising management of  development activities, 
especially when the CMEC passes through many of  the conflict-affected 
areas. While the CMEC could strengthen social, economic, and physical 
connectivity between lagging regions such as Kyaukpyu with growth 
hubs such as Mandalay and Yangon, special attention should be paid 
to improve benefits at the subnational level, including fiscal income and 
job opportunities. China could also prioritise flows of  its development 
assistance into the areas along the economic corridor.
Secondly, more efforts will be needed to increase the public’s confidence 
in the CMEC in Myanmar. Detailed information regarding MoUs and 
agreements signed by both governments should be disclosed in a timely 
manner. Bidding for and the tendering of  CMEC projects should be 
open to local, regional, and global actors. Joint research and dialogues 
with and among thank tanks and civil society groups should be 
encouraged. With the support of  joint governments, 1.5-track or 2-track 
mechanisms could be established. Both sides could also enhance the 
multilateral dimension of  the CMEC to improve credibility, including 
working together with different multilateral and bilateral parties such as 
the World Bank, the ADB, Japan, Thailand, and Singapore.
Thirdly, responsible investment, including active engagement with 
community and civil society organisations should be encouraged. After 
a series of  high-profile controversies such as the Myitsone Dam and the 
Letpadaung copper mine project, Chinese companies need to attend 
to local people’s concerns over environmental and social impacts to 
restore the Myanmar public’s trust in Chinese investments. Both sides 
should encourage community-based development initiatives and adopt 
consultative methods such as establishing village committees and giving 
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residents a say in deciding and monitoring the spending of  funds. 
Environmental and social impact assessments should be made available 
to the public in a manner that is accessible to all sectors of  society, 
encouraging diverse participation and collaboration.
Both governments should also consider taking mandatory measures to 
enhance environmental accountability in pushing forward the CMEC. 
Chinese parties should put into use the sustainability criteria stipulated 
in the Guidance on the Building of  the Green Belt and Road released by China’s 
Ministry of  Environmental Protection (2017), and refer to global 
sustainability standards for infrastructure development in Myanmar. 
Thorough infrastructure planning should be encouraged to avoid 
critical areas, including areas important for biodiversity and providing 
ecosystem services. The participation of  Myanmar civil society at all 
levels and stages of  project planning should be facilitated to avoid 
negative social and environmental impacts. Patience, transparency, and 
public participation in the decision-making process are the key to ensure 
success for the BRI and the CMEC.
Fourthly, given the fiscal constraints faced by the Myanmar government, 
both sides should make efforts to diversify its financing options, 
including the promotion of  the PPP model and better design and use 
of  China’s grants. In principle, infrastructure projects that are deemed 
commercially viable and bankable should be pursued through PPP 
and other innovative financing models. Given the relatively quick 
development of  PPP in China, China can strengthen its knowledge-
sharing with Myanmar in improving PPP mechanisms, including those 
relating to procurement and other relevant areas. China and Myanmar 
can also agree to strategically make use of  China’s grants to support the 
advancement of  the CMEC, including supporting feasibility studies, 
carrying out environmental and social assessment, improving vocational 
education and providing livelihood projects for people to be affected 
by different projects. In addition, the Chinese Ministry of  Finance has 
issued a Debt Sustainability Framework for Participating Countries of  
the Belt and Road Initiative (China Ministry of  Finance 2019).4 China 
and Myanmar could jointly conduct debt sustainability analysis (DSA) 
to provide references for lending decisions and manage debt risks.
During the second BRI Summit, China has placed high quality at the 
centre of  the BRI agenda and commits the BRI to peace, prosperity, 
inclusiveness, openness, innovation, greenness, and cleanness. Perhaps 
no country more than Myanmar would welcome the BRI if  these 
commitments are translated into actions.
Notes
*  This IDS Bulletin is supported by the Center for International 
Knowledge on Development’s (CIKD) China–UK Partnership 
Programme on Knowledge for Development.
1 Zhou Taidong, Director, Global Development Research Division, 
Center for International Knowledge on Development (CIKD), 
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Development Research Center of  the State Council (DRC) and PhD 
candidate at the China Agricultural University, China.
2 Namely, the New Eurasian Land Bridge, the China–Mongolia–
Russia Economic Corridor, the China–Central Asia–West Asia 
Economic Corridor, the China–Mainland Southeast Asia Economic 
Corridor, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, and the 
Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor.
3 The New Yangon City Project is a commercial project but part of  the 
CMEC plan. A framework agreement was signed between the New 
Yangon Development Company and the China Communications 
Construction Company (CCCC), which envisions a complex of  new 
towns, industrial parks, and urban development projects.
4 The Debt Sustainability Framework for Participating Countries of  
the BRI was issued by the Chinese Ministry of  Finance in April 
2019. It is a non-mandatory policy tool which sets out procedures of  
debt sustainability analysis, including debt coverage, macroeconomic 
projections, realism tools, country classification, and debt-carrying 
capacity, stress tests, risk signals, the use of  judgement, the final risk 
ratings, and the DSA write-up.
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The Belt and Road Initiative and 
Africa’s Sustainable Development: 
A Case Study of Kenya*
Jing Gu1 and Shen Qiu2
Abstract There is extensive international debate over the contribution 
of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to achieving the global Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). The potential for the BRI to make a substantial 
contribution to realising the SDGs has been acknowledged by leading 
global, regional, and national representatives. The BRI as a developmental 
project with global reach is heavily backed financially by China, and 
reflects the need for stronger instruments to implement and deliver 
on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the SDGs. Yet, 
there are practical challenges in the BRI–SDG relationship set against an 
international debate centred on concerns, criticisms, and ‘pushback’. This 
article assesses this relationship and provides a comprehensive examination 
of China–Kenya cooperation under the BRI and its implications for Kenyan 
implementation of the SDGs. Its arguments are based on both official 
documents and data, and primary research. Its findings contribute to the 
discussion on the potential of the BRI for Africa’s sustainable development.
Keywords: China, Belt and Road Initiative, Kenya, Sustainable 
Development Goals, Africa, investment, Mombasa–Nairobi Standard 
Gauge Railway, health, sustainable development.
1 Introduction
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), proposed in 2013 by China’s 
president, Xi Jinping, and officially launched in 2015, is justified as a 
global development project that aims:
[T]o promote the connectivity of  Asian, European and African 
continents and their adjacent seas, establish and strengthen 
partnerships among the countries along the Belt and Road, set up 
all-dimensional, multitiered and composite connectivity networks, and 
realise diversified, independent, balanced and sustainable development 
in these countries (China National Development and Reform 
Commission, Ministry of  Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of  Commerce).
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In recent years, the BRI has evolved into a worldwide project (Zou 2018). 
The BRI is now a multidimensional, multilayered project. However, at 
its core, it concentrates on building greater capacity, principally through 
infrastructure with a focus on transport, communications, and energy. 
The BRI involves China underwriting hundreds of  billions (and perhaps 
trillions, eventually) of  US dollars of  infrastructure investment across 
the world. The key agencies primarily responsible for disbursing BRI 
funding include the Silk Road Fund, the China Development Bank, and 
the Export–Import Bank of  China (China Exim Bank). The multilateral 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) is also a major financier of  
the BRI.
The BRI is moving into a new phase, undergoing what is being 
described as a shift from painting the broad strokes to refining the details 
(The Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation 
2019a, 2019b). The second Belt and Road Forum reached an extensive 
consensus on promoting ‘high-quality cooperation’ under the BRI, 
stressing open, green, and clean approaches, as well as goals of  
high-standard, livelihood-improving, and sustainable development 
(Xinhua News 2019). Up to 30 April 2019, China had signed 187 
BRI cooperation documents with 131 countries and 30 international 
organisations, including 39 African countries and the African Union 
(Belt and Road Portal 2019). However, this article examines the 
following question: what does the BRI contribute to Africa’s sustainable 
development? The article indicates aspects of  China’s development 
cooperation with Africa, particularly as this cooperation intersects with 
the evolving BRI, and considers the case of  Kenya – an important BRI 
strategic partner.
The objective of  this article is to explain and evaluate how African 
states engage with the BRI. It provides an examination of  China–Kenya 
cooperation under the BRI and its implications for the Kenyan economy 
and sustainable development. The study is spurred by a continuing 
debate over the impact on African development as the BRI moves into 
a new evolutionary phase. The article’s arguments are based on both 
official documents and data, and primary research, and its findings 
contribute to the wider debate by exemplifying the Kenya case, which is 
valuable for observing the potential of  the BRI for Africa’s sustainable 
development. The article is also grounded in, and takes its point of  
departure from, the wider development literature on aid and sustainable 
development, and works that seek to relate the BRI to this broader 
context with the breadth of  perspectives embodied within them.
2 The BRI’s engagement in Africa
2.1 The basis of China–Africa cooperation
China has a long history of  providing fraternal support and solidarity 
with African independence movements and post-independence states. 
The advent of  the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), the 
publication of  China’s Africa Policy in 2006, and the implementation 
of  China’s ‘Going Out’ policy for the internationalisation of  Chinese 
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enterprises provided the context, within which the past two decades have 
seen China’s engagement with Africa transition from primarily political 
relations to one grounded substantively in economic and development 
relations. Adding to the FOCAC process are initiatives of  the BRICS 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) (Gu et al. 2016; Cabestan 
2019), through trilateral cooperation arrangements such as the Africa–
Britain–China (ABC) initiative (Gu 2017).
Despite the impetus towards stronger Sino-African cooperation, 
there is far from a consensus over China’s role and impact in Africa 
with differing perspectives and interpretations at play in the debate. 
Juxtaposed to the view that China’s involvement in Africa is not 
altruistic, but based on a realistic and practical partnership of  reciprocal 
needs and mutual gains, are detailed data analyses assessing aspects such 
as China’s economic impact on Africa (Oqubay and Lin 2019; Jayaram, 
Kassiri and Sun 2017); China’s role in mitigating poverty and inequality 
in Africa (Huu and Schwiebert 2019); ‘responsible engagement’ (Xu 
2017: 1), including China’s changing approach to global corporate 
social responsibility (Agbebi 2018; Ho 2017; Liu 2015); and China’s 
environmental footprint in Africa (Shinn 2015; Compagnon and 
Alejandro 2013; China House 2018).
The academic and policy-oriented literature on Sino-African relations is 
substantial (Gu and Carey 2019; Mbaidjol 2018; Zhao 2017; Xu 2017; 
United States House of  Representatives 2018; United States Senate, 
Committee on Foreign Relations 2017; Gu and McCluskey 2015; 
Alden and Alves 2015; Okolo and Akwu 2015; Gadzala 2015; van Dijk 
2011; Raine 2009; Alden 2007; Alden and Davies 2006). This literature 
provides a broad spectrum of  perspectives. Indicative of  the critical 
perspective is the argument that China is simply replicating the so-called 
‘resources curse’ of  many of  its developing partners, which in effect locks 
these economies into structural underdevelopment and undermines 
Africa’s own efforts to undertake effective sustainable development and 
to strengthen the quality of  African governance. This perspective is 
clearly expressed by Lawson-Remer and Greenstein: ‘Instead of  creating 
prosperity, resources have too often fostered corruption, undermined 
inclusive economic growth, incited armed conflict and damaged the 
environment’ (2012: 21). The literature includes perspectives that portray 
China as a spectre haunting Africa (Lee 2018), as invading Africa (Dok 
and Thayer 2019), and as the latest in a long line of  neo-colonial powers 
intent on exploiting Africa’s natural and human resources (Su 2017; 
Insaidoo 2016; Junbo and Frasheri 2014; Rich and Recker 2013).
2.2 The changing position of Africa in the development process of the BRI
During the BRI’s initial stages, the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building 
Silk Road and Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road3 
implied that the BRI should mainly focus on the connectivity along Asia 
and Europe. Its roadmap did not explicitly cover Africa. On 4 December 
2015, the Chinese government issued the second China–Africa Policy, 
which is the guiding policy document. The African component of  the 
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BRI has taken time to establish. Nonetheless, by April 2019, 39 out of  
53 African countries, and the African Union, had signed BRI-related 
Memoranda of  Understanding (MoUs) with China. Despite a relatively 
slow early beginning, the BRI is now at the core of  China–Africa 
development cooperation, trade, and investment, and is a central 
component of  China’s working relationship with the African Union (AU).
In 2018, China’s total import and export volume with Africa was 
US$204.19bn, a year-on-year increase of  19.7 per cent. China’s exports 
to Africa were US$104.91bn, up 10.8 per cent and China’s imports 
from Africa were US$99.28bn, up 30.8 per cent; the surplus was 
US$5.63bn, down 70 per cent year-on-year (MOFCOM 2019). The 
BRI’s concentration on infrastructure capacity building is variously 
portrayed as a means of  politically stabilising Africa (Korybko 2019), or 
the key to unlocking Africa’s need for infrastructure. African states have 
an imperative need for high-quality infrastructure. Africa’s transport, 
electrification, and communications capacity is among the lowest in the 
world. The African Development Bank suggests that the continent’s 
infrastructure needs amount to US$130–170bn a year, with a financing 
gap in the range of  US$68–108bn (ADB 2019: 18). The September 
2018 FOCAC saw China sign MoUs with 37 African countries and the 
AU on jointly developing the Belt and Road.
China’s BRI project has established a significant network of  cooperation 
links with African countries. For example, the 756km Ethiopia–Djibouti 
electrified railway connecting Addis Ababa to Djibouti Port; the 
US$3.5bn Doraleh Multi-Purpose Port and international free trade 
zone; a new standard gauge railway in Tanzania; the Maputo–Katembe 
bridge in Mozambique – opened in November 2018, with a main 
span of  680 metres, the bridge is the longest of  its kind in Africa; and 
in August 2017, the China Gezhouba Group announced a US$4.5bn 
contract to build a 2,172MW hydropower plant in Angola, which, when 
completed, will supply up to half  the country’s total electricity.4
3 China–Kenya cooperation under the BRI: progress and challenges
3.1 Overview
According to Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta:
The Belt and Road Initiative gives our continent the opportunity 
to make a paradigm shift. Post-colonial Africa has been stuck in a 
rut… It will be a win-win situation when our people have the skills, 
assets and financing necessary to participate in the development of  
the infrastructure corridors that will enhance connectivity, support 
trade and reduce the cost of  doing business between our countries… 
We will all win when the economic corridors we develop hasten 
industrialisation; and when they hasten the development of  domestic 
private-sector capabilities (Xinhua News 2017a).
Kenya has been one of  the fastest growing economies in sub-Saharan 
Africa: the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) annual growth 
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rate averaged 5.45 per cent from 2004 to 2018 (Trading Economics 
2019). Nevertheless, despite the sustained economic growth and clear 
improvements across the range of  human development indices, the 
development challenges facing Kenya remain substantial. The 2017 
Human Capital Index’s (HCI) key finding was that a child born in Kenya 
today is 52 per cent of  who s/he could be with complete education and 
full health (UNDP 2018a). Almost 40 per cent of  Kenyans live in poverty 
with 14.5 per cent in extreme poverty. The country’s unemployment 
rate stood at 11.5 per cent in 2017, above the average of  10.8 per cent 
for the period 1991–2017. The population is also vulnerable to natural 
disaster. In 2017, the Kenyan government declared a severe drought to 
be a national emergency, with 23 of  47 counties affected. It was reported 
that 5.6 million people were in need of  humanitarian assistance with 
3.4 million people food-insecure (UNDP 2018b: 9).
Kenya’s 2017 Human Development Index (HDI) value was calculated 
at 0.590, placing the country in the medium human development 
category with a ranking of  142 out of  189 countries and territories 
(UNDP 2018a). In addition, in the assessment of  the UN’s Human 
Capital project, Kenya’s HCI for 2017 was ‘higher than what would be 
predicted for its income level’ with Kenya’s HCI ranking 94 out of  157 
(World Bank 2018a: 2). The aim of  the HCI project is to raise awareness 
and increase demand for interventions to build human capital.
In response to this aim for interventions to build human capital 
and to accelerate progress in raising human capital outcomes, the 
Kenyan government is pursuing its long-term national development 
Vision 2030. The aim of  this strategy is to turn the country into a newly 
industrialising, ‘middle-income country providing a high-quality life to 
all its citizens by 2030’ (Kenya Vision 2030, 2018). The strategy sets out 
the so-called Big Four development priorities: manufacturing, universal 
health care, affordable housing, and food security. This is promoting 
national economic development by increasing infrastructure, promoting 
sustainable development and accelerating poverty eradication (World 
Bank 2018b). The Kenyan government identifies investment in 
infrastructure capacity building as the critical means by which to 
achieve its sustainable development objectives. Kenya’s industrial 
transformation programme is intended to increase the country’s 
manufacturing base and exports. A key factor is the need for transport, 
communications, energy, and water infrastructure capacity building. 
This requires large-scale funding and implementation expertise, a 
value-added and comparative advantage possible through engagement 
with the BRI.
As a 2017 Chatham House assessment of  the Standard Gauge Railway 
(SGR) project reflected, ‘whether the partnership with China can 
deliver sustainable development will be much harder to determine, and 
is a question that will shape Kenyan politics for many years to come’ 
(Chatham House 2017). What then is the alignment between the BRI, 
the SDGs, and Kenya’s Vision 2030 with consideration to implementing 
94 | Gu and Shen The Belt and Road Initiative and Africa’s Sustainable Development: A Case Study of Kenya
Vol. 50 No. 4 December 2019 ‘The Belt and Road Initiative and the SDGs: Towards Equitable, Sustainable Development’
the SDGs? There are three aspects to this. Firstly, the BRI provides an 
existing, functioning framework of  finance, organisation, and project 
experience with which to potentially help Kenya deliver on its national 
economic programme, SDG strategy, and HCI interventions.
Secondly, the approach to development and the aims of  the BRI 
embodied in its 2015 Vision (2015) are held by leading officials of  the 
major global and regional intergovernmental organisations to coalesce 
with the 17 SDGs. Reflecting this, the second Belt and Road Forum’s 
(BRF) List of  Deliverables indicates that the BRI’s work programme 
actively engages with the SDGs, explicitly mainstreaming the SDGs 
into its industrialisation, health, education, energy, and environmental 
policies and implementation strategies (The Second Belt and Road 
Forum for International Cooperation 2019c; UN Environment 2018).
Thirdly, the SDGs were formally launched in Kenya in September 
2016 and implementation began. This process has mainstreamed 
both the SDGs and the AU Agenda 2063 into the preparation of  the 
third Medium-Term Programme (2018–22) and the second County 
Integrated Development Plans (CIDPs), providing the policy framework 
through which to engage the BRI. The following discussion considers 
these issues with respect to trade, investment, and health.
3.2 Trade
China became Kenya’s largest trading partner in 2014 (Etyang 2015) 
and Kenya established itself  as China’s sixth largest trading partner in 
Africa (White and Case 2018). In 2017, Kenya’s imports from China 
reached US$3,778bn, accounting for approximately 23 per cent of  
Kenya’s total imports. However, Kenya’s exports to China in 2017 were 
worth only US$96.7m, representing 1.68 per cent of  Kenya’s total 
exports (World Bank 2017).
Over 90 per cent of  China’s main exports to Kenya are made up 
by higher-value finished products, machinery and transportation 
equipment, and miscellaneous products. In return, Kenya’s exports 
to China are low-value agricultural and natural resources. Oil and, 
increasingly, titanium exports offer Kenya the potential for future 
higher-value exports to China, and recent agreement on the export of  
additional agricultural products such as avocados and floriculture are 
also raising the prospect for increased exports to China and revenue 
generation. China is an important export market for Kenya’s titanium. 
In the first nine months of  2017, Kenya’s titanium exports totalled 
US$93.81m (Yunch Titanium 2018).
A number of  long-standing concerns have been raised in Kenya about 
its trade relationship with China, with Kenya portrayed as getting 
a raw deal in its China trade. These concerns begin with the sheer 
size of  the deficit and the minimal volume, value, low value-added 
of  Kenyan exports, and the heavy dependency on titanium. In 2017, 
Kenya’s export value to China was 2 per cent of  China’s total, and 
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imports from China represented 23 per cent of  the total. Whilst imports 
of  equipment and materials were needed to construct Phase I of  the 
flagship Sino-Kenyan cooperation project, the US$3.6bn SGR between 
Mombasa and Nairobi may have temporarily inflated Kenyan imports 
from China and the further development of  the rail network may have 
prolonged this effect. If  the SGR is taken out of  the equation, then the 
underlying economic structural problem for Kenya remains. Further 
concerns focus on the undercutting of  local manufacturers, either 
by the alleged dumping of  Chinese goods or by import growth from 
China driven by the preference of  Kenyan traders for cheaper and 
speedier stock, including goods made in Kenya. There are also civil 
society claims of  Chinese neo-colonialism; for instance, the Pan-African 
Alliance’s assertion that, ‘slowly but surely China’s neocolonial 
hegemony is being achieved. And it seems like Africans are powerless to 
stop it’ (Junbo and Frasheri 2014; Malik 2018; Addis and Zuping 2018).
China’s expanding trade relationship with Kenya is having a knock-on 
effect for Kenya’s domestic banks. On the one hand there is, prima facie, 
a positive impact with Kenyan banks reporting a rise in the number 
of  Chinese clients and increased commercial business with Chinese 
companies – some Kenyan banks are now issuing performance bonds 
and guarantees for Chinese companies with dedicated desks with 
Chinese-speaking staff, opening up new business opportunities and 
trade finance products. However, at the same time, Kenyan banks are 
experiencing major challenges and there are concerns that, despite their 
efforts to adapt in order to realise these new opportunities, local banks 
are not benefiting from the growth in Chinese commercial business as 
they had anticipated, being sidelined by new Chinese entrants to the 
Kenyan banking sector and by different banking practices (Wass 2018).
But the majority of  the debate over what to do about the trade deficit 
centres on how the respective governments can work together to address 
the underlying structural asymmetries to reduce the deficit. For China, 
this has meant recognising the concerns of  the Kenyan government and 
signing new agreements to allow preferential market access for Kenyan 
agricultural goods such as avocados. China and Kenya have signed a 
protocol opening up frozen avocado exports to China, but (as at June 
2019) exports of  fresh avocados were still blocked due to Chinese 
bio-safety concerns. However, whilst China’s approach and level of  
responsiveness are important factors, there are Kenyan perspectives 
that focus on what the Kenyan government can do to help adjust the 
imbalance. For example, there are arguments proposing that Kenya 
adopt a more protectionist stance. Indicative of  this perspective, the 
University of  Nairobi’s Dr Iraki argues that with a stricter regulatory 
tariff approach, Kenya ‘can become more efficient, reduce labour costs, 
create local demand by improving on the quality and in the spirit of  
“Trumponomics”, become more patriotic’ (Daily Nation 2017).
In terms of  the Kenyan government’s own negotiating position, Kenya 
has refused to sign the 2018 China–EAC Free Trade Agreement. 
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Kenya’s Trade Ministry Principal Secretary Chris Kiptoo is reported as 
stating that:
China already accounts for 25 per cent of  Kenya’s import bill under 
the current common external tariff structure of  zero per cent, 10 per 
cent and 25 per cent for raw materials, intermediate goods and 
final goods respectively. This means that China is likely to get even 
a larger share of  Kenya’s market once we enter into a free trade 
arrangement (Otieno 2018).
According to Secretary Kiptoo, the Kenyan government is,
seeking a preferential, non-reciprocal trade deal, giving Kenyan 
exports duty free access to China. Such a scheme could be modelled 
on the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which allows 
African exports like apparel and textiles duty free access to the US 
market (Miriri 2019).
The sticking point for the Chinese government is the non-reciprocal 
element as this runs counter to its generic development philosophy and 
to its East African Community (EAC) free trade agreement. For the 
Kenyan government, the non-reciprocal provision is vital to protect its 
economy from what it believes would be a flood of  cheap imports that 
would undercut its manufacturers and continue to widen the trade gap.
3.3 Investment
China is an increasingly important investor and financier to Kenya. 
According to the then incoming Chinese Ambassador to Kenya, Wu 
Peng, China’s non-financial direct investment in Kenya in 2018 had 
doubled over that of  the previous year to about US$520m (Peng 2019). 
This foreign direct investment (FDI) is primarily channelled into a 
range of  sectors, most notably, construction, industrial engineering, 
the creative industries, transportation equipment, food and beverages, 
tobacco and alcohol, information and communications technology, 
electronic products, financial services, and consumer goods. Among 
them, the construction industry has the largest scale of  investment and 
the largest number of  projects.
Kenya’s infrastructure needs are extensive, as the following examples 
illustrate. The first example is the high profile US$3.8bn Mombasa–
Nairobi SGR, described in April 2019 by Wu Peng as ‘one of  the 
benchmarks of  BRI’ (Peng 2019). The SGR has cut the transit times 
for travellers dramatically and taken vehicles off the overburdened 
road system, but issues and controversy surround it including the 
quadrupling of  the construction cost; Kenyan government debt and 
its servicing; the longer-term need to see a return on the investment 
made because of  the escalated cost; China’s unwillingness to underwrite 
the next stage of  the railway’s development; and the environmental 
implications and operational costs incurred by the choice of  diesel to 
power the engines.
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The project has two scheduled phases, Mombasa–Nairobi and Nairobi–
Malaba. The 472km Mombasa–Nairobi phase is complete and has 
been opened. The Nairobi–Malaba phase has three segments: Phase 
2A stretches a further 120km from Nairobi to Naivasha; Phase 2B adds 
270km, from Naivasha to Kisumu; and Phase 2C is a 107km extension 
from Kisumu to Malaba. This is an important project for the Kenyan 
government’s economic, developmental, and cleaner energy strategy; 
for its aim to position Kenya as a regional transport and economic hub; 
and to integrate into the BRI’s connectivity networks. This project has 
been 90 per cent funded by the China Exim Bank and post-completion 
has been managed and operated by a Chinese company. In 2014, China 
agreed to loan Kenya US$3.233bn through the China Exim Bank to 
build the railway. The loan was made up of  a US$1.633bn commercial 
loan and US$1.6bn concessional loan and the agreement provided for a 
five-year repayment grace period.
Completion of  the first phase led to Chinese government claims being 
made as to the benefits to Kenya of  this cooperation, including the 
anticipated contribution to Kenya’s GDP growth of  around 1.5 per 
cent, creation of  46,000 jobs and a multiplier effect through the 
local economy through extensive subcontracting to Kenyan firms, 
technology transfers, and mentoring through a new rail engineering 
academy, and new study and training opportunities (Xinhua News 
2017b). For the Kenyan government, this is a flagship project and, 
for both governments, is presented as a successful symbolic example 
of  cooperation and a step forward in meeting Kenya’s priorities. The 
Chinese government presents a positive record for the railway: ‘Over 
2.71 million passengers have travelled with SGR, with an average 
attendance rate of  99 per cent. Around 4.04m tonnes of  goods have 
been transported through the railway, with economic indicators 
surpassing expectations’ (Peng 2019).
However, a Kenyan ministerial statement to Parliament indicated that 
the rail link has run at a loss for both commuter and freight services 
(The Citizen 2019). Kenyan government ministers cited low freight 
business as the main cause, but claimed the railway would have a better 
future performance, achieving profitability by June 2019. However, 
media reportage of  the rail company and Kenyan national data shows 
that this expectation has not been realised. The Kenyan National Bureau 
of  Statistics (KNBS) calculated that, in the first full year of  operating, 
the SGR earnings were 44 per cent below original expectations with 
freight earnings adjusted downwards by almost 50 per cent. Repayments 
on the principal loan from the China Exim Bank would begin in July 
2019, increasing the cost of  payments substantially by a factor of  six to 
Ksh34.3bn (US$332m) in the 2019/20 financial year (ibid.).
Adding to this situation, China has not agreed to the Kenyan 
government’s repeated requests for funding for the Naivasha–Malaba 
section. This leaves the originally planned project in question. The 
Kenyan government did gain agreement for funding at the BRF 
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through concessional financing and public–private partnerships 
(PPP) for projects including a Konza Data Centre and Smart Cities 
Project to be undertaken by Huawei construction of  the Nairobi Jomo 
Kenyatta International Airport to James Gichuru expressway on a PPP 
arrangement with the China Road and Bridge Corporation. In addition 
to the deep concerns raised over the Kenyan government’s burgeoning 
debt servicing responsibility arising from the SGR, is a debate over 
the management practices of  the Chinese operating company (Onjala 
2018). Such accusations have appeared in a number of  Kenyan news 
reports, but none more damning than a recent online exposé news 
report, unsubstantiated and contested by the Chinese rail franchisee, 
which reports that employees are subject to racism, segregation, harsh 
disciplinary practices, and do not get to drive the engines they were 
trained to operate (Wafula 2018).
3.4 Health
This section takes health as an example of  the way that the BRI can 
contribute to Kenya’s delivery on the Medium-Term Plan (MTP), the 
HCI, the SDGs, the AU Vision 2063, and the FOCAC agenda. As is 
the case with the BRI as a whole, there are opportunities and potential 
risks associated with the dimension of  health, and concerns about its 
impact on health policy and practice. Whilst the BRI has sought to 
develop a new hub for health cooperation, labelled the Healthy Silk 
Road, the rationale to widen and increase global connectivity will 
generate a significant increase in the movement of  people and thereby 
a heightened risk of  the spread of  infectious diseases (Murphy 2018; 
Gostin 2018; Tang et al. 2017). Further issues include the potential 
possible disaster risk implications of  infrastructure mega-projects as well 
as dangers arising from the increased transboundary movement of  
hazardous materials.
Moreover, the BRI also raises the critical issue of  health safeguarding, 
i.e. the way in which the BRI in practice synchronises and conforms 
to the existing international regulation of  occupational health and 
environmental standards. The Chinese government organised the first 
biennial ‘Belt and Road High Level Meeting on Health Cooperation 
towards a Healthy Silk Road’ in August 2017. At this meeting, over 
30 health ministers and leaders of  multilateral agencies signed the 
Beijing Communiqué, which emphasised a joint commitment by the 
signatories to protect public health and strengthen people-to-people 
exchanges among BRI countries. Specific commitments included the 
creation of  new cooperation hubs (the Belt and Road Health Policy 
Research Network, the Belt and Road Hospital Alliance, and the 
Belt and Road Health Industry Sustainable Development Alliance); a 
collaboration intended to contribute to delivering the SDG monitoring, 
prevention, and control, and response to major infectious diseases.
China committed to continuing to dispatch foreign aid medical teams 
to BRI partner states and to carry out appropriate hospital cooperation 
through the Brightness Journey of  Free Cataract Surgeries and Journey of  
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Smile-Free Cleft-Palate Surgeries, and, significantly for the SDGs and for 
strengthening HCI outcomes, China will implement maternal, child, 
and reproductive health projects in the Belt and Road nations, promote 
appropriate technology in paediatrics, obstetrics, and gynaecology, and 
enhance the national maternal and child health-care and treatment 
service capabilities to improve the national health level of  women 
and children (China Daily 2017). However, the Beijing Communiqué 
has weaknesses. As an editorial in The Lancet medical journal noted, 
non-communicable diseases were not referred to, and appeared dated 
compared to China’s own 2015 Healthy China 2030 strategy, and the 
editorial hoped that the BRI’s emphasis on infrastructure development 
in Africa and elsewhere would not conflict with the aims embodied in 
China’s own Healthy China (The Lancet Global Health 2017).
To help the Kenyan government’s Big Four agenda aim of  providing 
universal health care, the government-to-government agreement 
on health provides the framework for practical cooperation on the 
construction of  hospitals and other medical infrastructure, equipment 
provision, training of  medical staff, and commercial pharmaceutical 
collaboration. In 2016, China donated four modular container clinics 
to the Kenyan Ministry of  Health to boost the response to killer 
diseases in underserved and disadvantaged communities. In 2018, the 
Chinese government supplied and installed computerised tomography 
(CT) scanners to 37 Kenyan hospitals located primarily along Kenya’s 
major highways to provide enhanced emergency diagnosis for road 
accident victims and improve survival rates. The scanners can also be 
used to detect cancer. The project involves a partnership between a 
Chinese and a Kenyan medical enterprise contracted by the Kenyan 
government. It also involves knowledge and skills sharing with 37 
Kenyan radiographers and radiologists receiving training in China 
(MT 2018).
4 Analysis: the early impact of the BRI on Kenya’s sustainable 
development
The BRI has raised criticisms that it is fuelling a debt crisis in African 
countries (Onjala 2018; Were 2018). China is accused of  conducting 
a ‘debt trap diplomacy’ (Chellaney 2017; Mendis and Wang 2019). 
Kenya’s public debt has been increasing rapidly in recent years, rising 
to around 57 per cent of  GDP in the 2017/18 fiscal year,5 and China’s 
share of  Kenya’s bilateral debt rose to 72 per cent (Business Daily 2018), 
making it Kenya’s largest bilateral creditor. The experience of  the SGR 
project has raised questions over Kenya’s indebtedness to China; over 
China’s actual commitment to the intended development outcome 
rather than to the commercial and non-commercial loan provisions; 
and over the corporate cultures and working practices of  Chinese firms. 
Kenya’s debt level is said to have risen as a result of  the increased cost 
of  the rail project.
As noted elsewhere in this article, the five-year grace period given by 
the China Exim Bank expired in June 2019. Kenyan tax-payers were 
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scheduled to begin paying 0.7 per cent of  the economy to the Chinese 
financing agencies for funding the Nairobi–Mombasa stage of  the 
SGR. Against this background and an increased risk management 
culture including tighter auditing and anti-corruption measures in 
China, funding for the scheduled extension of  the SGR would have 
been considered in the light of  the provisions of  the Guiding Principles on 
Financing the Development of  the Belt and Road. These Principles advocate 
a transparent, friendly, non-discriminatory, and predictable financing 
environment that ensures sustainable economic and social development. 
Kenya is among the 26 countries that jointly formulated the Principles.
Further concerns have been raised regarding the BRI’s contribution 
to Kenya’s employment, skills, and technology transfer. Estimates of  
the number of  Chinese enterprises operating in African economies 
have varied over the years. A credible evaluation was undertaken by 
McKinsey and Company based on its field survey of  eight African 
countries between November 2016 and March 2017. The survey 
concluded that there were 396 Chinese firms operating in Kenya, more 
than three times the Chinese government’s official number of  131 firms 
(Sun, Jayaram and Kassiri 2017). Contrary to conventional wisdom, 
in recent years, Chinese enterprises have increased the employment 
of  local labourers in Africa. Across Africa, the McKinsey survey found 
that Chinese firms display a willingness to invest in hiring African 
workers and maintaining apprenticeship programmes, and that Chinese 
enterprises overwhelmingly employ and train local workers (ibid.). 
In the case of  Kenya, a report by the Kenya China Economic and 
Trade Association (KCETA) concluded that Chinese firms operating 
in Kenya have created over 50,000 local jobs with the proportion of  
local employees reaching 96 per cent in 2018. The report also noted 
that Chinese firms in Kenya provided around 67,000 local employees 
with professional training in 2018. Commenting on this, Isaac Mbeche, 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor of  the University of  Nairobi argued that 
‘Chinese firms have been devoted to cultivating talents and creating jobs 
in Kenya, enhancing the exchanges and cooperation between the two 
countries under the Belt and Road Initiative’ (Xinhua News 2018).
However, employment issues remain. According to the Federation of  
Kenyan Employers (FKE) Executive Director Jacqueline Mugo, ‘Due to 
the lack of  knowledge of  local labour laws and the understanding of  the 
local staff, disputes between Chinese employers and local employees occur 
a lot’. In particular, ‘the most common types of  labour dispute cases are 
salaries below the minimum-wage standards and unfair termination’ 
(Murathe 2018). In the view of  the FKE’s Director, the level of  disputes 
results from an unfamiliarity with Kenya’s labour law on behalf  of  the 
firms, leading them ‘to violate the law without knowing it’ (ibid.).
5 Conclusion
The BRI can, and already is, providing infrastructure, such as for 
transport. The new industry parks are under development – some 
offering specific knowledge, skills, science and technology sharing, and 
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employment. There is also collaboration in vocational training, science 
and technology research, postgraduate collaboration, and cooperation 
around the environment and health. Nonetheless, Kenya’s experience 
illustrates the dual pressures on governments engaged in the BRI. In 
one respect, the Kenyan government is able to elaborate its national 
and regional development priorities, but needs critical funding and 
implementation capacity to achieve its aims. Kenya’s experience also 
demonstrates the complexities and challenges involved with issues of  
debt servicing, project management, and employment practices.
The BRI is a work in progress. It is relatively new to the global arena 
and, as the second BRF’s List of  Deliverables indicates, it is still finding 
its way and seeking to address the substantive issues and questions 
through gatherings such as the BRF. With respect to policy lessons, then, 
for China it is that the BRI process needs to address systematically the 
issue of  partner debt serviceability and ensure that the BRI’s new Debt 
Sustainability Framework works effectively and equitably; that Green 
Silk Road principles and aims are followed and are synchronised with 
SDGs 13, 14, and 15 to mitigate climate change, and protect life on 
land and below water; and that the tendering and contract processes are 
transparent, fair, and equitable.
The management and employment culture, and the practices 
of  Chinese and other BRI project enterprises, need to be based 
on principles of  inclusivity, equality, and strong corporate social 
responsibility, thereby fulfilling the aims of  decent work and economic 
growth in SDG 8. For China’s BRI partners, their approach to 
the BRI needs to be firmly embedded in financial prudence and 
provisions for tendering transparency and open procurement. The 
Chinese government has moved into a more sober stance regarding 
the BRI, with a closer attention to risk exposure, project monitoring, 
and outcomes assessment, and the BRI’s members too are seeking to 
maximise their benefits from the BRI whilst minimising their risks.
Notes
*  This IDS Bulletin is supported by the Center for International 
Knowledge on Development’s (CIKD) China–UK Partnership 
Programme on Knowledge for Development.
1 Jing Gu, Research Fellow, Institute of  Development Studies, UK.
2 Shen Qiu, Head of  Consulting Services Division and Assistant 
Research Fellow, Center for International Knowledge on 
Development (CIKD), China.
3 The One Belt, One Road Initiative was officially launched in 2013, 
with the stated aim to connect major Eurasian economies through 
infrastructure, trade, and investment. The Chinese government 
drafted and published the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk 
Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road in 2015 
to promote the implementation of  the Initiative.
4 Information gathered from the Belt and Road Portal:  
https://eng.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/info/iList.jsp?cat_id=10076.
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5 Information gathered from Trading Economics:  
https://tradingeconomics.com/kenya/indicators.
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Sino-Greek Economic Cooperation: 
COSCO’s Investment in the Port of 
Piraeus*
Liu Qianqian1 and Polyxeni Davarinou2
Abstract This article examines COSCO’s investment in the Port of Piraeus 
in Greece, which provides a good example of economic cooperation 
between China and Greece against the backdrop of the Belt and Road 
Initiative. It argues that investment in the Port of Piraeus has had a 
positive impact on the development of Greece by stimulating infrastructure 
investment, enhancing the competitiveness of the port, boosting the 
local economy, and helping to attract more foreign investment. However, 
the article also identifies potential challenges for Sino-Greek economic 
cooperation in the long run. Structural obstacles and concerns from 
European countries could affect China’s investment in Greece as well as 
Sino-Greek economic cooperation in the future.
Keywords: sustainable development, investment, economic 
cooperation, Belt and Road Initiative, Piraeus, Greece, COSCO, 
mutual benefit.
1 Introduction
In just the last ten years, China’s impressive expansion regarding its 
economic presence in Greece has attracted worldwide attention. In 
2008, the China COSCO Shipping Group (hereinafter referred to 
as COSCO), a state-owned ocean shipping giant in China, started to 
invest in the Port of  Piraeus in Greece. Eight years later, the company 
acquired the majority stake (51 per cent) of  the Piraeus Port Authority 
(PPA) for €280.5m and, after the completion of  mandatory investments 
by 2021, will increase its stake by 16 per cent (HRADF 2016).
COSCO’s involvement in Piraeus is the flagship project of  Chinese 
investment in Greece and an important part of  the Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) in the Mediterranean. Despite the initial reactions 
about a sell-out of  national assets, positive perspectives from Greece on 
China and Chinese investment in Greece can be found after COSCO’s 
investment in Piraeus, as indicated by a recent study by the Institute of  
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International Economic Relations of  Greece (Tonchev 2018). However, 
China’s investment in Piraeus has not been without criticism, with 
Nasos Mihalakas (2011) labelling COSCO’s investment in Piraeus 
a Chinese Trojan Horse. Against this backdrop, this article aims to 
evaluate the impacts of  COSCO’s investment in Piraeus on Greece.
2 Overview of COSCO’s investment in the Port of Piraeus
China and Greece established diplomatic relations in 1972. However, it 
was not until 2008 when COSCO invested in the Port of  Piraeus that 
the bilateral economic relations between the two countries increased 
rapidly (Huliaras and Petropoulos 2014). The Port of  Piraeus is located 
at the southern tip of  the Balkan Peninsula and on the southwest coast 
of  Athens, Greece. It connects Europe, Asia, and Africa. With a land 
area of  2.725m square metres and a coastline of  about 24km, Piraeus 
is the largest port in Greece and an important container port in the 
Mediterranean region.
3 The privatisation of the Port of Piraeus and its significance to China
In October 2008, COSCO obtained through bidding a 35-year 
concession for the operation of  Piers II and III of  the container 
terminals of  Port of  Piraeus (China Daily 2016).
In April 2016, COSCO signed an agreement with the Hellenic 
Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF) to acquire 67 per cent of  
the stake of  the PPA for €368.5m and became the operator of  the port 
(ibid.). According to a senior executive of  COSCO in an interview with 
us,3 this was the first time that a Chinese company has taken over the 
operation of  a port overseas. According to the concession agreement 
expiring in 2052, the majority stake of  67 per cent would be acquired 
in two stages; the first, a €280.5m payment by HRADF for a 51 per 
cent stake. After a period of  five years, COSCO can acquire the other 
16 per cent for €88m, provided that a mandatory investment threshold 
of  €300m has been met or exceeded (HRADF 2016). The PPA has 
submitted its investment master plan worth approximately €600m which 
includes a new logistics centre, an additional cruise-ship terminal, 
four hotels, and a shopping mall – awaiting approval by the Greek 
authorities (Stamouli 2019).
China’s strong interest in the Port of  Piraeus is related to its unique 
position in the region (Davarinou, Mylona and Skoura 2016: 10; van 
der Putten 2014: 19; Bastian 2017). Piraeus is located at an important 
junction of  Europe and Asia. The Port of  Piraeus is considered to be 
a gateway for Chinese products entering Southeastern, Eastern and 
Central Europe. Zou Xiaoli (2016), the former Chinese ambassador in 
Greece, described it as the ‘dragon’s head’; a leading example for China’s 
efforts to promote cooperation with European countries under the 
framework of  the BRI. COSCO’s investment has driven more and more 
Chinese enterprises to come to Greece, including but not limited to, the 
China Energy Investment Corporation, Air China, and the State Grid 
Corporation of  China (Zou 2016). As China’s president, Xi Jinping, told 
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Alexis Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, during the first Belt and Road 
Forum on International Cooperation in 2017, the Chinese government 
was willing to work together with Greece to build the Port of  Piraeus as 
an important focal point for the BRI (Xinhua News 2019).
In addition, Piraeus also serves as the hub for the China–Europe 
Land–Sea Express Route under the framework of  the BRI. The 
Express Route runs from Greece’s Port of  Piraeus in the south, via 
Skopje in Macedonia and Belgrade in Serbia, and Hungary’s Budapest 
in the north. Compared with the previous routes that go through 
the Suez Canal, it arrives at the ports of  Hamburg and Rotterdam 
before entering Central and Eastern Europe. The China–Europe 
Land–Sea Express Route will reduce total shipping time by 7–11 days, 
according to a COSCO executive in Greece.4 The Express Route, once 
completed, will further enhance connectivity between China and the 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and deepen China’s 
trade and economic links with the CEECs. According to Zou Xiaoli, 
this Express Route will:
link the new Maritime Silk Road with the Silk Road on land and 
strongly boost economic and trade cooperation among China, 
Russia, Central Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Southeast Europe, 
West Asia and North Africa, and Southeast Asia (Zou 2016).
Due to the great strategic importance of  the Port of  Piraeus to China, 
attempts have been made to maintain both good relations with Greece 
and a good public perception. In other words, the investment should 
have benefits for both countries. The following section illustrates the 
impact of  COSCO’s investment in Piraeus on Greece.
4 The impact of COSCO’s investment in the Port of Piraeus on Greece
COSCO’s investment has significantly improved the competitiveness 
of  the Port of  Piraeus. COSCO has introduced the most advanced 
equipment and upgraded the infrastructure of  the port. The Port of  
Piraeus has become the fastest growing container port in the world 
(GTP Headlines 2019), the second largest port in the Mediterranean and 
the seventh largest in Europe. In terms of  the total container volume of  
the port, the ranking of  the Port of  Piraeus had increased significantly 
from 93rd in 2008 to 37th in 2018 in the world. This means that the 
total traffic of  containers at the Port of  Piraeus grew from 680,000 
Twenty Foot Equivalent Units (TEUs)5 in 2008 to 4.9m TEUs in 2018 
(ibid.). In 2019, the capacity of  the port is expected to reach 5m TEUs, 
making Piraeus the largest port in the Mediterranean (Stone News 2018). 
So far, COSCO has built 55 routes with the Port of  Piraeus as a hub. 
These routes reach as far as the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the 
Middle East, North West Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific.
The investment has also contributed to the economic development of  
Greece and created thousands of  local jobs (Xie 2017; PPA 2019a). 
Former Ambassador Zou Xiaoli made the following address at a seminar 
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on the BRI: ‘the real significance of  the COSCO project is highlighted 
by the opportunity it offers to Greece to return to the international 
capital market, which is vitally important for Greece to walk out of  the 
crisis and realise revitalisation’ (Zou 2016). Recently, the PPA released its 
Financial Report 2018 to the Greek government. According to the PPA, 
the port achieved a profit (before tax) of  €42.3m in 2018, representing 
a near twofold increase from €21.2m in 2017 (PPA 2019b). The net 
profit reached €27.9m in 2018, showing a 147 per cent increase from its 
€11.3m profit in 2017. COSCO paid the concession fee of  €4.8m to the 
Greek government, an increase of  €700,000 in 2017 (ibid.). In addition, 
COSCO’s investment in Piraeus also created 3,000 direct local, and more 
than 10,000 indirect jobs in Greece (People’s Daily and China Daily 2019).
Many Greeks feel optimistic about the impact of  COSCO’s investment 
on the Greek economy in the long run (Le Corre 2018: 18–21). 
According to the Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research 
(IOBE in Greek), a Greek thinktank, the Port of  Piraeus project will 
contribute to Greece’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth by about 
0.8 per cent in 2025, and create 31,000 new jobs between 2016 and 
2025, driving public debt down by 2.3 percentage points of  GDP (IOBE 
2016: 3–4). While these numbers are probably way too optimistic due to 
Greece’s investment deficit, they are indicative of  the expectations placed 
upon COSCO’s projects (Tonchev and Davarinou 2017).
COSCO’s investment in Piraeus has attracted new Chinese investors 
to Greece, which has the potential to help boost the Greek economy. 
Encouraged by COSCO’s success, many competitive Chinese 
enterprises are investing or seeking investment opportunities in Greece. 
As Tonchev and Davarinou (2017: 24) put it, the Port of  Piraeus project 
serves as an ‘anchor investment’ for attracting Chinese investment. 
Numerous examples of  this anchorage are detailed below. For instance, 
in October 2016, the China State Grid Corporation successfully 
acquired a 24 per cent stake in the Greek public independent 
transmission company, working with Greek authorities to provide better 
electrical interconnection between the Greek islands and the mainland. 
In another case, the China Energy Investment Corporation, one of  the 
world’s largest power companies, registered its new energy European 
headquarters in Greece, later signing a cooperation deal with the 
Copelouzos Group of  Greece in renewable energy and conventional 
electricity supply (Jovanović 2018). Air China, the Chinese flagship 
airline, launched Beijing–Athens direct flights in September 2017 
(Xinhua News 2017a). Due to Air China being optimistic about the air 
cargo market in Greece, from April 2018 it increased weekly flights from 
two to three. In addition, Shenhua, China’s largest coal producer, signed 
an agreement with the Copelouzos Group, one of  the largest investment 
groups in Greece, for the acquisition of  75 per cent of  the shares of  four 
wind parks developed by the Greek company (China Daily 2017). So far, 
more than ten competitive Chinese enterprises have invested in Greece 
(Embassy of  China in Greece 2015). The major Chinese enterprises in 
Greece are listed in Table 1.
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While it is not clear to what extent COSCO’s investment in Piraeus and 
other Chinese investment have influenced the volume of  Sino-Greek 
trade and investment, a closer economic cooperation between the two 
countries has been seen.
In order to deepen bilateral economic cooperation, the Chinese and 
Greek governments made the 2017–2019 Greece–China Action Plan 
(China Daily 2017). Recently, another new 2020–2022 Greece–China 
Action Plan was made (China Daily 2019). Stergios Pitsiorlas, Greece’s 
Deputy Economy and Development Minister, said: ‘[T]he basis of  this 
cooperation is that Greece’s growth strategy meets China’s Belt and 
Road Initiative and the benefits are mutual’ (Xinhua News 2017b). Alexis 
Tsipras, the Greek prime minister, was invited twice as a distinguished 
guest to Beijing to attend the first and second Belt and Road Forum 
on International Development in 2017 and 2019 respectively. More 
significantly, in April 2019, Greece became the 17th member of  the 
cooperation between China and the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEC), which had been known previously as the 16+1 
Initiative. It largely reflects the significance of  Greece in China’s regional 
strategy in Southeast Europe. China considers Greece a gateway for 
Chinese products to enter this region, as discussed in Section 2.2.
5 Integrating into the local environment
This section discusses several issues that have happened with COSCO 
operating the port. These issues are selected because, to some extent, they 
reflect COSCO’s interaction and integration with the local environment.
5.1 Addressing the employees’ concerns
When COSCO came to Piraeus to operate Piers II and III in 2008, the 
employees and the local people were very dissatisfied and concerned 
about the Greek government’s privatisation policy and the handover of  
Table 1 The major Chinese enterprises in Greece
Name of the company Scope of business
COSCO Shipping Transportation
ZTE Corporation Information technology and service
Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd Information technology and service
China Energy Investment Corporation Electric power
China Three Gorges International Corporation Electric power
China New Era Group Corporation Electric power
State Grid Corporation of China Electric power
Air China Transportation
Source Authors’ own, based on information from Ministry of Commerce, People’s 
Republic of China (2018).
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the terminals to a foreign company. Strikes took place and protestors 
displayed a banner along the waterfront reading ‘COSCO Go Home’ 
(Granitsas and Paris 2014). There were even standoffs with the COSCO 
Group management team.
At that time, the unemployment rate in the Athens suburb was 
extremely high at around 70 per cent (Granitsas and Paris 2014). 
Dockworkers were worried about job losses, redundancies, and a 
deterioration of  working conditions. After the first concession of  the 
port in 2008, there were criticisms over the use of  subcontractors that 
employed unskilled, nonunion workers and that did not maintain proper 
security standards (Alderman 2012).
In 2016, the acquisition of  the Port of  Piraeus project was completed in 
accordance with the regulations and procedures of  the administrative, 
judicial, and regulatory agencies in Greece. In the words of  Stergios 
Pitsiorlas: ‘It seems that COSCO managed to make peace with the 
dockworkers’.6 COSCO executives held dialogues with employees, and 
then carried out personnel restructuring that resulted in a collective 
agreement. In addition, there were no wage cuts or redundancies of  
local personnel. Out of  a total workforce of  more than 3,000 people, 
just ten are Chinese.7
5.2 Localisation
COSCO paid attention to the localisation of  the company and 
promoted an inclusive multicultural environment. In order to promote 
Sino-Greek cultural exchanges within the company, COSCO invited 
family members of  the employees to celebrate both Western and 
Chinese festivals together and introduced work lunches (a common 
practice in Chinese enterprises). It also organised regular workshops for 
employees to learn Chinese, elected the model workers, and organised 
tours to China for free. These practices have greatly enhanced the 
Greek employees’ sense of  collective identity and belonging to the 
company, according to a COSCO executive in Piraeus.8
5.3 The balance of pursuing profits and addressing the development needs 
of the local industries
COSCO tried to fully consider the development appeal of  the local 
industries and the city while pursuing profit. For instance, before the 
global financial crisis, Greece was a shipping giant in the world and 
the ship repair industry was an important pillar of  the Greek maritime 
sector. After the crisis, the Greek government wanted to revitalise 
its ship repair industry. Considering the development needs of  ship 
repairing in Greece, COSCO invested €30m to renovate the local ship 
repair zone and upgrade the infrastructure and electromechanical 
networks (Hellenic Shipping News 2018a). In 2018, a new floating repair 
dock was launched – 240m long, 45m wide, and with a 22,000-tonne 
lifting capacity with full crane equipment (Glass 2018). The total 
investment for the ship repair zone stands at more than €55m (Hellenic 
Shipping News 2018b). According to the official data provided by the 
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Table 2 Investment according to the COSCO master plan
Mandatory investments in euros (to be completed by 2021)
Passenger cruise port expansion (South Zone, Phase A) 136,283,800
Pier I repair (PPA Station) 8,000,000
Central port dredging 8,000,000
Construction of a new petroleum pier 15,000,000
Improvement of shipbuilding infrastructure 55,000,000
Conversion of the Pentagon warehouse into a passenger cruise 
station
1,500,000
Underground road car terminal (90 acres)  5,000,000
Improvement and maintenance of port infrastructure  15,000,000
Supply of equipment 25,000,000
Studies/research 5,000,000
Car terminal extension 20,000,000
Total amount of mandatory investments 293,783,800
Additional investments in euros
New warehouse in the area of ODDY, 80,000 sq. m (90 acres)* 60,000,000
Construction of two parking spaces of 75,000 sq. m each, in the 
G2 region
27,000,000
Eco buses 5,000,000
Construction of cruise passenger station 80,000,000
Reconstruction of the Pagoda building into a 5* hotel and 
conference centre
60,000,000
Remodelling of two large old warehouses into 4* and 5* hotels 48,000,000
Shipbuilding construction for mega yachts in Area G1 18,000,000
Construction of 5* hotel in Porto Leone 20,000,000
Total amount of additional investments 318,000,000
Other investments in euros
Construction of repair pier in Drapetsona 1,000,000
Construction of a five-storey car park in the commercial port area 5,000,000
Construction of logistics centre in ODDY area 30,000,000
Total amount of other investments 36,000,000
Grand total of investments 647,783,000
* Conversion as it appears in the original text. 
Source Foteinos (2019).
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PPA, by the end of  2018, ship repair activity had increased by 53 per 
cent compared to 2017 (PPA 2019b).
An evaluation of  COSCO’s impact on the Greek economy can be 
difficult due to the fact that the company’s investment in Piraeus is 
still in progress. As seen in Table 2, further investment focuses on the 
improvement of  port infrastructure to support its business activities, while 
expanding on cruise shipping and tourism, as the company aims to reach 
a capacity of  10m TEUs per year. The Port Planning and Development 
Committee (ESAL) has approved the majority of  the mandatory 
investments but has expressed its objections regarding additional ones 
(Foteinos 2019). The goals of  COSCO’s master plan are to double the 
company’s revenue (currently at €133m), disseminate growth in the wider 
area, and create 2,500 new permanent jobs (Tsimplakis 2019).
5.4 Environmental and social responsibility
As for environmental protection, COSCO manages, monitors, 
and evaluates the marine environment by using a high-standard 
environmental management system, PERS (Port Environmental 
Review System) of  the European Sea Ports Organization (PPA 2017: 
21–23). It also meets minimum European environmental standards 
and Greek regulations in relation to waste management, implementing 
the Ship Waste Management Plan in accordance with the relevant 
European regulation. Furthermore, COSCO focuses on energy 
conservation, and uses photovoltaic power generation to reduce carbon 
emissions, according to the Annual Financial Report 2017 of  the PPA 
(ibid.: 21–23).
In the area of  social responsibility, COSCO has cooperated with the 
Holy Metropolis of  Piraeus to provide food for the poor and has helped 
the local community through the construction of  schools and roads, and 
aiding orphanages of  the Piraeus Region (PPA 2017).
6 Challenges for future Chinese investment in Greece
While Sino-Greek economic cooperation appears to have entered its 
honeymoon period, the sustainability of  the economic relationship 
remains uncertain. On the one hand, the political uncertainty of  the 
Greek government and the policy change resulting from power shifts 
will continue to pose a significant political risk to China’s long-term 
investment in Greece. The Port of  Piraeus project was not without 
setbacks – from the strikes at the port to the initial suspension of  the 
privatisation plan by the Syriza-led administration on the day it took 
office in January 2015 (Ifeng News 2015). COSCO’s further investment 
plan in Piraeus has been no different; in February 2019, the Chinese 
delegation in Athens held a meeting with Greek officials and COSCO 
executives in order to overcome the Greek bureaucracy posed by ESAL 
and the Central Archaeological Council of  Greece. The structural 
obstacles posed are related to a conflict between local interests 
and several elements of  COSCO’s master plan. For example, the 
construction of  a mall inside the cruise terminal is seen as the final blow 
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to the shopping stores of  Piraeus and the development of  a logistics 
centre in Keratsini as directly competitive to the Thriasio Freight Centre 
(Mpellos 2019).
Again, in April 2019, the Central Archaeological Council of  Greece 
blocked on issues related to the protection of  ancient monuments, 
archaeological sites, and sites of  exceptional historical or legendary 
importance up to 1830 (PortSEurope 2019). This means that, as the local 
news reported, ‘there will now be stricter terms and conditions for land 
use, and more bureaucratic intervention in new plans’ (ibid.). COSCO is 
reportedly revising its new investment plan. This kind of  risk no doubt 
shadows Chinese investment in Greece in the long run.
On the other hand, European Union (EU) countries, especially 
Germany and France, have growing concerns over China’s investment 
in Greece. The authors agree with the comments of  Stergios Pitsiorlas:9 
‘Greece has been a place for power struggle in history. Many things in 
Europe have been changed by the investment of  COSCO Shipping, 
which is uneasy for European competitors.’ There are concerns 
regarding China’s growing economic engagement through BRI-related 
investments in Europe and the impact on China’s growing power base 
in this region expressed by Germany, France, and other EU members. 
This may have implications for Chinese regional investment expansion. 
Sigmar Gabriel, German foreign minister, blamed Greece for not 
supporting the EU’s proposal to bring the freedom of  navigation in 
the South China Sea to the International Tribunal for the Law of  the 
Sea (ITLOS) but tilted towards China politically for fear that Chinese 
investment might be affected (Qingmu 2017).
More importantly, against the backdrop of  China’s growing economic 
and political influence in Europe, the European Commission and the 
High Representative reviewed EU–China relations, passed the new 
EU–China Strategic Outlook, and set out ten concrete actions to deal with 
challenges with China (European Commission 2019). In April 2019, 
the EU also approved new rules for its member states for the screening 
of  foreign investment. It is widely believed that this change is related to 
their concerns about Chinese investment in Europe, such as Piraeus in 
Greece, and Trieste in Italy (Taylor 2019; Meunier 2019). Even though 
China’s investment in EU countries is very small,10 any pressure from 
the EU is likely to impact Chinese investment in Greece. European 
countries’ concerns, together with the newly established regulations, will 
undoubtedly increase the complexity and difficulty of  doing business, 
and thus reduce the enthusiasm of  Chinese enterprises to invest.
As Chinese investment increases, it draws increased attention from 
various parties in Greece, on issues of  insufficient interactions and 
communication with the public and local community, and the lack of  
open and transparent information on Chinese investment policy and 
data. Each of  these holds the potential to raise concerns or suspicions 
due to misunderstanding.
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7 Conclusion
With China’s growing economic engagement in Europe, concerns from 
EU countries over China’s motivations and potential influence will rise. 
At the Munich Security Conference in 2018, Sigmar Gabriel (2018), 
German foreign minister, claimed that China used the BRI to create a 
comprehensive system different from the Western values of  freedom, 
democracy, and human rights. Europe is in danger of  being divided 
by China. China uses these investments, like ‘sticks and carrots’, to test 
individual European countries and undermine the unity of  the EU 
(ibid.). To address these concerns, China should respond positively. As 
benefit-sharing and co-development are the golden rules of  the BRI, it 
would be wise for China to move towards involving Germany, France, 
Italy, and other key EU countries closer in the process of  cooperation, 
better accommodating their interests. For instance, China’s investment 
in Port of  Piraeus may reduce the existing interests of  some big 
European ports in this region, such as the Port of  Rotterdam in the 
Netherlands and the Port of  Hamburg in Germany. Therefore, when 
China invests in Piraeus or other European ports, it would be better 
for China to consider how these investments could reduce the losses of  
these European countries, or whether it is possible to promote trilateral 
cooperation or multi-party cooperation with these European countries. 
In this way, interests and risks can be shared.
This article has examined the effects of  COSCO’s investment in the Port 
of  Piraeus on Sino-Greek cooperation within the context of  the Belt and 
Road Initiative. It argues that investment in the Port of  Piraeus does have 
a positive impact on the Greek economy by ameliorating infrastructure 
investment, enhancing the competitiveness of  the port, and posing as a 
successful example that can attract more foreign investment. The role 
of  Piraeus in enhancing Sino-Greek economic cooperation cannot be 
overlooked. Nevertheless, it will be necessary for both actors to reconcile 
interests and goals with internal and international politics.
Notes
*  This IDS Bulletin is supported by the Center for International 
Knowledge on Development’s (CIKD) China–UK Partnership 
Programme on Knowledge for Development.
1 Liu Qianqian, Deputy Director-General, Finance Center for  
South–South Cooperation (FCSSC), Hong Kong.
2 Polyxeni Davarinou, Researcher, Institute of  International Economic 
Relations (IIER), Greece.
3 Fieldwork interview, Greece, October 2017.
4 Fieldwork interview, Greece, October 2017.
5 According to Logistics Glossary Online (2019), the Twenty Foot 
Equivalent Unit (TEU) is ‘the unit of  the capacity of  a container 
ship, a container terminal and the statistics of  the container transit in 
a port’. See www.logisticsglossary.com/term/teu/. 
6 Stergios Pitsiorlas, fieldwork interview, Athens, November 2017. 
7 Fieldwork interviews with COSCO local staff and executives, Greece, 
October 2017.
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8 Fieldwork interviews with COSCO local staff, Piraeus, October 2017.
9 Stergios Pitsiorlas, fieldwork interview, Athens, November 2017. 
10 Take China’s investment in Greece, for instance. The countries that 
invest in Greece are mainly concentrated in Europe. According 
to Bank of  Greece data, in 2017, foreign direct investment from 
European countries to Greece was €3.22bn, accounting for 89.7 per 
cent of  the total investment in Greece. Major countries investing in 
Greece include the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Cyprus (Bank of  Greece 2018).
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The China–Pakistan Economic 
Corridor: A Case Study*
Mustafa Hyder Sayed1
Abstract The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is a multifaceted 
project which was formally announced during a visit by China’s president, 
Xi Jinping, to Pakistan in April 2015. It is an infusion of infrastructure, 
energy, ports, railway networks, and people-centric projects, which enhance 
Pakistan’s trade connectivity, export potential, and geopolitical relevance. 
Pakistan and China believe that the CPEC will not only complement the 
economic development of the two countries but will also bring peace and 
prosperity in less developed regions of Pakistan. The article focuses on 
the impact of CPEC projects comprising early harvest projects, middle- 
and long-term plans, and social sector development initiatives including: 
poverty alleviation, clean water, health, education, vocational training, and 
agriculture. It also gauges the prospects and challenges faced by the CPEC 
and policy recommendations to make this project sustainable and inclusive.
Keywords: CPEC, China, Pakistan, Gwadar, energy, social, early 
harvest projects, corridor, connectivity, Balochistan.
1 Background
The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) was launched in 2015 
as the flagship and leading project of  China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) (Global Times 2019). The CPEC was given priority and precedence 
over the five other corridors of  the BRI due to:
1 The strategic geographic location of  Pakistan and its Gwadar Port 
(the latter is the converging point of  the Silk Road Economic Belt and 
the twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road). Gwadar’s significance 
had been highlighted long before the launch of  the CPEC by Robert 
Kaplan, who summarised Gwadar’s strategic potential as ‘the hub of  
a new Silk Road, both land and maritime; a gateway to landlocked, 
hydrocarbon rich Central Asia’ (Khan 2016); and
2 The time-tested and all-weather strategic partnership, signifying the 
unique state-to-state and also the close people-to-people connectivity 
and goodwill, that is above political partisanship (Weidong 2017).
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2 Introduction
The CPEC is a mammoth US$46bn investment from China, which was 
later extended to US$62bn (Shaikh 2018) for the completion of  all its 
projects, set to culminate in 2030 (Ministry of  Planning, Development 
and Reform 2017). The CPEC was a strategic decision by China 
to choose Pakistan as the pilot project of  the BRI, the lessons and 
experience of  which would determine the learning curve of  how to 
execute Belt and Road projects in other BRI host countries and corridors 
(Rehman 2018). In order to experiment with a large, economic, and 
cultural footprint that had not been seen in any other host country 
in the past (only in continents, i.e. Africa), the prerequisites of  a solid 
foundation that consisted of  goodwill in the populace and across the 
political spectrum in Pakistan, and an existing strategic and defence 
relationship, made the CPEC more predisposed towards success.
2.1 Dimensions of the CPEC
The CPEC is about infrastructure, energy, and maritime and cultural 
connectivity, under one umbrella and brand. However, the CPEC is 
not monolithic. Every project in the CPEC has different terms and 
conditions as each is executed by a different Chinese state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) and is independent from other CPEC projects. To 
illustrate, the PowerChina-invested coal-fired power plant is jointly 
invested with a Qatar-based consortium undertaking the project on a 
build–operate–transfer (BOT) basis (Pakistan Observer 2019), whereas 
the coal-fired power plant located in Thar Block II, which has less than 
a 10 per cent Chinese shareholding,2 is a public–private partnership 
between the Sindh provincial government, the China Machinery 
Engineering Company (CMEC), and Engro (a Pakistani company). The 
Gwadar International Airport, on the other hand, is financed by a grant 
(CPEC 2019a).
The common denominator in CPEC projects is the National 
Development Reform Commission (NDRC), which nominates the 
Chinese SOE for each project and is responsible for the supervision 
of  CPEC projects, whilst the Ministry of  Planning, Development 
and Reform is its counterpart in Pakistan (Ministry of  Planning, 
Development and Reform 2018).
2.2 The division of the CPEC into three phases (early, medium-, and 
long-term projects)
Being a long-term project that goes beyond 2030 (Ministry of  Planning, 
Development and Reform 2017), the CPEC is divided into three phases: 
early harvest projects (EHPs) (priority projects for the first five years), 
medium-term, and long-term (China International Development 
Cooperation Agency 2019). Eleven out of  the 22 EHPs have been 
completed, whilst 11 are under construction. The EHPs have addressed 
Pakistan’s energy shortfall of  5,000 megawatts (MW) (Kugelman 
2014), and the rest have rehabilitated the existing and constructed new 
infrastructure of  roads and highways, which would create an enabling 
environment to boost trade and mobility.
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Table 1 Eleven early harvest projects completed (with total contract amount of 
around US$19bn)
50MW Dawood wind power project China–Pakistan Friendship School, Faqeer 
colony
100MW Pakistan Jhimpir UEP wind 
power project phase 1
Gwadar Port operation and development 
of free zone
Sachal 50MW wind power project Laying of optical fibre from Rawalpindi to 
Khunjerab 
Zonergy 900MW solar project in 
Punjab 
Preliminary design phase 1 for upgradation 
of ML1 and Havalian dry port of Pakistan 
Railways 
Port Qasim 2x660MW coal-fired 
power project
Sahiwal 1,320MW coal-fired power 
plant 
Three Gorges second wind power 
project (100MW)
Source Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
(2018b).
Table 2 Eleven early harvest projects under construction
KKH-Phase-II (Havelian–Thakot) Suki Kinari hydropower project 
Karachi–Lahore motorway Sukkur–Multan 
section 
Gwadar Smart Port City Master Plan 
Metro Rail transit system on the Orange 
Line in Lahore
DTMB demonstration project 
Expressway on Eastbay of Gwadar 2x330MW Mine mouth coal-fired 
power plant at Thar Block I, Sindh 
720MW Karot hydropower project 3.8m tonnes per annum open case 
lignite mine at Thar Block II, Sindh
CPHGC 1,320MW coal-fired power plant, 
Hub, Balochistan 
Source Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
(2018b).
3 Impact evaluation of the CPEC
3.1 The CPEC’s contribution to Pakistan’s energy mix
CPEC power projects at present have added 3,240MW to Pakistan’s 
national grid (Associated Press of  Pakistan 2019), which makes up 
11 per cent of  the 29,573MW installed power capacity (Mustafa 2018). 
These power projects include a 1,320MW coal-fired power plant in 
Karachi’s Port Qasim, Sindh; a 1,320MW coal-fired power plant in 
Sahiwal, Punjab, 300MW from phase 1 of  the Zonergy solar park; the 
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50MW Dawood wind farm; the 100MW Jhimpir UEP wind power 
project; the 50MW Sachal wind farm; and the 100MW Three Gorges 
second wind power project (Embassy of  the People’s Republic of  China 
in the Islamic Republic of  Pakistan 2019). Also, a 660MW coal power 
project in Thar and another 1,320MW coal-fired power plant in Hub, 
Balochistan are under construction.
3.2 Social sector development
Gwadar Port has seen the establishment of  the China–Pakistan 
Friendship School (Embassy of  the People’s Republic of  China in the 
Islamic Republic of  Pakistan 2018a), built with a grant of  US$400,000, 
and the development of  the Gwadar Free Zone, which is an industrial 
zone built by the China Overseas Ports Holding Company (COPHC) 
that represents an inward investment of  US$250m (COPHC 2015). 
The school was built under the social sector platform, details of  which 
are described later in the article.
3.3 Infrastructure development
An ambitious motorway project that connects Pakistan’s northwestern 
city of  Peshawar with Karachi, capital of  Sindh Province, is a work-in-
progress with more than a quarter complete, and the remaining due to 
be completed by August 2019 (CPEC 2019b). Also, a US$44m, 820km 
cross-border fibre-optic cable project from Khunjerab to Rawalpindi 
has been completed (Taneja 2019).
4 Recommendations to counter challenges facing the CPEC
The CPEC is a megaproject and like all megaprojects has been 
confronted by challenges and implementation barriers. There are 
five key problems with realising the CPEC, which the author outlines 
here, alongside recommended steps to increase the effectiveness of  
project implementation: (1) a communication strategy to ensure the 
proactive dissemination of  information; (2) building the capacity of  
host country implementing institutions; (3) extensive due diligence and 
preparation for informed decision-making; (4) improved coordination 
between federal government departments, the federal government, and 
provincial governments; and (5) inclusive decision-making via engaging 
civil society, local communities, the private sector, and both national and 
regional political parties across the political spectrum.
The EHPs under the CPEC to date have mostly been delivered with 
success, despite a host of  challenges. These successes include a coal 
mine and coal-fired power plant in Thar Block II, which according to 
Deputy Chief  of  Mission (DCM) Lijian Zhao3 will be completed by the 
end of  July 2019 and will serve Pakistan’s local coal needs. A further 
coal power station under the China Power Hub Generation Company 
(CPHGC) is due to enter commercial operation in August 2019, 
delivering 1,320MW, according to Ambreen Shah, the CPHGC Vice 
President.4 Two additional megaprojects under the CPEC include the 
Multan–Sukkur motorway, which was due to be completed by August 
2019, and the Thakot–Havelian Highway, part of  the Karakoram 
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Highway (KKH), which is under construction and expected to be 
finalised by March 2020 (ibid.).
5 Discussion
In the second phase of  the CPEC, the focus will move onto the social 
sector, particularly in areas such as: poverty alleviation, clean water, 
health, education, vocational training, and agriculture. Moreover, most of  
these social sector projects are in far-flung areas of  Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
(KPK) Province, Southern Punjab, and Balochistan which have a low 
Human Development Index (HDI) and demand greater attention. 
However, failures in communicating these prospective benefits to 
stakeholders and the wider population has led to misperceptions (Marwat 
2017) and misplaced speculation (Embassy of  the People’s Republic of  
China in the Islamic Republic of  Pakistan 2019), casting aspersions on 
the project as a whole and the dissemination of  inaccurate information 
– all because of  a lack of  a proactive and well-articulated media and 
communication campaign. Instead, government spokespersons have 
been fire-fighting; often adopting a defensive position that ultimately 
compounds the criticism and trust deficit, rather than addressing it.
For example, some sections of  the Pakistani press and social media 
insisted that there had been loss of  employment of  Pakistani labourers 
on CPEC projects to Chinese labourers, despite the fact that the already 
comparatively cheap Pakistani labour would make such an enterprise 
commercially cost-ineffective. According to Balochistan budget figures 
for 2017–18, the minimum wage in Balochistan, since October 2018, 
was set at 15,000 rupees per month (Government of  Sindh Labour and 
Human Resources Department 2018), whereas in Xinjiang, as per the 
China Briefing August 2018 report, the minimum wage for a month is 
1,540 RMB (equivalent to 35,439 rupees) (Koty and Zhou 2019).
At an event in Faisalabad (14 February 2018), a major industrial hub, 
the members of  the Chamber of  Commerce were oblivious to an 
important CPEC Special Economic Zone (SEZ), that had been planned 
for the city. A common refrain is that the CPEC is a road going from 
China to Gwadar, and the land through which this road shall pass will 
transform into lucrative real estate, and the rest of  the country will 
remain unchanged.
5.1 One corridor, multiple passages
The CPEC can be described as ‘one corridor, multiple passages’ 
(Xinhua News 2016), envisioned as a long-term project that would go 
up until 2030. It is an infusion of  connectivity projects consisting of  
infrastructure, energy, ports, railways, and people-to-people projects, 
which enhance Pakistan’s trade connectivity, export potential, and 
geopolitical relevance significantly (World Bank 2018). The CPEC 
is representative of  the whole of  Pakistan. It has three major routes: 
the central, eastern, and western routes, which connect Gwadar to 
Kashgar, and which include all of  the provinces of  Pakistan. Examples 
of  CPEC projects across the country include the Karot hydropower 
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project in Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), the Rashakai SEZ in KPK, 
the Jhimpir UEP wind power project phase 1 in Sindh, the 1,320MW 
CPHGC coal-fired power plant in Hub, Balochistan, and the Sahiwal 
coal power project in Punjab. Hence, the corridor is not confined to any 
specific route or province but meets geographical inclusivity.
5.2 Opportunities for Pakistan
The CPEC too has the potential to transform Pakistan into a hub 
of  regional economic cooperation, as it seeks to connect South, 
Central, and East Asia, along with the Gulf  countries. Plans for 
this inter-regional hub role are already underway with the 9th Joint 
Cooperation Committee (JCC) meeting taking place in November 2019, 
and the Gwadar International Airport project entering the initial stages 
of  development, with the latter being financed by a grant of  US$230m 
provided by the Chinese government.5 In February 2019, during the 
visit of  Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince, Mohammad Bin Salman, he 
announced a new US$8–9bn oil refinery investment in Gwadar (Kiani 
2018). Iran has also shown interest in participating in the CPEC and 
connecting its Chabahar Port with Gwadar Port.
To further the regional connectivity potential emanating from the 
CPEC and institutionalising a mechanism for third-party participation, 
a meeting was held of  the Joint Working Group on International 
Cooperation during the eighth JCC, held in November 2018 in Beijing, 
which featured the participation of  the Foreign Secretary of  Pakistan 
and the Vice Foreign Minister of  China (Radio Pakistan 2018; Rehman 
2019). In addition to rapid development via the CPEC, Pakistan 
is being re-branded as a country which is an investment-friendly 
destination, and a market that international companies must factor in 
when they explore opportunities for out-bound investment.
5.3 The need for capacity enhancement
The aforementioned challenge of  an absent communication strategy 
speaks to two larger, structural issues: (1) the capacity of  the government 
and its bureaucracy, and (2) feasibility studies and its preparedness. 
The Planning Commission, which was recently upgraded to the 
Ministry of  Planning, Development and Reform (MPDR), the focal 
ministry responsible for coordinating the CPEC in Pakistan, has ten 
projects listed on its website (Ministry of  Planning, Development and 
Reform 2019). Each project is supervised by a project director who is 
responsible for overseeing that particular project. The CPEC is one 
of  these ten projects, and others include the Young Development 
Fellows (a programme to provide opportunities to talented youth), the 
Peace and Development Unit, and the Centre for Rural Economy. 
Considering that the CPEC’s EHPs’ investment alone is equal in value 
to Pakistan’s exports for fiscal year July–April 2018/19 at US$19bn 
(Ministry of  Finance 2019), not accounting for the other nine projects 
of  the MPDR, conventional wisdom would expect it to be a daunting 
task to successfully meet the time-sensitive deadlines of  the large-scale 
CPEC EHPs.
IDS Bulletin Vol. 50 No. 4 December 2019 ‘The Belt and Road Initiative and the SDGs: Towards Equitable, Sustainable Development’ 125–138 | 131
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
Both capacity and due diligence are intertwined, as capacity enables 
due diligence to be conducted, and without due diligence, it is 
difficult to anticipate and ascertain the extent and nature of  the 
capacity development required. Both the above points are crucial as 
it is tempting for host governments, particularly in lesser developed 
countries, to forego capacity building and due diligence to achieve 
short-term political gains, cognisant of  their limited political tenures 
rather than the long-term project cycle.
5.4 CPEC project implementation and feasibility assessment
When it comes to project implementation, the NDRC undergoes a 
process of  evaluation and feasibility analysis, after which the project 
is rejected or approved. To ease the process for foreign investors, the 
NDRC is considering the removal of  the ‘first approval’ stage (Donovan 
2019) to increase investments and create an enabling environment 
to enhance trade, a practice which the Ministry of  Planning, 
Development and Reform and Board of  Investment (BOI) Pakistan, 
could also incorporate. For example, two EHPs, the upgradation of  the 
ML-1 railway from Karachi to Peshawar and the Havelian dry port 
project, faced delay as there was little fastidious, expert-led, internal 
brainstorming, due diligence, and feasibility assessment on the Pakistani 
side to assess and determine why the particular project should be 
initiated, or one project be given precedence over another.
The discussions that did take place on the identification of  projects 
were led by political leaders and cabinet members, who are predisposed 
to giving primacy to political considerations and are unable to make 
the same informed decisions that could be made by an economist or 
an industrial zone specialist. For example, the Balochistan government 
did not issue until recently the No Objection Certificate (NOC), a 
prerequisite for the project to begin, stalling the project and pushing its 
deadlines forward. The project now awaits a tariff to be determined by 
the National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA), the pace of  
which has also been on a par with that of  the Balochistan government.
5.5 The need for a one-window solution
The absence of  a one-window solution where Chinese companies, and 
any foreign investor for that matter, both new and existing, can go 
for assistance and help, was and remains all the more necessary. For 
example, the Port Qasim power plant invested in by PowerChina, was 
one of  the highest priority power projects of  the CPEC. However, 
because it was in Sindh Province, which had a different ruling party 
from that in the centre, it led to poor coordination between the federal 
government and the provincial government, making the efficiency of  
the project suffer. For example, the provision of  security, land, and so 
forth were provincial subjects whilst the power project was supervised 
by the federal government. Because of  this, the government focused 
on a person-centric approach, where an official with an efficient and 
accomplished reputation would be placed to oversee key CPEC projects, 
as opposed to institutionally strengthening the organisation that the 
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official may be heading. The establishment of  a ‘CPEC Secretariat’ 
(Rana 2019) has finally been announced which would likely serve as the 
go-to organisation for all CPEC related matters.
Incumbent governments are predisposed to taking and claiming 
political ownership of  the projects undertaken during their tenure. 
However, BRI and CPEC projects are long term and for their success 
need political ownership from across the political spectrum from the 
start, since they outlast typical tenures of  three to five years of  elected 
governments, and those under the CPEC have a particularly long life of  
20 years and more. In the first two years after the launch of  the CPEC 
in 2013, resentment and a sense of  disenfranchisement was witnessed 
from the provincial lawmakers in Balochistan (Shahid 2018) and 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, who claimed that they had not been consulted 
and included in the decision-making process with regard to the CPEC. 
Later, the government established a Parliamentary Committee on 
CPEC (Parliamentary Committee on China–Pakistan Economic 
Corridor 2016) comprising both the houses of  the parliament, and 
consisting of  all political parties including the opposition, to garner 
consensus and right any wrongs that may have been committed in the 
nascent stages of  decision-making by the government (The Routine 2018).
Critical stakeholders for large projects are the local communities that 
reside in the area or vicinity of  the project site, and whose ecosystem, 
way of  life, and even source of  income, may be impacted, often 
adversely. Under the CPEC, local communities have been made 
beneficiaries and their needs have been addressed. In Gwadar, the China 
Overseas Ports Holding Company (Embassy of  the People’s Republic 
of  China in the Islamic Republic of  Pakistan 2018a) has established a 
primary school for girls and is in the process of  establishing a vocational 
training institute and a 500-bed hospital, all with grants from the 
Chinese government. In Thar, a desert, where a mega coal project has 
been established, the Sindh Engro Coal Mining Company has trained 
local women to drive dumper trucks for transporting coal, leading 
to both their empowerment, and inclusive growth and development 
(The Express Tribune 2017). However, an institutional approach to making 
local communities more involved is required, where they are made privy 
to the decision-making process, and a channel of  communication where 
their demands and views are able to reach decision makers.
5.6 The CPEC and people-to-people connectivity
The CPEC is as much about access to basic necessities for the ordinary 
Pakistani as it is about major investments and projects in energy, 
infrastructure, and industrial zones. After the successful completion of  
the EHPs, the CPEC now consists of  people-focused projects (Hussain 
2019). A new Joint Working Group on Socioeconomic Development was 
established under the Joint Coordination Committee of  the CPEC in 
2018, which is aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
of  the United Nations (Sheikh 2016). During the second Belt and Road 
Forum in May 2019, China allocated US$1bn for 27 projects under this 
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new working group, including in education, health, agriculture, water 
and irrigation, poverty alleviation, and human resource development 
(Hussain 2019). The areas of  these projects are: (1) establishing technical 
and vocational training institutes, which is in line with SDG 8 – decent 
work and economic growth; (2) establishing health-care facilities and 
thereby making health care accessible (SDG 3 – good health and 
wellbeing), and the provision of  educational facilities in disenfranchised 
areas (SDG 4 – quality education); (3) clean drinking water projects such 
as the Gwadar desalination plant (SDG 6 – clean water and sanitation); 
and (4) agriculture and poverty alleviation projects (SDG 1 and 2 – no 
poverty and zero hunger). Furthermore, Gwadar City’s development 
is being envisioned as creating a clean, green, and environment-friendly city 
(SDGs 7 and 13 – affordable and clean energy and climate action), 
whilst the SEZs under the CPEC will create an enabling environment 
for investment, generating jobs and enhancing industrial development, 
leading to economic growth (SDGs 8, 9, and 10 – decent work and 
economic growth; industry, innovation and infrastructure; and reduced 
inequality) (Ali 2018).
Thus far, 70,000 Pakistanis have gained employment in CPEC projects 
(Achakzai 2018). Moreover, for enhancement of  people-to-people 
connectivity and youth-based training, 20,000 scholarships will be 
given to Pakistani students over the next three years. Phase II includes 
social projects such as the Pak China Friendship Hospital (CPEC 
2017), and the Pak–China Technical and Vocational Institute (Ministry 
of  Planning, Development and Reform 2017) at Gwadar, as well as 
the 300,000 gallon desalination plant in Gwadar, which will boost 
sustainable development.
6 Conclusion
There is much that can be learnt from the first five years of  the BRI 
projects and corridors, including CPEC, in terms of  both what to do 
and what not to do. Firstly, the programme would benefit from a more 
inclusive, institutionalised (not ad hoc), and scientific approach to 
examining (1) the feasibility of  the project, (2) the project’s alignment 
with the host country’s national development strategy, and (3) the 
project’s intended and unintended consequences and long-term 
impact on the environment and economy. One way to address the 
aforementioned issues would be by creating an organisation which is 
government-led, but which includes representation from national and 
regional political parties, local communities, the private sector, and 
civil society, in addition to experts of  the project(s)-related fields, which 
would pre-empt prospective community or civil society blowback.
By engaging these stakeholders that are ultimately power centres who 
matter, potential concerns or insecurities (often present in developing 
countries that have limited experience in dealing with an influx of  
foreign personnel or companies) would be deflected and/or addressed in 
a timely manner. This, coupled with a well-conceived, facts-based, and 
sustained communication campaign is necessary to apprise stakeholders 
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of  the benefits of  particular projects to them and the economy, and 
to make them part of  the solution. All this would help to build a truly 
win-win partnership.
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Will the Belt and Road Initiative 
Boost Least Developed Countries 
Towards Sustainable Development?*
Namsuk Kim1
Abstract This article reviews the progress of least developed countries 
(LDCs) towards LDC graduation and to achieving the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs). It shows that the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI) could contribute to filling the financing gap and speed up progress. 
LDCs are defined as low-income countries with structural handicaps 
to achieving sustainable development. The comparison between SDG 
monitoring indicators and LDC identification indicators shows that progress 
towards the SDGs and towards the graduation from the LDC category 
are in general heading in the same direction. Estimates show that, under 
the business-as-usual scenario, only about half of LDCs could become 
eligible for graduation by 2030, while at the same time remaining a long 
way from the SDGs. There remains a significant financing gap which calls 
for additional cooperation initiatives, and the BRI to provide critical and 
necessary enabling conditions in this area.
Keywords: Belt and Road Initiative, least developed countries, 
Sustainable Development Goals, financing for development, United 
Nations, graduation.
1 Introduction
Least developed countries (LDCs) are a group of  countries that are 
identified by the United Nations (UN) as having severe challenges in 
achieving sustainable development. The category was created in 1971, 
allowing these countries access to special support measures from the 
international community, such as trade preferences, technical assistance, 
and aid. The list of  countries to be included in the category is reviewed 
against a set of  criteria every three years (UN 2015).
While remarkable socioeconomic progress has occurred around the 
world throughout the past decades, the majority of  LDCs, which 
constitute the poorest and most vulnerable group of  countries, by 
and large did not share in this global progress. The principle of  
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universality written into the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 
(2030 Agenda) and represented by the phrase ‘leave no one behind’, 
would only be accomplished when those countries that start furthest 
behind – LDCs – are able to catch up and achieve the SDGs and 
the 2030 Agenda’s other identified targets. The upcoming decadal 
programme of  action for LDCs is expected to formulate the action 
agenda for 2021–30, which has the same end point as the 2030 Agenda. 
The 2030 Agenda’s universal and integrated set of  goals and targets 
address the root causes of  poverty and the need for development that 
works for everyone, a priority for the LDCs (UN 2015).
To support LDCs to be on track towards the SDGs, it is critical to 
identify where the challenges are and how they will evolve up to 2030. 
But it is a difficult task to forecast and estimate progress towards the 
SDGs because the 2030 Agenda covers a wide spectrum of  economic, 
social, and environmental aspects, with 17 goals, 169 targets, and 
232 official indicators to measure progress. In this context, this article 
reviews the connection between achievement of  the SDGs and LDC 
graduation (which uses just a few indicators); the current trajectory and 
required acceleration for LDC graduation; and the role of  the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) in financing for development in LDCs.
The progress made for enabling LDCs to move towards graduation has 
not been successful enough. Since the establishment of  the category, 
the number of  LDCs has increased from 25 in 1971 to 47 in 2018. 
During this period, only five countries have been able to make sufficient 
progress to graduate from the LDC category, and only 14 countries 
have met the criteria for graduation during the past decade, 2011–20 
(UNDESA 2018a).
Recognising the development challenges that LDCs face, the 
international community has provided support measures to those 
countries, some of  which are exclusive to LDCs.2 However, as seen 
above, the support measures for LDCs have not been sufficient at 
enabling LDCs to make progress against the SDGs and graduate from 
the LDC category. This is the reason why alternative and additional 
cooperation platforms, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 
should be explored.
The Government of  the People’s Republic of  China launched the 
initiative of  jointly building the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 
twenty‑first century Maritime Silk Road in October 2013. The Belt 
and Road is envisioned to become a road of  peace, prosperity, opening 
up, green development, innovation, connected civilisations, and clean 
government. It maps out a grand vision for international development 
cooperation, covering five key areas – policy coordination, infrastructure 
connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people‑to‑
people bond – which are extensively and intrinsically linked to the 
SDGs. By the end of  March 2019, 173 cooperation agreements with 
125 countries and 29 international organisations had been signed 
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with China (Office of  the Leading Group for Promoting the Belt and 
Road Initiative 2019). The majority of  these countries are developing 
countries, including LDCs, land‑locked developing countries (LLDCs), 
and small island developing states (SIDS).
Section 2 presents an overview of  the connection between the 
SDGs and LDC graduation, based on the indicator and target‑level 
comparison. Section 3 reports the results from the statistical exercises 
on the prospects of  LDC graduation by 2030. Section 4 presents the 
financing needs for LDCs and role of  the BRI. Section 5 concludes.
2 Graduating from the LDC category and achieving the SDGs
The LDC classification criteria aims to fully reflect the international 
development context that continues to change over time, and thus these 
criteria are periodically reviewed and adjusted. Since the 2030 Agenda 
was adopted, it has become clear that the opportunities and challenges 
of  LDCs in the implementation of  international agreements, and 
especially the SDGs, needs to be explored in order to ensure coherence 
and synergies between different international agendas.
LDCs are defined as low‑income developing countries suffering from 
severe structural impediments to sustainable development (UNDESA 
2018b). The three criteria used to identify LDCs are gross national 
income (GNI) per capita, the Human Assets Index (HAI), and the 
Economic Vulnerability Index (EVI).
GNI per capita provides information on the overall level of  resources 
available to a country. The threshold for inclusion is set at the three‑year 
average of  the level of  GNI per capita, which the World Bank defines 
for identifying low‑income countries. For instance, in the latest review in 
2018, the threshold for inclusion in the LDC category was US$1,025. 
The threshold for graduation was US$1,230, which is set at 20 per cent 
above the inclusion threshold (UNDESA 2018b).
The HAI is a measure of  the level of  human capital. Good health is 
a critical part of  human wellbeing and improving the health status of  
the population leads to productivity increase, educational attainment, 
and poverty reduction. Education is another major element of  
human wellbeing in itself, and a low level of  education implies lower 
productivity and a limited capacity to absorb technological advances. 
The HAI consists of  five indicators on health and education: (1) the 
number of  the population undernourished; (2) the child mortality rate; 
(3) the maternal mortality rate; (4) the gross secondary enrolment rate; 
and (5) the adult literacy rate. The HAI threshold for inclusion into the 
LDC is set at 60. The graduation threshold is set at 10 per cent above 
the inclusion threshold at 66 (UNDESA 2018b).
The EVI measures the structural vulnerability of  countries to economic 
and environmental shocks. High vulnerability is a major impediment 
to sustainable development in view of  heightened exposure to shocks 
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Table 1 Linkages between LDC indicators and SDG indicators
LDC indicators
SDG indicators
Group A
Constraint
Group B
Outcome and constraint*
Group C
Reviewed as potential LDC indicators**
Group D
Other indicators
Population 
remoteness
GNI per capita (8.1.1)
Under-five mortality rate (3.2.1)
Undernourished (2.1.1)
Secondary school enrolment (4.1.1)
Literacy rate (4.6.1)
Maternal mortality rate (3.1.1)
Export concentration (8.2.1; 9.b.1; 
10.a.1; 17.10.1; 17.11.1; 17.12.1)
Share of agriculture (2.4.1; 8.9.1; 9.2.1; 
14.7.1; 15.1.1)
Population in low coastal zones 
(11.5.1; 11.b.1; 11.b.2)
Instability of exports (10.a.1; 17.10.1; 
17.11.1; 17.12.1)
Victims of natural disasters (1.5.1; 
11.5.1; 11.b.1; 11.b.2; 13.1.2)
Instability of agricultural production 
(2.a.1; 2.b.1; 2.b.2; 2.c.1)
Access to electricity*** (7.1.1)
1. Poverty rate (1997, 2008)
2. Stunting (2015)
3. Births attended by skilled personnel (2014)
3. HIV infections (2008)
3. Mortality attributed to cardiovascular 
disease, etc. (2015)
4. Participation in education and training 
(1997, 2011)
4. Information and technology skills (2005)
5. Legal framework (2011)
6. Drinking water (2011)
8. Jobs in tourism (2008, 2011)
9. Access to road (1991, 1997)
9. Mobile network (2005)
10. Income of bottom 40% (1999, 2008, 
2011)
10. Population below 50% of median income 
(1999, 2008, 2011)
10. Resource flows for development (2010)
10. Remittances cost (2008, 2011)
11. Disaster economic loss (2002)
12. Material consumption (1991)
16. Homicide (2008, 2011)
16. Conflict deaths (2008, 2011)
About 200 
indicators mostly 
related to policy
Notes * Directly or indirectly related SDG indicators are in parentheses.  
** Number represents corresponding SDG, and the years in which the CDP considered the indicator are in parentheses. 
*** Used as an LDC indicator during 1991–99. 
Source Author’s tabulation from the UN Committee for Development Policy (1971–2018).
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and their long‑lasting negative impacts. Vulnerability depends mainly 
on the magnitude and frequency of  such shocks, and on the structural 
characteristics of  the country concerned. The EVI is composed of  
eight indicators, grouped into two main components: an exposure 
index and a shock index. The exposure index includes: (1) population; 
(2) remoteness; (3) merchandise export concentration; (4) the share of  
agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing; and (5) the share of  population 
in low elevated coastal zones. The shock index includes: (6) the instability 
of  exports of  goods and services; (7) victims of  natural disasters; and 
(8) the instability of  agricultural production. The EVI threshold for 
inclusion into the LDC category is set at 36. The graduation threshold is 
set at 10 per cent below the inclusion threshold at 32 (UNDESA 2018b).
The indicators used as LDC criteria have been selected on the 
basis of  their relevance to measuring structural impediments, their 
methodological soundness, and the availability of  data; namely, their 
frequency and coverage. In order to ensure comparability across 
countries, all indicators are based on internationally available data.
There is a fundamental difference between the objectives of  SDG 
monitoring indicators and the LDC classification indicators: while 
SDG monitoring indicators aim to measure outcomes of  development 
progress, LDC indicators attempt to measure structural factors that hinder 
development. This difference in objectives results in the differences in 
the selection and interpretation of  indicators.
Despite the difference, there is an overlap between the SDG review 
indicators and LDC indicators, because some of  the indicators can have 
characteristics of  both development outcomes and structural handicaps 
to varying extents. For example, low levels of  human capital are major 
challenges for countries, not only because they are a manifestation 
of  unsustainable development (an outcome), but also because they 
limit the possibilities for economic production and growth, prevent 
poverty eradication, exacerbate inequalities, and hamper resilience to 
external shocks (a structural handicap). For this reason, many indicators 
on health and education are used for LDC classification as well as 
SDG monitoring.
Table 1 illustrates the linkages between LDC indicators and SDG 
indicators, grouping the indicators into four groups. Group A is the 
LDC indicators that are regarded as structural impediments only, with 
little relation to action or policy, at least in the medium term. Group B 
represents indicators that are used both for LDC identification and 
SDG monitoring. Group C includes SDG indicators that have been 
reviewed in the past by the Committee for Development Policy (CDP) as 
possible LDC indicators but not adopted for various reasons. Indicators 
in Group D have not been considered for LDC indicators yet.
In sum, making progress towards LDC graduation is well in line with 
making progress towards the SDGs. Almost all the LDC indicators 
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currently or previously in use are closely linked with SDG monitoring 
indicators in various goals and targets. Only two LDC indicators are 
regarded as structural indicators and bear little relation to an action‑
oriented SDG monitoring framework. A significant number of  SDG 
indicators and areas have been reviewed in the past for possible 
inclusion in the LDC criteria but rejected for various reasons. The 
reasons for discarding the indicators are: duplication, data deficiencies, 
no structural impediment, and country‑specific issues.
3 LDC graduation prospects and SDGs specific to LDCs
The next question is, how fast are the LDCs making progress towards 
graduation? The official graduation eligibility process was formulated 
in 1991. In principle, at least two out of  the three criteria must pass 
the graduation thresholds, in order to be eligible for graduation. When 
a country is identified as eligible for graduation for two consecutive 
triennial reviews, then an additional procedure is implemented for a 
possible graduation (UNDESA 2018b). As an exception, a country 
is eligible for graduation if  its GNI increases to a sufficiently high 
level – defined as at least twice the graduation threshold level – even 
if  that country has not satisfied the graduation thresholds for both 
the HAI and the EVI (UNDESA 2005). This is called an income-only 
graduation criterion, and the income‑only graduation threshold was set 
at US$2,460 in the 2018 review of  the LDC category.
The projected number of  LDCs that may meet the graduation threshold 
depends heavily on the estimation methods and assumptions. In its 
estimations, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) (2016) applied the income trajectory based on the GDP 
forecast of  the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and logarithmic 
trends of  the HAI and EVI, and suggested 13 projected graduation cases 
between 2021 and 2024. Drabo and Guillaumont (2016) considered 
more closely the possible graduation cases based on the income‑only 
criterion. Assuming the per capita income growth rate is sustained at 
the same rate as in 2001–14, 14 countries would be projected to meet 
the income‑only criteria between 2018 and 2030. If  the average growth 
rate is one percentage point higher, or increased to 7 per cent per year, 
17–24 LDCs may meet the income‑only criterion between 2018 and 
2030. Similarly, Kawamura (2014) used average annual growth rates of  
three criteria observed during the period 2000–10 and suggested that 
11 countries may become eligible for graduation by 2021.
While the aforementioned papers use the official Triennial Review data, 
released every three years, to forecast future graduation eligibility, this 
article uses annual data of  the same composition, methodology, and 
data source to maintain consistency over time. The data are unbalanced 
panel data, covering all 47 current LDCs from 1993 to 2018.
The graduation threshold for income is set as 20 per cent higher than a 
three‑year moving average of  the low‑income country (LIC) thresholds 
used by the World Bank. This article projects these income thresholds 
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Table 2 Projected number of LDCs meeting graduation criteria by 2030
Country Scenario 1: Average 
annual growth rate
Scenario 2: Compound 
annual growth rate
Scenario 3: Linear 
time trend
Scenario 4: 7% 
minimum growth (SDG)
1 Afghanistan G, H G, H G, H
2 Angola* IO, H IO, H IO, H IO, H
3 Bangladesh* G, E, H G, E, H G, E, H G, E, H
4 Benin G, E, H E, H E, H G, E, H
5 Bhutan* G, H G, H G, H G, H
6 Burkina Faso
7 Burundi
8 Cambodia G, H G, H E, H G, E, H
9 Central African Republic
10 Chad
11 Comoros IO
12 DR Congo
13 Djibouti G, E, H G, E, H G, E, H IO, E, H
14 Eritrea IO IO IO
15 Ethiopia G, E G, E E, H G, E
16 Gambia
17 Guinea
18 Guinea-Bissau
19 Haiti G, E G, E
20 Kiribati* IO, H IO, H IO, H IO, H
21 Lao PDR* G, H G, H G, H G, H
22 Lesotho G, H G, H G, H
23 Liberia
24 Madagascar
25 Malawi
26 Mali G, H G, H
27 Mauritania
28 Mozambique
29 Myanmar* G, E, H G, E, H G, E, H G, E, H
30 Nepal* E, H E, H E, H E, H
31 Niger
32 Rwanda E, H E, H E, H E, H
33 Sao Tome and Principe* G, H G, H G, H G, H
34 Senegal E, H G, H
35 Sierra Leone
36 Solomon Islands* G, H G, H G, H G, H
37 Somalia E, H E, H
38 South Sudan
39 Sudan IO
40 Timor-Leste* IO, H IO, H IO, H IO, H
41 Togo E, H E, H E, H E, H
42 Tuvalu* IO, H IO, H IO, H IO, H
43 Uganda
44 United Rep. of Tanzania E, H G, E, H E, H E, H
45 Vanuatu* G, H G, H G, H G, H
46 Yemen G, H G, H
47 Zambia IO, H IO, H G, H IO
Number of countries 
meeting criteria
26 22 23 30
Notes Criteria met for graduation for the first time: G = GNI per capita; E = EVI; H = HAI; IO = income only. *Denotes 
countries already identified meeting criteria by 2018 review. Income graduation threshold is projected based on historical 
thresholds of low- and middle-income countries by the World Bank (2019a). 
Source Author’s own calculation based on projections using the annual data of LDC criteria.
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based upon its historical trend assessment. The thresholds for the HAI 
and the EVI are fixed at 66 (or above) and 32 (or below), respectively, 
and therefore, there is no need to project their thresholds. It is notable 
that the EVI and HAI tend to change slowly over time, because they 
consist of  many sub‑indicators that do not change quickly. As the EVI 
and the HAI only change incrementally over the years, changes in many 
LDCs follow a straight line which can be approximated locally by a 
linear trend, or a simple average growth rate.
Scenario 1: Average annual growth rate
In this baseline scenario, countries make progress between 2019 and 
2030 at the same average annual growth rates (AAGRs) as over the 
past ten years, 2009–18. This is a method commonly used in the 
above‑mentioned existing research on prospects of  LDC graduation. 
All three criteria – GNI per capita, EVI, and HAI – are estimated based 
on this method. Assuming that the progress made in the past ten years 
will continue until 2030 in all three criteria, the total of  26 LDCs may 
meet graduation thresholds (see Table 2). Sustained growth in GNI per 
capita until 2030 appears to be the deciding factor to achieve this result.
Scenario 2: Compound annual growth rate
The compound annual growth rates (CAGRs) for 2009–18 are used in 
this scenario to project the path. In this scenario, the total of  22 LDCs 
may meet graduation thresholds by 2030 (see Table 2). The income 
growth is almost the same, or lower for some LDCs when the CAGRs 
are used, compared to the cases where we use the AAGRs.
Scenario 3: Linear time trend
In this scenario, countries follow the long‑term historical trend in all 
LDC criteria until 2030. A simple time variable, instead of  the time 
dummies, is used for estimating the linear time trend, and for the 
parsimony of  the model. Based on the linear trend, 23 LDCs may meet 
the graduation criteria at least once by 2030 (see Table 2).
Scenario 4: SDG target 8.1 on 7 per cent minimum growth rate
SDG target 8.1 is to sustain per capita economic growth in accordance 
with national circumstances, and in particular at least 7 per cent per 
annum GDP growth in the LDCs. Scenario 4 is to have a minimum 
of  7 per cent growth for GNI per capita for all LDCs, while the HAI 
and EVI follow the historical trend in Scenario 1. With this adjustment, 
compared to Scenario 1, four additional countries meet the criteria, 
with 30 LDCs meeting the graduation criteria by 2030. It is also notable 
that 17 LDCs still would not be able to meet the LDC graduation 
criteria, even with a 7 per cent annual growth rate, if  their progress on 
improving human assets and reducing structural vulnerability is limited.
To summarise, the statistical exercise suggests two different prospects:
1 Business as usual: Scenarios 1, 2, and 3 (based on historical trend) 
predict that 22–26 LDCs, about 50 per cent of  the current total, may 
meet the graduation criteria by 2030;
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2 Optimistic result: Scenario 4 (SDG target of  minimum growth of  
7 per cent) suggests that 30 LDCs, about 64 per cent of  the total, 
may meet the graduation criteria by 2030.
To achieve the optimistic result, therefore, an unprecedented pace of  
growth in many LDCs is required. The statistical analysis suggests that 
LDCs need to have a minimum of  7 per cent income growth (meeting 
the SDG target), for a substantive share of  LDCs to be able to meet the 
graduation criteria by 2030. The result implies that the LDCs are not 
making progress fast enough to become eligible for graduation and to 
achieve the SDGs.
A total of  18 of  the 169 SDG targets refer explicitly to the LDCs, and 
dozens more are of  central importance to their development success 
(UNCTAD 2018a). But there are not many SDG targets for LDCs with 
specific numeric targets.
SDG target 8.1 is to ‘Sustain per capita economic growth in accordance 
with national circumstances and, in particular, at least 7 per cent gross 
domestic product growth per annum in the least developed countries’ 
(UN 2015: 19). According to the World Bank data, only five LDCs 
achieved over a 7 per cent growth rate in 2017. While the average 
growth rate is around 6.4 per cent for Asian LDCs, African and Pacific 
Island LDCs show only a 4 per cent growth rate on average in 2017 
(World Bank 2019a).
SDG target 9.2 is to ‘Promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization 
and, by 2030, significantly raise industry’s share of  employment and 
gross domestic product, in line with national circumstances, and double 
its share in least developed countries’ (UN 2015: 20). The average share 
of  the industrial sector in LDCs remains at 25 per cent in 2016, which 
is the same as 2006 (World Bank 2019a). Not only is this well off‑target 
overall, but also there exists a huge variance across LDCs. Resource‑rich 
LDCs in general have a high proportion of  GDP from the industrial 
sector; for example, Angola and DR Congo. Whereas LDCs with 
limited productive capacity have a relatively low share in industry; for 
example, Gambia and Kiribati. In order to achieve SDG target 9.2, it 
is critical for those LDCs with low productive capacity to make much 
faster progress in transforming their economic structure.
SDG target 17.11 is to ‘Significantly increase the exports of  developing 
countries, in particular with a view to doubling the least developed 
countries’ share of  global exports by 2020’ (UN 2015: 27). As of  2016, 
the share is estimated as 0.9 per cent, only a 0.1 percentage point 
increase from 2006 (UNCTAD 2018b). It is apparent that to achieve 
the SDG targets set for LDCs, there is a huge need for support to boost 
income growth, economic transformation, and global integration.
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4 The Belt and Road Initiative as an accelerator for LDCs
Since its inception in 2013, the BRI has expanded from Asia to Europe, 
Africa, Latin America, and the South Pacific. The BRI evolved to cover 
five priorities for international development cooperation; namely, policy 
coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial 
integration, and people‑to‑people bond. Over 140 entities, countries, 
and international organisations have either signed Memoranda of  
Understanding (MoUs) or expressed interest to cooperate under the 
initiative (Office of  the Leading Group for Promoting the Belt and 
Road Initiative 2019).
The BRI has substantial financial backing with estimates as high as 
US$1tn, pledged by Chinese financial institutes, investment funds 
including the Silk Road Fund, the China–Africa Fund, state‑owned 
commercial banks, and private investors (World Bank 2019b). 
Lending through multilateral development banks, such as the Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank, has contributed to overall BRI 
financing and elevated China’s global developmental role.
From 2013 to 2018, the value of  trade between China and the countries 
along the Belt and Road surpassed US$6tn, accounting for about 27 per 
cent of  China’s total trade in goods. During the same period, China’s 
direct investment in those countries surpassed US$90bn (Baniya, Rocha 
and Ruta 2019). A total of  30 out of  47 LDCs signed cooperation 
agreements under the BRI with China on cooperating to improve 
infrastructure, direct investment, and export promotion.3
The BRI holds substantial potential to generate welfare benefits for 
participating countries and contribute to the implementation of  the 
SDGs. The five priority areas of  the BRI have many possible direct and 
indirect linkages with various SDGs (Hong 2017). Direct linkages are 
concentrated in SDG 1 (no poverty), SDG 8 (decent work and economic 
growth), SDG 9 (industry, innovation, and infrastructure), SDG 10 
(reduce inequality), and SDG 17 (global partnership).
The channels of  the BRI affecting SDG progress at the country level 
remain to be seen, because the possible linkages are very complex. 
Many SDG targets are intertwined with synergies and potential 
trade‑offs which lead to the necessity of  prioritising some SDGs in many 
developing countries with limited financial resources. In this context, 
financing for the SDGs funded by the BRI could be a crucial element 
for many developing countries.
While supporting LDCs to make progress towards LDC graduation 
and to achieve the SDGs requires a major step‑up in international 
cooperation, all sources of  financing for LDCs have not displayed any 
significant increase in recent years and some of  them have dropped in 
the past couple of  years. It has become clear that the required need for 
financing for development in LDCs is not likely to be met at the current 
trend of  financial flows to LDCs. Alternative and additional financial 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 50 No. 4 December 2019 ‘The Belt and Road Initiative and the SDGs: Towards Equitable, Sustainable Development’ 139–154 | 149
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
sources need to be explored. In this context, it is notable that the BRI is 
starting to provide a significant amount of  flow to LDCs (OECD 2018b).
To look into the details further, a few external income sources are of  
importance for LDCs: export revenue; foreign direct investment (FDI); 
remittances; and official development assistance (ODA).
4.1 Export
While exports, particularly commodity exports, are one of  the major 
income sources for LDCs, recent trends in international markets 
have not been favourable. Global demand for commodities has been 
weak and has kept the price low in the past five years. LDCs’ total 
export revenues fell from US$255bn to US$190bn between 2013 and 
2016 (UNCTAD 2018b). The overall trade share of  LDCs has been 
increasing very slowly over the past decade (World Bank 2019a).
BRI investment in improving transportation may contribute to lowering 
travel times and increasing trade. The magnitude of  the impact varies 
across estimation methods. The World Bank estimates that travel times 
will decline by up to 12 per cent once major economic corridors, which 
cover many LDCs in Asia, are completed (World Bank 2019b). Travel 
times to the rest of  the world are estimated to decrease by an average 
of  3 per cent, showing that non‑BRI countries and regions, which 
include many LDCs in Africa, will benefit as well. Subsequently, trade 
may rise from between 2.8 and 9.7 per cent for corridor economies 
and between 1.7 and 6.2 per cent for the world. De Soyres et al. (2018) 
estimate that planned investments under the BRI can reduce shipment 
time by 3.6 to 4.5 per cent, and trade costs by 3.2 to 4.0 per cent. Reed 
and Trubetskoy (2019) find large potential benefits from increased 
market access in high‑density cities with poor infrastructure. Zhai (2018) 
estimates that countries can export 5.6 to 10.9 per cent additionally, 
helped by BRI investment.
4.2 Foreign direct investment
FDI inflows to LDCs are estimated at only US$25bn in 2017, showing a 
decline from US$37bn in 2015 (UNCTAD 2018c). They are concentrated 
in a limited number of  LDCs, including a few fast‑growing Asian LDCs 
and resource‑rich African LDCs. Nine out of  the 47 LDCs, namely, 
Bangladesh (US$2.2bn), Cambodia (US$2.8bn), DR Congo (US$1.3bn), 
Ethiopia (US$3.6bn), Mozambique (US$2.3bn), Myanmar (US$4.3bn), 
Sudan (US$1.1bn), Tanzania (US$1.2bn), and Zambia (US$1.1bn), 
account for 80 per cent of  all FDI flows to LDCs in 2017 (ibid.).
Countries that lie along the Belt and Road corridors fall short of  their 
potential FDI by 70 per cent. With the new transport links supported by 
the BRI, low‑income countries are expected to see a significant 7.6 per 
cent increase in FDI (World Bank 2019b).
4.3 Remittances
Remittances to LDCs were around US$37bn in 2017, slightly decreased 
from 2015–16 (World Bank 2019a). While this amounts to about 
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7 per cent of  the world total, remittances are a significant source of  
external finance in a number of  LDCs, and their resilience compared 
with other financing flows may contribute to easing the balance of  
payment pressure. But the largest recipients of  remittances are heavily 
concentrated in just a few LDCs. Bangladesh (US$14bn in 2016), Nepal 
(US$7bn), Yemen (US$3bn), Haiti (US$2bn), Senegal (US$2bn), and 
Uganda (US$1bn) accounted for as much as three quarters of  personal 
remittances flowing to LDCs (UNCTAD 2018b).
While people‑to‑people bond is one of  the five priority areas of  the 
BRI, data on the migration or remittances related to the BRI are 
currently very limited. This is an area for further research and policy 
coordination is required.
4.4 Official development assistance
If  private flows cannot fill the financing gap, official flows need to rise to 
support LDCs. The ODA represents about 70 per cent of  LDCs’ total 
external finance (OECD 2018a). SDG target 17.2 calls for:
developed countries to implement fully their official development 
assistance commitments, including the commitment by many 
developed countries to achieve the target of  0.7 per cent of  ODA/
GNI to developing countries and 0.15 to 0.20 per cent of  ODA/GNI 
to LDCs. ODA providers are encouraged to consider setting a target to 
provide at least 0.20 per cent of  ODA/GNI to LDCs (UN 2015: 26).
However, net ODA disbursement to LDCs remained at US$26bn 
in 2017 and has not shown a significant increase since 2015 (OECD 
2019). Only seven Development Assistance Committee (DAC) members 
provided ODA over 0.15 per cent of  GNI in 2012–16 (UNCTAD 
2018c). While data are limited, it is estimated that China provided official 
aid of  US$8bn in 2014 (AidData 2017). The figure rises to US$37bn in 
2014, with seven African countries in the top ten recipients (ibid.). More 
recent data would be able to indicate how much aid the BRI has added.
Given the current trend of  external financial flows to LDCs to finance 
their development towards the SDGs, it is extremely challenging to 
achieve this and make progress towards LDC graduation, particularly 
in Africa, without the BRI and other additional support. Also, 
implementing the BRI should not assume automatic SDG benefits, 
as each country is contextually unique and operating at a range of  
development stages, with different economic structures and therefore 
priorities in development strategy. It will be critical to assess the extent 
of  the positive impacts of  the BRI and their impact on the development 
of  LDCs in order to formulate optimal investment policies.
5 Conclusion
Member states of  the UN reaffirmed their commitment to the 
full, effective, and timely implementation of  the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, as well as the support for mainstreaming 
it into the national development policies and programmes of  LDCs. 
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To fulfil these commitments, it is critical for the governments of  LDCs 
and their development partners to understand how these various 
agendas are interlinked, how to prioritise their development policies, 
and how to identify available resources to finance them.
A comparison of  the two sets of  indicators for LDC classification and 
SDG progress‑monitoring reveals that there is a substantial overlap: 
11 out of  the 17 SDGs have targets explicitly linked to LDC criteria. 
Likewise, 12 out of  the 14 LDC indicators are closely related to the 
SDG indicators. Therefore, making progress towards LDC graduation 
is in line with almost all development progress towards achieving the 
SDGs. Accelerating improvement in human assets and structural 
transformation would also contribute to achieve many SDG targets.
Forecasts of  the progress towards the SDGs in LDCs are not favourable. 
Based on statistical analysis of  historical trends, only 22–26 LDCs 
(47–55 per cent of  the total) may meet graduation thresholds by 2030. 
An optimistic hypothetical scenario, which meets the SDG target of  
achieving 7 per cent annual growth for all LDCs, predicts that 30 LDCs 
(64 per cent of  the total) may meet the graduation criteria by 2030. 
Even if  all LDCs achieve high growth in income, about one third of  
LDCs will not be able to meet the graduation thresholds by 2030 unless 
fast progress is also seen in improving human assets and reducing 
structural vulnerability.
To boost the speed for LDCs to achieve the SDGs, another engine is 
needed – the BRI. Within a short period of  time since its inception, the 
BRI has been able to prove its significant potential to accelerate SDG 
progress. In particular, the BRI can contribute by filling the gap in 
development financing for LDCs through various channels to its priority 
areas: unimpeded trade for LDCs to export; financial integration to raise 
FDI and ODA; and people‑to‑people bonds to increase remittances.
The SDGs and the BRI are two distinct agendas but share common 
objectives, which could be instrumental in supporting the development 
progress of  LDCs. These interlinkages are potential synergies, not yet 
realised. One of  the most important tasks to maximise the development 
impact of  the BRI is to assess the country‑specific factors that affect 
the channels between the BRI and the SDGs in LDCs, and to identify 
which channels the BRI can contribute to the most.
Notes
*  This IDS Bulletin is supported by the Center for International 
Knowledge on Development’s (CIKD) China–UK Partnership 
Programme on Knowledge for Development.
  The author thanks Roland Mollerus, Matthias Bruckner, 
Marcia Tavares, and Lin Yang for their helpful comments. The 
opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily represent the 
views of  the United Nations. For further information, please contact 
the author.
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1 Namsuk Kim, Economic Affairs Officer, Department of  Economic 
and Social Affairs, United Nations, USA, kimnamsuk@un.org.
2 The list of  LDC‑specific support measures can be found at  
www.un.org/ldcportal. 
3 Yemen is currently not in the BRI list due to the Yemen Civil war, 
according to Yidaiyilu official website,  
www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/gbjg/gbgk/77073.htm. 
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Glossary
AAGR average annual growth rate
ABC Africa–Britain–China
ACE ASEAN Centre for Energy [Indonesia]
ADB Asian Development Bank [Philippines]
AGOA Africa Growth and Opportunity Act
AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank [China]
AJK Azad Jammu and Kashmir [Pakistan]
ASEAN Association of  Southeast Asian Nations [Indonesia]
AU African Union [Ethiopia]
B&R Belt and Road
BOI Board of  Investment [Pakistan]
BOT build–operate–transfer
BRF Belt and Road Forum [China]
BRI Belt and Road Initiative [China]
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
CAGR compound annual growth rate
CAICT China Academy of  Information and Communications 
Technology
CAS Chinese Academy of  Sciences
CBD China Development Bank
CBRC Chinese Banking Regulatory Commission
CCCC China Communications Construction Company
CCICED China Council for International Cooperation on Environment 
and Development
CCIEE China Center for International Economic Exchanges
CDP Committee for Development Policy
CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries
CEIS Centre for Economic and International Studies [Italy]
CEPR Centre for Economic Policy Research [UK]
CGTN China Global Television Network
CHINCA China International Contractors Association
CIDCA China International Development Cooperation Agency
CIDP County Integrated Development Plan [Kenya]
CIKD Center for International Knowledge on Development [China]
CITIC China International Trust Investment Corporation
CMEC China Machinery Engineering Company
CMEC China–Myanmar Economic Corridor
CMPort China Merchant Port Holdings
CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation
COPHC China Overseas Ports Holding Company [Pakistan]
CPC Communist Party of  China
CPEC China–Pakistan Economic Corridor
CPHGC China Power Hub Generation Company
CREEC China Railway Eryuan Engineering Company
CSAIL China Three Gorges South Asia Investment Ltd
156 | Glossary DOI: 10.19088/1968-2019.144
Vol. 50 No. 4 December 2019 ‘The Belt and Road Initiative and the SDGs: Towards Equitable, Sustainable Development’
CSR corporate social responsibility
CT computerised tomography
DACU Development Assistance Coordination Unit [Myanmar]
DBAR Digital Belt and Road programme [China]
DCM Deputy Chief  of  Mission, Chinese Embassy
DRC Democratic Republic of  Congo
DRC Development Research Center
DTMB digital terrestrial multimedia broadcast
E&S environmental and social
EAC East African Community
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Development [UK]
EEC Eastern Economic Corridor
EECO Eastern Economic Corridor Office of  Thailand
EHP early harvest project
EPC Engineering Procurement Construction
ESA environmental and social assessment
ESAL Port Planning and Development Committee [Greece]
EVI Economic Vulnerability Index
eWTP Electronic World Trade Platform
FCSSC Finance Center for South–South Cooperation [Hong Kong]
FDI foreign direct investment
FKE Federation of  Kenyan Employers
FOCAC Forum on China–Africa Cooperation [China]
FY fiscal year
GCG Green Credit Guidance
GDP gross domestic product
GNI gross national income
HAI Human Assets Index
HCI Human Capital Index
HDI Human Development Index
HRADF Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund [Greece]
ICAPP International Conference of  Asian Political Parties [Korea]
ICT information and communications technology
IDB Inter-American Development Bank [USA]
IDS Institute of  Development Studies [UK]
IFC International Finance Corporation, World Bank [USA]
IFCPS Performance Standards on Environmental and Social 
Sustainability of  the International Financial Corporation, World Bank 
Group [USA]
IIED International Institute for Environment and Development [UK]
IIER Institute of  International Economic Relations [Greece]
IMF International Monetary Fund [USA]
IOBE Foundation for Economic and Industrial Research [Greece]
ITLOS International Tribunal for the Law of  the Sea
JCC Joint Cooperation Committee
JWC Joint Working Group
KCETA Kenya China Economic and Trade Association [Kenya]
KKH Karakoram Highway [Pakistan–China]
KNBS Kenyan National Bureau of  Statistics
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KPK Khyber Pakhtunkhwa [Pakistan]
LDC least developed country
LIC low-income country
LLDC land-locked developing country
M&A mergers and acquisitions
MDB multilateral development bank
MEE Ministry of  Ecology and Environment [China]
MEP Ministry of  Environmental Protection [China]
MFA Ministry of  Foreign Affairs [China]
MOFCOM Ministry of  Commerce [China]
MOGE Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise
MOI Means of  Implementation
MOPF Ministry of  Planning and Finance [Myanmar]
MoU Memorandum of  Understanding
MPDR Ministry of  Planning, Development and Reform [Pakistan]
MSDP Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan
MSDP-IU MSDP Implementation Unit
MTP Medium-Term Plan
MW megawatt
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission [China]
NECC National Economic Coordination Committee [Myanmar]
NEPRA National Electric Power Regulatory Authority [Pakistan]
NGO non-governmental organisation
NLD National League for Democracy [Myanmar]
NOC No Objection Certificate
O2O online to offline
OBOR One Belt, One Road [China]
ODA official development assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[France]
OFDI outward foreign direct investment
PBOC People’s Bank of  China
PERS Port Environmental Review System
PPA Piraeus Port Authority [Greece]
PPP public–private partnership
RMB renminbi
SAIIA South African Institute of  International Affairs
SAR Special Administrative Region
SBN Sustainable Banking Network [USA]
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SEZ Special Economic Zone
SGR Standard Gauge Railway
SHARP Strategic Hires and Retention Pathways
SIDS small island developing states
SIM subscriber identification module
SME small- and medium-sized enterprise
SOE state-owned enterprise
TEU Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit
UAE United Arab Emirates
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UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP United Nations Development Programme [USA]
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
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UNEP United Nations Environment Programme [Kenya]
UNEP FI United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative
UNGC United Nations Global Compact
UNPRI United Nations Principles for Responsible Investment
UNSW University of  New South Wales [Australia]
WITS World Integrated Trade Solution
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature [Switzerland]
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